Multi-dimensional personhood and the welfare state by Spencer, Nicholas
Multi-dimensional personhood 














This thesis is the result of my own work and includes 
nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration 
except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. It 
is not substantially the same as any that I have submitted, or, 
is being concurrently submitted for a degree or diploma or 
other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any 
other University or similar institution except as declared in 
the Preface and specified in the text. I further state that no 
substantial part of my thesis has already been submitted, or, 
is being concurrently submitted for any such degree, 
diploma or other qualification at the University of 
Cambridge or any other University or similar institution 
except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. It 






Multi-dimensional personhood and the welfare state 
Nicholas Spencer 
Abstract 
The welfare state in Britain has been a subject of much ecclesiastical and pastoral concern 
since (before) its inception, but this interest has not been matched by any comparable and 
sustained theological engagement. This thesis seeks to redress this by drawing on the 
thought of William Temple, Jacques Maritain, John Paul II, and Rowan Williams to articulate 
a theologically-nuanced understanding of the proper function of the state vis-à-vis the 
provision of welfare. Drawing on the work of Gøsta Esping-Anderson, Raymond Plant and 
Alan Deacon in the introductory chapter, the thesis explains the justification for a 
normative approach to the welfare state that grounds itself in anthropological 
considerations. It then proceeds to analyse the theological anthropology of each of the four 
thinkers in question and to explore how these have informed and shaped each’s theology of 
the state vis-à-vis the provision of ‘welfare’. It argues that – contrary to the few 
theologically-informed analyses discussed in the introductory chapter that have engaged 
with this anthropological approach to welfare but have done so on an inadequate, 
unidimensional understanding of the person – a serious theological engagement with 
welfare will recognise and seek to honour a multi-dimensional understanding of human 
personhood. Thus, a theological understanding of human persons will recognise their 
created, material, agential, sinful, relational, transcendent, and creative nature, as well, in 
particular, as their ultimate orientation to, and fulfilment by, gift. These aspects of human 
personhood must be taken into consideration when determining welfare state policy, and 
the final chapter sets out why and how this can be done. Returning to the work of Deacon, 
Plant and Esping-Anderson, it argues that a multi-dimensionality needs to be incorporated 
into welfare state thinking as means of determining the range and nature of the 
“contestable social concepts” that lie behind thinking on welfare, and as a way of engaging 
with but problematizing the idea of welfare regimes, popularised by Esping-Anderson. It 
concludes by outlining a constructive response to the welfare state, by drawing on the 
various dimensions of human personhood to inform four ‘dimensions’ of the welfare state, 
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1: Introduction: The Welfare State, theology and 
anthropology: background, methodology and 
subjects 
The Church and the Welfare State 
This thesis speaks into the debate about the future of the British welfare state, by outlining 
the need and potential for, and significance and implications of, a theologically-informed 
anthropology. It draws on the thought of William Temple, Jacques Maritain, John Paul II, 
and Rowan Williams, analysing and exploring the connections between their theological 
anthropology and conceptualisation of the proper function of the (welfare) state. It uses 
this work to delineate a multi-dimensional concept of the person, and explore the 
consequences this has for the foundation, funding, structure, and ethos of welfare 
provision. In doing this, the thesis offers an original contribution to a still rather thin 
tradition of critical theological engagement with the welfare state. 
“Seen within the history of Western civilization, the present-day welfare state can be 
understood as the long-term heir to the early Christian church.”1 Charles Taylor’s remark, 
made towards the end of A Secular Age, underlines the deep connection between church and 
welfare state, a connection that is particularly clear in recent British history. “Christianity 
and Social Order… provided the Christian undergirding of the Beveridge Report”, wrote 
Archbishop of York, John Sentamu, in the preface to his volume of essays On Rock or Sand: 
Firm Foundations for Britain’s Future.2 William Temple was “a perfect exemplar of the descent 
of New Jerusalemism from the religious expression of the romantic movement”, wrote 
Corelli Barnett, rather less appreciatively, in The Audit of War.3 
In reality, the link between church and welfare state in Britain both pre- and post-dates 
Temple’s much-mythologised role as godfather to the Beveridge report. Although almost 
entirely ignored by Chris Renwick in his history of the origins of the welfare state,4 the 
churches played an important role in generating the conditions for the state’s assumption 
of welfare services in the twentieth century, and sometimes in generating key ideas also.5 It 
was a clergyman, the Revd William Blackley, who first advocated the idea of National 
Insurance in an article published in 1878, a plan that was then subject of a House of 
Commons Select Committee inquiry from 1885 to 1887.6 When Archbishop Frederick 




by Charles Booth that the state should pay a pension of five shillings a week to everyone 
over the age of sixty-five.7 The connections between the nascent Labour Party and the 
nonconformist churches are well-charted,8 as is the link between nonconformity and the 
New Liberalism at the turn of the century.9  “The permeation of the leadership of the 
Church of England by the ideals and attitudes previously largely confined to the enthusiasts 
of the Christian Social Union” during the first two decades of the 20th century was, 
according to Edward Norman, “truly remarkable.”10  
As before Temple, so after. “In no nobler or more effective way will the historic connection 
between Church and State be continued than by the readiness of Churchmen and 
Churchwomen to give paid or voluntary service to social work under the control of the 
State,” wrote Cyril Garbett, Archbishop of York, in his 1950 book, Church and State in 
England.11  Thirty years later, Faith in the City emphasised “the repeated New Testament call 
to “share one another’s burdens”’, which it argued, ‘authorize[d]’ the Church ‘to challenge 
the [Thatcherite] slogan of “efficiency”’, when it came to the reform of public services.12 
Thirty years later again, on 19 February 2014, 43 Christian leaders wrote to the Daily Mirror 
newspaper criticising the coalition government’s welfare reforms, their intervention 
framed as pastorally-driven, despite the fact that normative political considerations lurked 
not far under the surface.13  
Not all of this interest in the welfare state, it should be noted, has been uncritically 
appreciative. Temple, as we shall note in chapter 1 below, sounded warning notes about the 
state’s assumption of responsibilities that were traditionally the Church’s. Garbett 
remarked in a speech to the House of Lords in 1956 that to make the welfare state 
spiritually and economically viable “every citizen must develop a sense of responsibility 
superior…to that required under any other society that has ever existed.”14 Margaret 
Thatcher deployed the parable of the Good Samaritan as argument against state welfare 
provision,15 and more recently the Catholic political economist Philip Booth has edited two 
editions of a collection entitled Catholic Social Teaching and the Market Economy, which has 
articulated a theologically-grounded and economically-literate argument against extensive 
state welfare provision.16 
The reasons for the ecclesiastical interest in the welfare state are abundant. Prior to the 
Forster Act of 1870 and National Insurance Act of 1911, the responsibility for educating, 




the churches, discharged through a vast range of charitable associations that had a greater 
or lesser Christian inspiration.17 Christian involvement in such areas remains immense 
today, the recent expansion of food banks being only the most prominent example of this.18  
The simple fact that much (though not all) welfare spending is targeted at those who are at 
a needy and vulnerable moment of their life – children, elderly, ill, unemployed, homeless – 
and who may not have an immediate network of support around them has a deep biblical 
resonance. Many of the ‘subjects’ of the welfare state are, in effect, the modern equivalent 
of the Old Testament’s oft-mention quartet of the economically-dependent: widows, 
orphans, aliens, and poor. Churches across the country have regular and frequent pastoral 
dealings with those who receive and sometimes depend on welfare. As a result, any state 
retrenchment in these areas is often felt viscerally, which itself informs the nature of the 
Christian response to political reform and the proper function of the state. 
Beyond these reasons, there is a broader reason for the Church’s interest. Recent years 
have heard various calls to “roll back the state” to its core or essential functions (whatever 
they are) or to “fix government”.19 Historically, the question of the limits, legitimacy and 
function of the state has been one to which Christian thought has paid considerable 
attention.20 For all that the proper function of the state remains a wider issue than that of 
welfare alone, and for all that issues of the welfare can be profoundly technocratic, a 
considered Christian engagement with the welfare state is part of the longstanding 
Christian contribution to the wider question of the role of the state, and what that means 
for the Church. 
Alongside the mainstream thesis that secularisation is as a result of modernisation, and the 
newer “economistic” thesis that sees secularisation as the result of a lack of ‘free market’ in 
religious ideas and beliefs, a number of scholars have posited what they call a 
“governmental” or “state” thesis, in which the bigger the state, and especially the more 
extensive its provision of welfare, the smaller space there is for religion. Anthony Gill and 
Erik Lundsgaarde have tested this thesis empirically, finding that  
“there is a strong statistical relationship between state social welfare spending and 
religious participation and religiosity. Countries with higher levels of per capita 
welfare have a proclivity for less religious participation and tend to have higher 




welfare spending per capita even have less of a tendency to take comfort in religion, 
perhaps knowing that the state is there to help them in times of crisis.”21 
To quote this finding is not to endorse it, but rather to underline how there are significant 
sociological reasons, in addition to the historical and pastoral ones, for the ecclesiastical 
interest in the welfare state. 
The need for theological  reflection on the welfare state 
Given these historical, pastoral and sociological connections between the church and the 
welfare state, there has been relatively little serious theological engagement with the 
question of the proper function of the state vis-à-vis the provision of welfare.  
The subject has not been ignored by the churches. Indeed, the Church of England’s 
engagement has been consistent since Faith in the City.22 This was quickly followed by Not 
Just for the Poor: Christian Perspectives on the Welfare State,23 since which the Board of Social 
Responsibility and then the Mission and Public Affairs Division have periodically returned 
to the issue.24 
Roman Catholic interventions have been less frequent and less focused on the specific 
question of welfare. The 1996 publication The Common Good and the Catholic Church’s Social 
Teaching made only two references to the welfare state, although its concern with “welfare” 
was much wider than that figure suggests.25 Subsequent interventions – Vote for the Common 
Good (2001), Choosing the Common Good (2010) and the Conference’s General Election Letter of 
2015 – were less substantial, all avoiding direct engagement with the welfare state. Both 
Churches used the Big Society agenda, which flourished between 2009 and 2012 to reflect in 
an ad hoc way on the question of welfare, the Church of England publishing various papers 
for synod26 and the Catholic Bishops Conference of England and Wales exploring the 
consonance between the Big Society and Catholic Social Teaching.27 
Beyond these two major denominations, there has been a host of other published 
interventions, such as from the Joint Public Issues Team28, the Church Urban Fund,29 the St 
Paul’s Institute,30 William Temple Foundation,31 the von Hügel Institute,32 the Centre for 
Enterprise, Markets and Ethics,33 and Theos.34 In addition to these we might add the range 
of high profile media interventions made by different church leaders, such as the 




Telegraph on the same theme, at the same time, making the same point.36 In short, the 
subject has certainly not been ignored by British churches. 
That recognised, the problem with these interventions is that they have mostly been 
reactive, motivated by pressing pastoral or immediate ‘political’ concerns rather than any 
more considered theological reasoning, the result being that they have tended to comprise 
one part theology to four parts sociology, economics or political science.  
Thus, Faith and the City was a specific response to the urban disaffection of the early 1980s, 
but, for all its impact and thoroughness, had 23 pages of theology out of nearly 400.37 Not 
Just for the Poor achieved a slightly better balance (18 pages out of 140), its chapter on 
‘Welfare in the Light of Christian belief’ highlighting five theological categories as a 
framework for analysis.38 Political interventions from the Catholic Bishops Conference have 
reliably drawn on a well-developed conceptual framework exemplified by the ‘Common 
Good’ of each title, but, as noted, have never developed this in relation to thinking about 
the welfare state. The Challenge of Social Welfare, from the Centre for Enterprise, Markets and 
Ethics contained a chapter by Brian Griffiths, exploring “A welfare society”, and brief 
reflections on the topic from the other three contributors. Theos’ The Future of Welfare 
boasted only a handful of essays that were theological.39 
The von Hügel Institute’s 2008 report Moral, But No Compass was subtitled “Government, 
Church and the Future of Welfare” but focused primarily on the current and potential 
involvement of the Church of England with “welfare reform, voluntary activity and public 
service delivery,”40 and explained in its methodology that it had not “been possible to 
develop a full theological exposition of all of the questions at stake”, and that “deeper 
theological explorations [would] be featured in subsequent phases of our work”, which 
were, it seems, never completed.41 The Institute’s later, independent study into Catholic 
Social Teaching and the Big Society was not focused specifically on the Welfare State but 
did examine whether and which principles of CST were embodied in the Big Society idea, 
and how that informed conceptualisations of the welfare state. Its theological reflection 
was limited (11 pages out of 65) but helpful in as far as it highlighted the foundational 
anthropological issues that lay deep beneath the political debate, and that are central to 
this thesis. 
One of the reasons for the brevity and paucity of this institutional theological engagement 




richer. Duncan Forrester published Christianity and the Future of Welfare in 1985, though at 
107 pages this was brief and rather more historical and political than it was theological.42 
His more substantial academic work, such as Christian Justice and Public Policy does not 
engage directly with the question of the welfare state.43 
More recently, Anglican theologian Mark Chapman engaged in questions of welfare in his 
Blair’s Britain: A Christian Critique and Doing God: Religion and Public Policy in Brown’s Britain, 
though again at limited length.44 In the run up to the 2015 General Election, On Rock and 
Sand,45 a volume of essays exploring “firm foundations for Britain’s future” edited by John 
Sentamu included major academic contributors, both economic (Andrew Sentence) and 
theological (Oliver O’Donovan), but wrapped up its analysis of the welfare state in a wider 
context of analysis.  
The previous year, Malcolm Brown edited a volume on Anglican Social Theology (AST)46 
which drew on “the Temple Tradition” (Alan Suggate’s chapter), as well as looking at the 
move ‘post-Temple’ (John Hughes’ chapter), and compared and integrated evangelical and 
Catholic perspectives (Jonathan Chaplin and Anna Rowlands respectively). Issues of welfare 
were relevant here, but only as part of the wider picture of Anglican Social Theology. 
Oliver O’Donovan did not engage directly with the question of welfare in The Ways of 
Judgement except in so far as identifying welfare provision – alongside the other functions 
of government, such as “lawmaking, war-making … [and] education” – as within the 
purview of his conceptualisation of government as judgement.47 However, his 
understanding of the “authority” of secular government as residing in the act of 
“judgement”, of its task as “repelling whatever obstructs our acting freely together”, and of 
political authority as having no “special mandate” to pursue the common good conceived 
as a kind of “giant millennium dome”, elevated above the more local and immediate 
common goods of “societas humana”, are both relevant to the theme of this thesis, 
consonant with its conclusions.48 
Jonathan Chaplin and Anna Rowlands also both contributed to the volume Together for the 
Common Good: Towards a National Conversation (as did Malcolm Brown).49 This touched on the 
welfare state but in the broader context of the ‘common good’ in contemporary Britain. 
John Atherton, Christopher Baker and John Reader looked at the issue of welfare in the 
fourth chapter or their Christianity and the New Social Order, locating it in wider debates 




Manifesto focused primarily on social engagement rather than the function of the welfare 
state, although the book’s repeated emphasis on working alongside and with rather than to 
or for those in need resonates with one of the conclusions of this thesis.51 Luke Bretherton, 
John Milbank and Adrian Pabst have each (the last two in partnership) contributed 
substantial volumes of political theology in recent years, which have touched on questions 
of welfare, and which are referenced in the concluding chapter of this thesis.52 Perhaps the 
most substantial ‘religious’ engagement with the specific issue of welfare in recent years is 
Ashgate’s two volume publication on Welfare and Religion in 21st Century Europe edited by 
Grace Davie (among others).53 These are primarily sociological in focus, however, with the 
theological reflection on the topic limited to Thomas Ekstrand’s chapter in volume two.  
More sustained in its theological attention, and very different from most of the other 
volumes mentioned above, is the already-cited collection Catholic Social Teaching and the 
Market Economy, first published in 2007, and extended in 2014. Part one of this, looking at 
Economic Welfare and the Role of the State, contains chapters by Robert Sirico on 
‘Rethinking welfare, reviving charity: A Catholic alternative’, and Philip Booth on ‘Taxation 
and the size of the state’, as well as others, such as chapter 14 on ‘The social teaching of 
Benedict XVI’ and chapter 15 on ‘Subsidiarity and solidarity’, all of which aligned to give a 
powerful, CST-grounded and economically-literate argument for a small state.54  
This brief review of ecclesiastical, institutional and theological engagement with the 
question of the proper function of the state vis-à-vis the provision of welfare should 
underline the fact that the topic has been one of real interest to British churches and 
theologians over recent years but that that attention has tended to be occasional, 
piecemeal, theologically-attenuated, or informed by sociological or economic ideas prior to 
theological ones. This thesis is an attempt to begin to rectify that; an attempt, in effect, to 
reflect theologically on the welfare state in a way that reverses the proportions of previous 
engagements and deals primarily with theological ideas, on which it then grounds a 
subsequent approach to welfare policy. 
Having explained the justification of this approach, I will outline the methodology of 
theological anthropology I propose to use. However, before I do so it is important to 




From the Welfare State to welfare states 
As Chris Pierson and Matthieu Leimgruber have observed, the “late‐breaking and 
multivalent” term ‘welfare state’ “occupies a crowded conceptual terrain”, debate over 
which “is further complicated by uncertainty over exactly what it is that the ‘welfare state’ 
(and its cognate terms) connotes.”55 
At a generic level, it is relatively straightforward and uncontroversial; the welfare state 
being understood as a system whereby the state “provides services, grants, allowances, 
pensions, etc., to protect the health and well-being of citizens, esp. those in need.”56 Such a 
definition, however – and in particular terms like “provides”, “well-being” and “those in 
need” – invites further questions, pertaining to its scope, structure and objectives. 
In the light of this, it is important to recognise at the outset that there is no single, clearly 
delineated or objective entity that is ‘The Welfare State’, however much an insular 
tradition might incline us to speak of one.57 Not only do individual welfare states change 
significantly over time, but there are different types of welfare state in existence at any one 
time. 
In 1990, the Danish sociologist Gøsta Esping-Andersen published an influential study 
entitled The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, which argued against the convention that 
“the level of social expenditure adequately reflects a state’s commitment to welfare”.58 
Esping-Andersen’s thesis was that the kind of welfare system counted for as much as its size. 
Other principles are involved – such as whether the system favours universal or targeted 
programs (and if targeted, on what criteria); whether it favours taxation or insurance as 
the preferred funding model (and if insurance, what combination of private, work and or 
state insurance); what range, duration and generosity of welfare entitlements it affords; 
and what mix of state, market, voluntary sector, and family it favours in provision – all of 
which shape the kind of welfare system, or “regime”, it is. 
Esping-Andersen went on to propose and test the idea that welfare states cluster into 
groups or typologies.59 He used two dimensions of analysis to determine these regimes, 
“decommodification” – the extent to which welfare is a matter of right which thereby 
enables recipients’ independence from the market – and “stratification” – the extent to 
which the welfare system cements social solidarities such as by “consolidating class 
divisions among wage-earners”.60 On the basis of these dimensions, he identified three 




The first is the ‘liberal’ regime, also sometimes called the ‘Social Assistance’ or ‘Anglo-
Saxon’ regime. This emerged from, and bears the hallmarks of, pre-existing traditions of 
poor relief. Within this system, social rights exist but are predicated on a demonstrable 
need. Benefits are limited to “a clientele of low-income, usually working class, state 
dependents”.61 The system is parsimonious and favours means-testing: benefits are modest, 
entitlement rules are strict, and receipts of benefit often associated with stigma. The 
overall redistributive impact is negligible. It is individualistic in spirit and largely uncritical 
of the market.62  
The second is the ‘conservative’ or ‘state-corporatist’ regime. This emerges from state-
directed programmes, and is often instituted by conservative parties, as a result of which it 
is commonly ordered towards fostering loyalty to the state, which itself enforces and 
organises a system of social insurance. Unlike the liberal regime, the ‘conservative’ one 
institutes social rights that are based on contribution: citizens receive benefits according to 
the extent to which they have earned them, rather than on the basis of need, and therefore 
there is a strong sense of entitlement, and a much weaker sense of stigma. This regime is 
also comparatively strong in its commitment to the traditional model of the family as a 
vehicle of welfare, the state discouraging the participation of married women in the 
workplace, and asserting its duty to intervene only when the family’s capacity to do so is 
exhausted.  
The third is the ‘Social Democratic’ regime. If the underlying principle of the liberal regime 
is need, and of the conservative regime is contribution, that of the social democratic 
regime is citizenship. The regime is predicated on the conviction that the state has a duty 
to provide basic equal benefit to all of its citizens, irrespective of their prior earnings, 
contributions, or particular needs. Welfare is universal but also often generous and free 
from stigma. The regime “constructs an essentially universal solidarity in favour of the 
welfare state. All benefit, all are dependent, and all will presumably feel obliged to pay.”63 
In contrast to the conservative regime, this one is more willing to intervene in traditional 
family roles. The system is highly redistributive, and expensive, financed by means of 
universal and often high rate of central taxation.  
By using these criteria to identify these classifications, Esping-Andersen was able to 
identify which countries ‘fit’ in which regimes. Neither his conclusions, nor the logic of his 




is now widely accepted, and for all the on-going debate about how many and on what 
criteria, there is broad consensus that welfare states differ in more ways than size, and 
cluster into regimes that reflect different conceptions of eligibility, citizenship, solidarity, 
equality, and need.  
The emerging field of religion and welfare state studies has contributed to this shift by 
contending that Christian thought and practice has influenced the development of welfare 
regimes. Different theologically-informed attitudes to work, responsibility, poverty, family, 
and gender roles have, it is argued, shaped the evolution of different welfare regimes in 
historically Lutheran, Catholic, Calvinist, and denominationally-mixed cultures.64 The 
precise extent to which this has been the case is still debated,65 but the arguments deployed 
not only support Esping-Andersen’s work but also underline the legitimacy and relevance 
of theological engagement with welfare states. In doing so, they help us to take the step 
from a sociologically and historically descriptive account of Christianity and welfare states 
to normative engagement based on theological anthropology. The following section 
outlines how this is to be achieved.  
Justifying a normative approach to welfare states: Raymond Plant 
and Alan Deacon 
Esping-Anderson complexified the standard conceptualisation of ‘the welfare state’ by 
introducing different ‘dimensions’ – of need, want, right, stigma, state loyalty, solidarity, 
etc. – to the fundamental understanding of welfare scale or generosity. Similarly, the 
manner in which Christian thought has informed the understanding of key concepts that 
shaped welfare provision in different Western societies implies a strong, if buried, 
normative element at work in that formation. Developing a welfare system that is marked 
by stigma, or strongly oriented to work, or encourages loyalty to the state, or is based 
primarily on contribution, or is predicated on traditional gender divides, carries with it 
certain conceptions of the personal and public good. In this regard, a way is made open for 
a normative approach to the proper function of the welfare state that is grounded on 
theologically-informed conceptions of anthropology. 
Recognising this helps us to answer the common objection to a religious (or indeed any 
‘comprehensive moral’) intervention in matters like welfare policy. If it could be 
established that the goods distributed by a welfare state are actually straightforwardly a 




recourse to conceptions of the good, it follows that any theological contribution to the 
debate is rendered unnecessary. This is the ‘common objection’, raised by liberal political 
theorists, part of a wide-ranging debate whose lines extend way beyond welfare provision. 
For reasons of space, I will rehearse briefly the main argument, and then articulate the 
‘anthropological’ response, by drawing on the work of the political theorist Raymond Plant 
and welfare sociologist, Alan Deacon. 
The argument that particular, contestable and comprehensive conceptions of the good 
should be immaterial to (social) policy is well known. John Rawls’ hypothetical contract 
made by rational individuals behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ was, in Plant’s words, an attempt 
“to neutralise particular interests, to neutralise attempts to make one conception of the 
good dominate over others.”66 A demonstrable notion of right precedes (and precludes) any 
particular good in the determination of basic social principles, the result of which is that 
appealing to any conceptions of the good as a way of determining public debate about the 
distribution of goods inherent in social policy is unnecessary (and arguably harmful 
because divisive).67  
This argument has come in for sustained criticism since it was first developed, and has been 
subsequently refined. For our purposes, the most relevant and penetrating criticism came 
from the thinkers who were subsequently, and loosely, labelled ‘communitarian’,68 who 
pointed out that the idea that “the self is prior to the ends which are affirmed by it”69 which 
is central to Rawls’ theory of justice is not only contestable but a substantive 
anthropological position itself.  
It is this point that lies at the foundation of the methodological approach within this thesis. 
There are many charges that one might level at the anthropological presuppositions that 
underlie this ‘fairness’ argument: it pays insufficient attention to constitutive attachments 
of the self; its asocial individualism is a poor reflection of any lived reality; it inadvertently 
undermines human dignity; it ignores “the extent to which people are constituted as the 
people that they are precisely by those conceptions [of the good] themselves”70  
These are all serious charges but in one sense extraneous to the basic fact that the 
argument presupposes a particular anthropology at all. The ‘person’ of Rawls’ justice-as-
fairness argument is one in which “a human being’s capacity autonomously to choose its 




the essence of her identity.”71 The vision of the human here is of the unencumbered 
choosing self. 
Rawls reworked his theory in the light of these (and other) criticisms, and Political Liberalism 
presents a chastened theory of political justice that is presented “independently of any 
wider comprehensive religious or philosophical doctrine.”72 The extent to which this is 
possible is highly debateable,73 and in any case even with such a reworking in place, the 
underlying criticism that Rawls’ concept of justice was still contingent on certain 
foundational anthropological assumptions is unaffected. The fact that social policy sits 
firmly within this narrower, political, field underlines the basic challenge: to think about 
the goods inherent in social policy demands the admission of certain conceptions of human 
good and human nature, and is therefore not necessarily closed to comprehensive moral 
doctrines such as that grounded in Christian theology.  
What this might involve is illustrated by the work of political theorist, Raymond Plant, and 
in particular two publications, Political philosophy and social welfare: Essays on the normative 
basis of welfare provision74 (co-authored with Peter Taylor-Gooby and Anthony Lesser) and 
Politics, theology, and history.75 Writing the first in 1980, Plant observed that while political 
philosophy had long interrogated ideas like citizenship, rights, duties, etc. it had 
overlooked those concepts that were central to welfare.76 
At the time (before the work of Esping-Andersen), this could be assumed to mean 
predominantly ‘need’, but Plant extended the list to include “right, stigma, want and 
community”.77 These, he argued, were “essentially contested concepts” not in the sense 
that they had no agreed meaning whatsoever but because, as he observes with regard to 
the concept of community, any “agreed descriptive meaning is so formal that it will be of 
no use in social and political analysis, and that once a move is made beyond this formal 
agreement then we are back with contestability and ideology once again.”78 
He made the same point in 2001 in Politics, theology, and history, dedicating part two of the 
book to showing that “there can be no authoritative rendering of crucial political and social 
concepts such as justice, freedom and community.”79 Ideas like need, harm or community 
are necessarily “elaborated against the background of particular moral traditions, 
narratives and communities.”80 “Social goods have social meanings”, and there is “no 
neutral account of human nature or the goods that human beings desire which could be 




desires most fully.”81 Ultimately, such concepts invariably draw on “a range of 
metaphysical or religious assumptions” the consequence of this “ineradicably normative 
and ideological” nature being deleterious on those social scientists who “wish to be allied 
with the natural sciences as the positivist programme would require them to be.”82 
Plant touches on what this means with regard to a number of concepts like “social 
justice”83, merit,84 wants,85 liberty,86 and harm.87 However, he dwells at greatest length on 
how this contestability is made manifest in our understanding of “need” and “community” 
and it is the contestability of the first of these terms I will expound briefly here, as a way of 
illustrating how theological anthropology can engage with questions welfare policy.  
As argued above, Plant reasoned in his earlier book that if “satisfaction of need is the only 
proper criterion for distribution of social service resources”88 and if need can be “fixed in 
some straightforward, neutral objective way…bypassing contestable appeals to social and 
political values”, the contribution of ethical or religious ideas is surplus to requirement.89 
Drawing on the work of G.E.M. Anscombe,90 he argues that “A claim by B that X is needed is 
fully intelligible only when the purpose for which it is needed is exhibited.”91 ‘Need’, in 
effect, is shorthand for ‘need in order to’. It is only when such ends or purposes “are both 
articulated and found to be justified” that the appeal to need attains any moral force.92 Talk 
of needs is ineradicably teleological, the classification of needs “depend[ant] crucially upon 
ends, goals and purposes.” Need may indeed be “rooted in human nature”, as Plant’s co-
author Harry Lesser observes, but “the precise form it takes will always be determined in 
part by social conditions.”93 And, we might add, not just social conditions for if, as Plant 
argues, “needs are means to ends: a subject always needs something for some purpose”94 to 
define what a need is necessarily involves integrating ideas of its subject and the 
“purposes” it wishes to pursue. In other words, to say X is needed by Y for purposes of Z, is 
to assume something about the nature and telos of Y. 
It is important to underline here, by way of parenthesis, a point raised earlier, namely that 
recognising the essential contestability of a term like ‘need’ is not to resign all attempts at 
establishing an agreed meaning or to abandon everything to a relativistic discourse in 
which different, subjectively-defined conceptions of ‘need’ talk past one another. Plant and 
his co-authors proceed to outline a concept of need that they judge to be as widely 




widespread agreement on such essentially contestable terms, but that any agreement has 
to be open and honest about the grounds of those terms. 
It is also worth noting in passing, that this theoretical issue has been repeatedly born out in 
the history of social policy itself. Thus, for example, when Seebohm Rowntree conducted 
his first study into poverty in York at end of the nineteenth century, he found it necessary 
to distinguish between “primary” poverty and “secondary” poverty.96 In a similar vein, 
William Beveridge defined “want” in his war-time report as “benefit adequate to all normal 
needs, in duration and amount” but straightaway acknowledged that “determination of 
what is required for reasonable human existence is to some extent a matter of 
judgement.”97 As Chris Renwick observed, at every stage on the road towards the welfare 
state, “far-reaching ideas about concepts such as human nature were embedded into both 
political discourse and the seemingly unremarkable administrative structures encountered 
in everyday life.”98 
The example of need illustrates not simply the essential contestability of a term that is 
central to welfare debate but also indicates how such a term grounds its moral content 
ultimately in anthropological presuppositions. Plant himself, towards the conclusion of 
Politics, History and Theology uses his argument to direct theological engagement in social 
policy. Fundamental concepts, like justice, freedom, rights and community, he argues, have 
“a normative basis” and it is precisely to these “complex moral issues to which these 
religious beliefs might direct their attention.”99  
Plant’s exploration of the essential contestability of foundational concepts of social welfare, 
and the need and potential to draw on anthropological and theological commitments to 
give them coherence and content, offers a robust theoretical foundation of this thesis. The 
following chapters will outline the theological anthropology of four major twentieth 
theologians, focusing on the implications for their theology of the welfare state. In doing 
so, it will not only explore how these thinkers have drawn on their foundational 
theological beliefs “about the basis of human nature” to delineate the “kind of institutional 
structures” inherent in the welfare state (to use Plant’s terms) but it will also generate the 
raw material for a fresh approach to contemporary welfare in the final chapter.  
Something of how this has happened – of how such (theologically-informed) 
anthropological assumptions have in practice informed thinking and policy proposals 




of Social Policy at the University of Leeds, supplemented by that of Andrew Connell, a 
research associate at Cardiff University. 
In a number of papers and publications, most notably his 2002 work Perspectives on Welfare, 
Deacon explores how “arguments about welfare are rooted in more fundamental 
disagreements about the nature of human beings and the meaning of a good society.”100 He 
outlines a number of categories in the course of his analysis and shows how each is rooted 
in a particular conception of human nature. I will mention three here (Titmuss, Field, 
Etzioni/Sacks), and add a fourth (Thatcher), drawing out the theological associations in the 
process. 
First, there is the idea that state welfare has its basis in fundamentally altruistic human 
nature, an approach Deacon associates with Richard Titmuss and the “quasi-Titmuss” 
school. Titmuss, although no Christian himself, was influenced by Richard Tawney, and in 
particular Tawney’s conviction that everyone was entitled to equality of respect by virtue 
of their common relationship to their Creator, from which, according to Deacon, followed 
the belief that all were entitled to resources and opportunities they need to fulfil their 
potential.101 On this basis, Titmuss favoured welfare that was, in effect, close to Esping-
Andersen’s social democratic regime, universal, non-judgemental and oriented to reducing 
inequality with an end to improving fellowship between citizens. New structures of welfare 
would release long pent-up human capacities and desires to serve a good wider than that of 
the self, allowing natural sentiments of altruism, reciprocity and social duty to flourish.102  
If this loose school of welfare thought was predicated ultimately on an altruistic 
understanding of humans, a second somewhat different view is exemplified for Deacon in 
the work of Labour MP, Frank Field. Field’s long involvement in welfare politics has at 
times been explicitly theological, and he has described his welfare reform proposals of the 
mid-1990s as “about placing a Christian understanding of mankind centre stage.”103 His 
anthropology reacted against Titmuss’s “sanitised, post-Christian view of human 
character” which writes the “fallen side of mankind” out of the script.104 Field’s issue wasn’t 
that humans couldn’t or didn’t behave altruistically.105 Rather, it was that to assume this 
was the natural or inevitable form of human motivation was to court disaster. Policy had to 
recognise the reality of sin and policy-makers to “wrestle with the angel and the serpent in 




According to Andrew Connell, who studied Frank Field as part of his analysis of New 
Labour’s early welfare policy, Field’s anthropology was informed by a doctrine of free will 
and the goal of freedom.107 As Field wrote in 1975, “for me, the main goals of public policy 
are the extension of human freedom while at the same time creating a more equal 
society.”108 However, he also placed a singular emphasis on what he saw at the core of 
human nature, self-interest. Welfare structures, Field argued, needed to recognise and 
work with that grain of human nature, rather than pretending that humans were better 
than they really were. “No welfare system can function effectively if it is not based on a 
realistic view of human nature… Mankind was (and is) capable of acts of extraordinary 
altruism, but altruism is generally secondary to self-interest.”109 
Field emphasised the need to combat poverty and to ensure greater material equality but 
this was not for its own sake but “because, and really only because, it led to a more equal 
distribution of freedom.”110 Field, unlike the quasi-Titmuss school, took agency seriously. 
That recognised, it is worth emphasising that Field also had an acute sense of how 
circumstance affected moral agency, argued that policy makers should foster the right 
conditions for the development of that agency, strongly protested against the level (if not 
the fact) of human material inequality, and had only limited faith in the market to deliver 
human goods.  
Field’s theologically-informed anthropology does not map neatly onto any of Esping-
Andersen’s regimes. This not only reminds us of the limits of Esping-Andersen’s regime 
categories but also points to the way that a (theological) anthropological approach to 
welfare can problematize some of the foundational categories of welfare state policy, an 
observation to which we will return in the conclusion. 
There is no such problem of categorisation with the third example, which stands further 
along the spectrum from Titmuss through Field. Margaret Thatcher was one of the few 
British politicians of the time who could rival Field’s explicitly theo-political reasoning,111 
setting out her Christian anthropology in a number of high profile speeches before and 
during her premiership.  
In one of the earlier of these, to an audience at St Lawrence Jewry in 1978, she explained 
that “there are two very general and seemingly conflicting ideas about society which come 
down to us from the New Testament”. One was “that great Christian doctrine that we are 




Christ, [from which] we learn our interdependence.” The other was that “we are all 
responsible moral beings with a choice between good and evil, beings who are infinitely 
precious in the eyes of their Creator.” It was from this delicate theological balance that her 
Christian politics was formed. A decade later she began her so-called ‘Sermon on the 
Mound’ to the Church Assembly at Scotland by outlining three “distinctive marks” of 
Christianity, namely that  
“first…from the beginning man has been endowed by God with the fundamental 
right to choose between good and evil…second, that we were made in God’s own 
image and, therefore, we are expected to use all our own power of thought and 
judgement in exercising that choice…and third, that Our Lord Jesus Christ…when 
faced with His terrible choice and lonely vigil chose to lay down His life that our sins 
may be forgiven.” 
One could be excused for thinking these three principles were, in fact, one, and that 
Thatcher’s latter (and, as it happened, last) great theological excursion revealed how her 
anthropology had shifted from a decade earlier losing balance in favour of a more 
uncomplicatedly individualist, choice-based vision. In reality, and in spite of what she said 
at St Lawrence Jewry, Thatcher firmly believed there was no tension between the two 
principles, claiming in her Iain Macleod Memorial Lecture in 1977 that “there is not and 
cannot possibly be any hard and fast antithesis between self-interest and care for 
others”.112 
Thatcher’s (theological) anthropology had much that is recognisable in Field’s, with its 
emphasis on fundamental human equality, agency and self-interest, alongside its rejection 
of Titmuss’s altruism and the idea that material equality was an end in itself. It differed, 
however, in as far as she saw individualised self-interest as a sufficient foundation for the 
wider public good, with a consequent singular emphasis of freedom of choice, and a broad 
indifference to how circumstance limited agency. The impact of this on Thatcher’s attitude 
to the market and the state is well known, and although the impact on welfare policy is 
open to different interpretations,113 it is fair to say that in Thatcher’s explicitly 
theologically-grounded conception of human agency, autonomy and sufficient self-interest 
we see how a clear link with Esping-Andersen’s ‘liberal’ welfare regime.  
Fourthly and lastly, Deacon identifies a conception of human nature that is motivated not 




commitment and relational duty. This category he labels, loosely, as communitarian, 
drawing on Amitai Etzioni and Jonathan Sacks, among others, for its details.  Its 
understanding of human nature rejects the idea of individuals as autonomous selves, 
whether motivated by self-interest or altruism, but rather sees them embedded in 
community, their characters, practices and beliefs formed by the experience and 
expectations of family, friends, and other immediate networks and groups. Such 
relationships are not short-termist, self-interested or contractual but rather, drawing on 
Sacks’ The Politics of Hope, ‘covenantal’, relationships predicated “on loyalty, fidelity, 
holding together even when things seem to be driving you apart’”.114 
This ‘communitarian’ category of human nature is alert to the significance of human 
agency and responsibility, and willing to talk about right and wrong. It insists that social 
policy recognises and respects these communal and quasi-covenantal bodies, especially the 
family. It also recognises the need to build popular support for welfare, eschewing ‘heroic 
agendas’ based on human altruism. All this steers it clear from the Titmuss school, not least 
in its willingness to countenance conditionality on the grounds of the importance of 
reciprocity. However, it also recognises the importance of context on the exercise of moral 
agency, and instinctively looks to persuasion rather than compulsion, as a means of 
shaping personal behaviour. Like Field’s vision, this category is harder to place within 
Esping-Andersen’s regimes, not least because it is the least clear and worked through of 
those Deacon highlights, but it is nonetheless closer to his ‘conservative’ or ‘state-
corporatist’ category than to either the liberal or social democratic ones.  
In summary: just as Esping-Andersen’s work opens up the possibility and need to talk about 
types of welfare state, rather than simply spending levels; and the work of those in the 
emerging field of religion and welfare studies shows how Christian theological ideas of 
work, responsibility, poverty, family, etc. have influenced the formation of these regimes in 
the past; so the work of Raymond Plant, at a political theoretical level, and Alan Deacon, at 
a social science one, point out how Christian theological anthropology can inform 
contemporary discussions of the proper function of the welfare state. The way in which we 
conceive of the human and the human good has, can and should shape the objectives, 
structures and policies of welfare states. The final section of this introductory chapter will 
look at those few instances in contemporary Christian thought in which this has actually 
happened before introducing the four major twentieth century theologians within whose 




contemporary Christian theological approach to the welfare state in the final chapter will 
be drawn. 
Theological anthropology and political theology in William 
Temple, Jacques Maritain, John Paul II and Rowan Williams 
As we have noted, the potential for critical and fruitful theological engagement with the 
question of the proper function of the state vis-à-vis the provision of welfare reflects the 
fact that this question invariably draws on normative concepts of, for example, need/ want, 
community, family, and so forth, and that these concepts are themselves rooted in 
underlying conceptions of the human. Political theory rests in some measure on 
philosophical anthropology, and political theology on theological anthropology.  
Just as it is important to be clear about the meaning of the phrase ‘welfare state’, it is worth 
getting a little conceptual clarity around the phrase “theological anthropology”. There are 
many directions in which this term might send us, not least towards major questions about 
the fundamental ‘constitution’ of the human. John W. Cooper in his essay on ‘Scripture and 
Philosophy on the Unity of Body and Soul: An Integrative Method for Theological 
Anthropology’115 outlines some of the responses to this issue, teasing apart the essential 
difference between what he calls historic Christian dualism, various kinds of theistic 
naturalism and dual-aspect monism, and straightforward biblical monism. For all the 
difference there is between these positions, however, he argues that whichever of the 
options one favours it doesn’t alter the basic fact of body-soul holism – different from 
monism – the idea that “there is a virtual consensus among biblical scholars, theologians, 
and philosophers that scripture affirms the unity and integration of human life.”116  
“Monists and dualists agree that body, soul, spirit, heart, mind and will – whatever their 
metaphysical nature and relation – are diverse but interdependent, interactive, and 
integrated aspects or parts of living, active humans”.117 Although this does not mean that 
metaphysical questions pertaining to human constitution are entirely irrelevant for our 
purposes, it does allow us to move the focus away from them and, assuming the basic 
commitment to body-soul holism, explore the wider questions of what Christian scripture 
and theological reflection have to say about human nature, its goods, including its social 
goods, its fallibilities, and its ends. Thus Christian/ theological anthropology (and 
sometimes just ‘anthropology’ for short) is used throughout this thesis to denote the ideas 




scripture and tradition, in such a way as to distinguish it, for example, from the kind of 
social anthropology such as deployed by Michael Banner, for theological purposes, in The 
Ethics of Everyday Life.118 
The dependence of political theology on theological anthropology is a wholly 
unexceptional statement when it comes to areas like economic or environmental policy.119 
Thus, for example, several of contributions to the 2016 collection Theology and Economics 
pick up this theme, most substantially Donald Hay and Gordon Menzies’ essay, which seeks 
a better, and theologically-grounded model for economic behaviour than that offered by 
‘Rational Economic Man’ and ‘Rational Choice Theory’.120   
However, this is still comparatively uncharted territory when it comes to thinking about 
the proper function of the welfare state. There are a few minor exceptions which are 
important to note. The von Hügel report Moral, but No Compass gestured briefly in this 
direction, remarking that “a closer inspection of the ethics, values and principles informing 
many policy choices and positions suggests that they are…rooted in a profound 
understanding of what constitutes human flourishing”, but did not pursue this 
observation.121 Its later report, The UK Government’s ‘Big Society’ Programme and Catholic Social 
Teaching, mentioned “the clash between two different anthropological understandings of 
what constitutes human flourishing”. This was the clash between personalism which 
“defined the human person in an organic way as someone rooted in a particular 
community but opening out on others in dialogue and love” and which characterised 
Catholic Social Thought, and the concept of the human that was “based on exaggerated 
notions of individual autonomy…often exercised without regard for the social 
consequences of individual decisions” and which characterised secular humanism.122 This 
difference in anthropological conceptions did cash out in political terms, the former 
“accepting the totality of a human being, including his natural physiological and gender 
characteristics”, the latter “us[ing] human rights and equality legislation to promote the 
notion of the human being as the practitioner of an almost absolute freedom of choice”. 
However, these examples, coupled with the less than complete conceptual coherence 
surrounding the Big Society idea that the report identified, intimated that the link between 
anthropological conceptions and welfare policy remained an obscure one. 
Maurice Glasman’s chapter on ‘Welfare and the Common Good’ in The Challenge of Social 




understood not as either selfish or altruistic but in terms of “self-interest broadly 
conceived”, a position based “on a broadly Aristotelian reading of persons in which human 
flourishing is understood as bound up with the well-being of family, friends and 
colleagues”.123 John Atherton, Christopher Baker and John Reader drew on the question of 
theological anthropology, and in particular William Temple’s theological anthropology, in 
their short discussion of welfare in Christianity and the New Social Order.124 Indeed, this brief 
treatment is one of the very few Christian engagements in this area to register an 
awareness of Esping-Andersen’s three regimes of welfare capitalism.125  
In a 2016 paper for the House of Bishops on ‘The Enemy Isolation’, Malcolm Brown drew 
clear connections between the “ineluctably relational” Christian understanding of God as 
Trinity, the development of personhood through “interdependence” and “the practices and 
habits of neighbourliness”, and the need for “a good welfare structure to sustain [such] 
communities”.126 In the process Brown touched on a number of the key issues – work, 
family, place, responsibility; on several key practical considerations – sanctions, 
bureaucracy, contributory schemes; and on a number of often neuralgic details.  
One of the most theologically developed engagements in this topic was in a seminar held at 
Archbishops’ House, Westminster in 2011, on ‘Catholic Social Teaching and the philosophy 
behind the “Big Society”’, a discussion paper from which was subsequently published. This 
made a number of pointed references to the Welfare State but did not focus exclusively on 
this so much as the ideas that do (or should) inform it and its context. Thus, it highlighted 
an understanding of personhood that was “optimistic, social and oriented to human 
potential” (para. 26), self-transcending and developmental (para. 28), “always oriented 
towards others” (para. 32), and yet marked by “frailty… and the capacity of individuals and 
societies for alienation and radical evil” (para. 29). It placed this anthropology within a 
further context of the common good, solidarity, true compassion, “the relational 
understanding of the Trinity” (para. 36), “structures of sin” (para. 41), the role of the 
Church and the principle of subsidiarity, and explored how that was to be “translated into 
practical politics” (para 39). This made for a substantial agenda for just 10,000 words, in the 
process offering one of the deeper and more rounded understandings of how a 
theologically-informed conception of human nature, in its wider sense, informed thinking 




These six examples – Moral, But No Compass, The UK Government’s ‘Big Society’ Programme, 
Maurice Glasman’s chapter on ‘Welfare and the Common Good’, Christianity and the New 
Social Order, Malcolm Brown’s ‘The Enemy Isolation’, and ‘Catholic Social Teaching and the 
philosophy behind the “Big Society”’ – show how the bridge between theological 
anthropology and the welfare state has sometimes been noticed and ventured across if only 
rarely, hurriedly and tentatively. This thesis intends to strengthen and secure that bridge 
(to push the metaphor a little further than is warranted) by examining how four twentieth 
century theologians have themselves crossed it, and how has the theological anthropology 
of each informed their political theology, with specific reference to the welfare state.  
The number of potential relevant theologians who have written on theological 
anthropology and political theology, and have linked the two with reference to the role of 
the state in providing welfare, is not great. The four thinkers I elected to study encompass 
temporal, theological and geographical spectra. Two are taken from the formative and 
optimistic years of the welfare state and two from later, more downbeat years of welfare 
retrenchment; two come from the Roman Catholic tradition, two from the Anglican; and 
two from an insular English (or English and Welsh) context, one from a Franco-American 
context, and one from a Polish-global one. Importantly, all four thinkers wrote at length on 
both issues of theological anthropology and political theology and, crucially for my 
purpose, all four recognised the cardinal link between the two. Others might conceivably 
have been chosen, such as John Courtney Murray, Pope Benedict XVI, John Milbank, or 
Luke Bretherton. However, given (a) the widely-recognised theological depth and influence 
of my four figures, (b) the range of spectra that they cover, and (c) the fact that they 
themselves reference or draw on other figures (including three of those named above), I 
felt that William Temple, Jacques Maritain, John Paul II, and Rowan Williams were the best 
possible sources to achieve my goal given the inevitable limitations of space. 
William Temple was successively Bishop of Manchester, Archbishop of York, and 
Archbishop of Canterbury before his premature death in 1944. In a number of short 
publications, many originating in lecture series, he articulated an understanding of the 
state that adds nuance and depth to his best known wartime publication. This re-reading of 
Temple, finding in his work a conceptualisation of the state that is more pluralist and more 
reserved than either his best known publication or the tradition that took his name after 
the war, has been underway for some time.127 Building on that tradition, I emphasise the 




changed with circumstance, that any legitimate conception of the state must ultimately 
rest on a proper conception of the human person.  
Building on this retrieval of the centrality of ‘personalism’ – allowing for the slight 
anachronism of that term – within Temple’s political theology, and highlighting the 
contact points between his and Jacques Maritain’s work, the chapter adopts and develops 
his own schema for describing human personality, as laid out in The Nature of Personality and 
in his Pilgrim editorials, modifying it with Temple’s own understanding of human 
sinfulness, which emerged more sharply in mid-career, and also his understanding of the 
idea of gift within human anthropology, which found particular emphasis in the detailed 
study on Men Without Work, which Temple commissioned, for which he wrote the 
Introduction, and by which he was profoundly influenced in the 1930s.  
With this multi-dimensional theological anthropology in place, both true to Temple’s own 
formulation and to a fresh reading of his emerging ideas, the chapter then teases apart two 
linked but distinct approaches within his political theology, that of the state as provider 
and the state as broker of welfare. Focusing primarily on the latter, highlighting the 
influence of Reinhold Niebuhr, R.M. MacIver and John Neville Figgis, and drawing out the 
parallels with Jacques Maritain, the chapter particularly examines Temple’s 
conceptualisation of the state as broker and protector of the associational activity by means 
of which human personality and freedom are developed through fellowship, service and 
gift. Recognising that Temple’s political theology oscillated between this vision, and that of 
the state as provider welfare, a vision for which he is better known on account of his war-
time writings, the chapter nonetheless argues that this slightly occluded aspect of Temple’s 
thought, and its roots in his theological anthropology, are valuable for any contemporary 
theological reassessment of the welfare state.  
The second figure, Jacques Maritain, a Catholic convert and Thomistic philosopher, lacks 
Temple’s occasional moments of political specificity. However, the idea of the person was 
central to his political and social thought and his writings exhibit a sustained engagement 
with the idea of personhood, in particular the goods of communication and gift, while also 
offering a careful demarcation of state, society and body politic in the responsibility of 
creating the conditions for the development of that personhood.  
I analyse how Maritain’s (sometimes slightly obscure) reading of human materiality and his 




in which humans satisfy their “inner urge to communications of knowledge and love.”128 
Freedom, communication and gift are all affected by human sinfulness, and although I 
discern a certain ambivalence in Maritain’s writings concerning the severity of the wound 
of sin within human nature, Maritain is nonetheless clear that, while it is “absurd” to 
expect the body politic to assume, still less make, “all men…good and fraternal to one 
another”, it is proper for it to seek “social structures, institutions, and laws” that “orient 
the energies of social life toward such a friendship.”129 
Although he only talks about state ‘welfare’ occasionally, I show how Maritain’s vision of 
the state’s function in this regard has clear parallels with Temple’s mid-career writings, 
seeing the state’s responsibility as that of securing the material and the associational 
infrastructure to enable the development of human personality. More precisely, I show 
how his understanding of the (welfare) state is predicated on its responsibility for the 
“temporal common good”, made real through a socialised economy and rich ecology of 
associational activity, underpinned by a legal infrastructure, framed largely in terms of 
rights, the state’s role in which being one primarily of “arbitrage”130 or “regulation”.131 It is 
this vision, I argue, that Maritain sees as properly honouring the theocentric personalistic 
humanism that lies at the heart of his politics. 
The third figure, John Paul II, was pope from 1978 to 2005, having spent his intellectually, 
theologically and ecclesiastically formative years under Soviet influence in Poland. His 
entire theological enterprise, first Thomistic but latterly more explicitly Christological, was 
focused on the nature of the human person, and he saw the “correct view of the human 
person and of his unique value” as the guiding principles of “of all of the Church’s social 
doctrine.”132  
Primarily through his three social encyclicals, Laborem exercens, Sollicitudo rei socialis, 
Centesimus annus, but obliquely through much else of his papal writing and speeches, I 
examine how his understanding of the human person was the foundation of the state and 
the wider social good. John Paul’s more scripturally-grounded conceptualisation of the 
person distinguishes him from Temple and Maritain and thus adds a new and important 
dimension to the anthropological analyses of this thesis. Similarly, his understanding of 
and emphasis on the capacity and responsibility of human rationality distinguishes his 
anthropology from that of the other subjects, placing emphasis on the idea that to be 




and deepens, rather than contradicts, that of other figures in this thesis, such as in his clear 
focus on the communication and gift that is central to personhood.  
John Paul II is the most critical of our four figures about welfare state (or the ‘Social 
Assistance State’ as it was called in Centesimus annus) and although he is not categorical in 
his hostility, his conception of the human orients him to an understanding of the welfare 
state that is subtly different in emphasis if not in content. According to his thought, the 
state’s primary role in securing welfare is firstly through the supervision and regulation of 
the market economy to minimise unemployment and ensure maximal participation in the 
economy through meaningful work that respects the dignity of the worker and ensures 
appropriate remuneration; secondly, through protecting and helping the family, both 
directly and indirectly; and thirdly, facilitating the ‘associational solidarity’ by means of 
which needs are met and personhood is nurtured. Beyond this, there is certainly the 
potential for more substantial and direct state provision of welfare, but only in unusual, 
extreme and temporary circumstances, and it is rare for John Paul to envisage a state 
welfare provision that circumvents the “effective instruments of solidarity”. 
Rowan Williams was Archbishop of Canterbury from 2002 to 2012, having been a leading 
academic at both Oxford and Cambridge, Bishop of Monmouth and Archbishop of Wales. 
Prolific, difficult, and with a wide range of theological and intellectual influences, Williams 
is as clear as the three other subjects in this thesis that “it’s impossible to have anything 
resembling an intelligent discussion in the political and social realm without struggling to 
clarify what we actually believe about human beings.” In a range of lectures delivered as 
Archbishop, he repeatedly made this link, with regard to economic policy,133 the law,134 the 
environment,135 human rights,136 and the proper function of the state vis-à-vis the provision 
of welfare.  
Williams brings an important and explicit ‘multi-dimensionality’ to our picture of 
theological anthropology. Although aspects of this ‘multi-dimensionality’ correspond with 
those of Temple, Maritain and John Paul II – human materiality, createdness, dependency, 
communicativeness, relationality, and self-gift – Williams brings important new elements 
to the picture. His concept of personhood is most explicitly rooted in a theology of 
creation, specifically creation as itself necessarily communicative. He emphasises the 
temporal and developmental nature of human personhood, the imaginative core to 




To be human, for Williams more than the other figures here studied, is, finally, to be 
unknowable, unfinished, and endlessly generative. Human personhood is continually being 
modified in communication with the other, in the exercise of the imagination and in self-
giving. 
This helps generate a theology of the welfare state that is sees the state’s role as creating 
the right “climate” (a frequently used metaphor) for the first-level communities in which 
welfare is secured and personhood developed. Importantly, however, this involves far more 
than the minimal or even “referee” state it might be taken to imply, and Williams is less 
reserved about the state’s direct responsibility in securing welfare than is John Paul II. His 
welfare state is not a disinterested arbitrator between the communities that are the 
primary locus for welfare but an institution that needs to reflect and draw on those 
communities within which it operates. Williams’ welfare state simultaneously has the 
responsibility of facilitating connections, clearing civic space, building capacity, and 
promoting and resourcing collaboration between different welfare-orientated 
communities, and guaranteeing “a safety net of public welfare provision” and protection 
from acts that outrage human dignity, directly if necessarily. In this way, it is, as I term it in 
the chapter, a ‘thick brokerage’ welfare state. 
The pattern in which I treat these four thinkers adopts that of the Compendium of Social 
Doctrine of the [Catholic] Church (which itself was a valuable background source for the 
thesis). This grounds the Church’s teaching on social doctrine, including on welfare and, 
briefly (and somewhat negatively) in paragraph 351, on the “Welfare State”, on its 
conception of the human person, particularly visibly so in Part 1 Chapter 1.3 (‘The human 
person in the plan of God’s love’) and Part 1 Chapter 3 (‘Social doctrine and the personalist 
principle’). Indeed, the connection between the format of the Compendium and this thesis 
goes beyond the explicit structural link between theological anthropology and political 
theology and incorporated what relevant chapter (describing the human person and 
human rights) in the Compendium calls the “the many aspects of the human person” 
(Chapter 3.3). The Compendium dwells on “all on the principal and indispensable dimensions of 
the human person” (para 124; emphases original), including the inner (40), relational and 
social (110), bodily (128), cognitive (130), affective and sexual (148), and transcendent and 
historical (170). In this way, the Compendium’s model offers a coherent, well-worked-
through and pertinent foundation for the approach I have adopted in this thesis, one that 




Having explored the theological anthropology of each of the four figures and analysed the 
ways in which this informs and shapes their conceptualisation of the proper function of the 
state vis-à-vis the provision of welfare, I draw on these findings in the final concluding 
chapter. 
This begins by returning to the intellectual foundations of the thesis in reverse order – 
Deacon, Plant and Esping-Anderson – and showing how the theological-political 
anthropology drawn from Temple et al critically engages with the discussions they opened 
up. Thus, the analysis of Temple et al accepts but simultaneously complexifies and expands 
Deacon’s connection of anthropology with the welfare state by introducing a multi-
dimensional and developmental understanding of human personhood into the mix, in place 
of his uni-dimensional conception based on altruism and selfishness.  
This multi-dimensional understanding of persons – as created and material, agential, sinful, 
relational and communicative, transcendent, creative, and oriented to, and fulfilled by gift 
– can then be brought to bear on Plant’s discussion of contestable social concepts. Such a 
rich, multi-dimensional conception of the human person will naturally inform how one 
understands ideas of need, right or harm that underpin the objectives of a welfare state. 
However, importantly, it also problematizes any idea that there can be a single, dominant 
social concept informing the purpose of the welfare state, whether that is need, merit, or 
citizenship, as per Esping-Anderson three welfare regimes. Rather, as I argue in this section 
in the final chapter, this multi-dimensional conception of the human person orients us in 
various ways, towards a welfare state that, for example, concerns itself with material 
dignity, respect for agency, the relationality of civil society, appropriate monitoring and 
evaluation of welfare services, and a willingness to foster creative experiment among 
groups and organisations in the provision of welfare. In short, a multi-dimensional 
anthropology can help pin down Plant’s contestable social concepts, but can also help 
decide which contestable social concepts are relevant to the shaping of a welfare state in 
the first place.  
This critical engagement with Plant’s contestable social concepts naturally has implications 
for our engagement with the third of this thesis’ foundations, Esping-Anderson (as 
intimated in the previous paragraph). Here in the final chapter, we once again engage 
critically, acknowledging Esping-Anderson’s expansion of the conceptualisation of welfare 




discussion. This section of the concluding chapter argues that although aspects of Esping-
Andersen’s welfare regimes do resonate with the thinking of Temple et al, none 
satisfactorily captures the fullness of multi-dimensional personhood. Temple et al do not, in 
principle, support or reject any particular welfare regime, still less a straightforwardly 
larger or smaller welfare state, but ask how it serves the development of the person, or fails 
to. The consequence, then is to foreclose of any attempt to shortcut the hard work of 
constructing an approach to welfare that honours the theological anthropology of Temple 
et al by simply reaching for an established welfare regime from the shelf. 
The second and final part of the concluding chapter then responds to this challenge, by 
putting forward a more concrete set of suggestions for the development of a ‘Christian 
welfare state’ – or, less hubristically, a vision of the welfare state that is consonant with the 
understanding of the person and her good as understood by Christian theology. The final 
section, drawing on all that has preceded it, and in occasional dialogue with recent 
(theological and secular) British interventions on this question, outlines a vision of the 
foundation, funding, structure, and ethos of a welfare state that recognises and honours the 
multi-dimensional theological anthropology gleaned in the preceding chapters.  
In summary, this thesis offers five new and distinctive lines of thought. First, it brings 
theological anthropology into the field of welfare state studies where it has heretofore 
been present only in the shadows. Second, it brings discussion of the proper function of the 
welfare state into theological discourse, where it has heretofore be present only partially. 
Third, it draw outs and offers fresh readings of the connection between theological 
anthropology and political theology in William Temple, Jacques Maritain, John Paul II, and 
Rowan Williams, subjects that have to date been incompletely attended to, if at all. 
Fourthly, it outlines a nuanced and multi-dimensional concept of the person that resists 
the tendencies towards uni-dimensionality seen much welfare thought. And finally, by 
drawing on, critiquing and developing an original synthesis of these four thinkers, it offers 
a concrete, theological-grounded vision for the future of welfare state in contemporary 
Britain. 
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2: “ They have themselves to give” : William Temple 
Introduction 
“There are certain Christian principles alongside of liberty – notably fellowship – which 
find peculiarly vivid expression in the Beveridge plan.” So William Temple wrote to Major 
Guy Kindersley, stockbroker and former MP for Hitchin in Hertfordshire in 1943.1 
Kindersley had written to the Archbishop to say he was “profoundly disturbed in spirit” by 
the announcement that Temple was to chair a meeting at Westminster at which Beveridge 
was “to speak in support of the proposals contained in his Report.” Temple was writing to 
justify his actions and calm the Major’s fears.  
The Beveridge proposal, according to Kindersley, raises the “greatest of all political issues 
[namely] the liberty of the citizen and the dangers inherent in the claims of an omni-
competent State.” He recognised that “any society implies an ‘ordered’ freedom” but went 
on to reason that “every encroachment on individual liberty by the State should be 
regarded by Christians with suspicion.2  
Temple’s response was conciliatory. There were indeed “dangers in any such scheme” 
which should be guarded against. However, he argued, “the dangers on the other side” – 
meaning freedom from state interference without any commensurate social security – “are 
much greater”. Indeed, the Beveridge plan could “be so administered as to increase actual 
liberty” while also instantiating the Christian principle of fellowship that was no less 
important. 
This was by no means Temple’s only written defence of the Beveridge plan, and the Temple 
Archives at Lambeth Palace Library contain correspondence with various individuals in 
1943 and 1944 in which he defended his position and, more loosely, the Beveridge report, 
which he described, in one letter, as being in “close harmony with Christian ethical 
principles”.3 The associations between Archbishop and Beveridge – the man, the plan and 
the welfare state he helped generate – were multiple and close.4 Lecturing members of the 
Bank Officers’ Guild in February 1943, Temple praised the plan for its “universality”, its 
“national fellowship and unity”, its fostering of the “admirable qualities of thrift and 
enterprise”, and for the way it expressed “our national fellowship and unity.”5 He made a 
similar argument later that February when he spoke in a House of Lords debate on the 
Report,6 and latterly wrote to Winston Churchill suggesting that he appoint a Minister for 
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Social Security to “persuade the country that the whole matter” of post-war social 
reconstruction “was being faced” as opposed to “being tackled only piecemeal.”7 
The close association between Temple and the (post-war British) welfare state thus began 
early and has long been recognised by friend and foe alike. “The Welfare State…owed a 
good deal to the influence of Archbishop William Temple”, write Trevor Beeson, a self-
declared disciple of the Archbishop.8 The tradition in the Church “associated with 
Archbishop William Temple…sees the state as a tool to implement Christian charity”, wrote 
John Milbank in the Church Times in 2011.9 
The straightforward association between Temple’s thought and the kind of welfare state 
envisaged by Beveridge and instituted by Attlee’s government has not gone unchallenged. 
A number of scholars, such as Wendy Dackson10 and Matthew Grimley11 have outlined a 
more nuanced account of Temple’s thought which shows that his endorsement of (what 
was to become) the post-war welfare state was neither wholesale nor inevitable.12 This 
chapter develops this ‘revisionist’ reading of Temple, not questioning the sincerity of his 
qualified defence of Beveridge’s ideas, but paying particular attention to the theological-
anthropological underpinnings of Temple’s political thought, and drawing out their 
political implications in a way that shows they are not simply exhausted by the detailed 
conclusion of Christianity and Social Order. 
Temple himself repeatedly drew the link between holding a proper conception of the 
human person and of the functions of the state. In the third of his Bishop Paddock 
Memorial Lectures, published as Church and Nation in 1915, he spoke of “another formula for 
describing the justice which we shall desire to practice in the State… [namely] the 
recognition of personality.”13 The State, he remarked in his Henry Scott Holland lectures in 
1928, subsequently published as Christianity and the State, is primarily “the fosterer of the 
growth of Personality on which the richness of the common life depends.”14 In as far as 
politics and economics study “a certain department of human conduct, which is itself 
dependant on, and productive of, moral character” (as opposed to being “exact science[s]” 
like geometry or physics) they are amenable to religion’s conception of the human and the 
human good, he explained in his Gifford lectures in 1932-33.15 “We cannot form a theory of 
society or of the State,” he said, most clearly, in Citizen and Churchman eight years later, 
“until we have formed a conception of human personality.”16  
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That conception, according to an editorial in The Pilgrim, a journal of Christianity and 
politics that he edited between 1920 and 1927, was that “every human being [was] of 
unique and irreplaceable value, because he is a child of God,” a fact with which any “social 
doctrine or system” should be in accord.17 The four ‘Christian Social Principles’ that Temple 
outlined in an essay for The Pilgrim were all grounded in his conception of the person: 
sacredness of personality, the fact of fellowship, the duty of service, and the power of 
sacrifice.18 
This chapter will set out a pattern to be followed in the next three, in outlining and 
analysing Temple’s anthropology in the first half, before exploring what this meant for his 
conception of the state vis-à-vis its ‘provision’ of ‘welfare’ (both terms become contestable) 
in the second. Although a great deal has been written on Temple’s political theology,19 this 
has been insufficiently linked to his anthropology. This is largely because none of Temple’s 
best known and most significant intellectual influences – his philosophical idealism20, his 
Christian socialism,21 or his commitment to the idea of a national church with national 
moral responsibility22 – treated theological anthropology as a major concern.  
That recognised, from his Oxford lectures of 1910, published the following year as The 
Nature of Personality, through his Pilgrim editorials and Christianity and the State in the 1920s, 
various minor writings of the 1930s,23 to Christianity and Social Order published in 1942, the 
concept of personality and, more broadly, a rich understanding of the human person, is 
discernible within Temple’s thinking. I will draw out this ‘personalistic’ strand (although 
the term itself is slightly inaccurate and anachronistic for Temple), which has heretofore 
been underappreciated in the literature on Temple’s political theology, by analysing four 
key, relevant dimensions within his theological anthropology: freedom, fellowship, gift, 
and sin. I will then go on, in a pattern that is followed in subsequent chapters, to 
demonstrate how this theologically-grounded understanding of the human person 
informed Temple’s conceptualisation of the state, and in particular its responsibility for 
welfare. In particular, I will emphasise as a key theme the idea of the human person being 
made through, for and finding fulfilment in ‘gift’ which, again, has been only tangential in 
the literature on Temple, and which, as with Maritain, John Paul II and Rowan Williams, 
offers, I believe, the key anthropological insight within Temple’s political theology. 
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Temple’s theological anthropology 
Both the lectures that were published as The Nature of Personality, and The Pilgrim editorials 
that latterly formed the first section of Essays in Christian Politics and Kindred Subjects offer 
structures for understanding Temple’s anthropology. The former sets out a scheme 
whereby human personality is grounded in its unique awareness of temporal reality, which 
enables a freedom, which when harnessed to purpose generates character. The latter, as noted 
above, sets out principles of sacredness, fellowship, service, and sacrifice that recur, albeit 
modified, in Temple’s writings, in the process offering a bridge between his idea of the 
person and of the kind of principles to which state and society should attend.24 The 
following analysis of Temple’s theological anthropology draws from and modifies both of 
these schema, and introduces another element, that of human sinfulness, which emerges as 
a significant, if sometimes ambiguous, factor in both his anthropological and political 
thought.  
Persons as free and self-determining 
Temple claimed in The Pilgrim that a “man’s value” was not merely to himself or to society 
but to God, and that any true social doctrine or system would necessarily recognise and 
respect the “unique and irreplaceable” value of all people.25 “Every degraded wretch of 
whom society despairs is a soul that God created as an object of His love, and died…to win 
to loving fellowship with Himself.” He made a similar point in Citizen and Churchman, when 
he wrote that there can be no rights of man “except on the basis of faith in God” as “my 
worth is what I am worth to God”.26 
For all the obvious significance of this point, however, and the fact that he judges this 
principle of respect for personality in all men to be “the fundamental” Christian social 
principle, it is a minor theme in his writing, largely absent in his published work including 
in his numerous Gifford lectures, Nature, Man and God. 
A more sustained theme, and the starting point of his exploration of the topic in The Nature 
of Personality, which he pursues in a number of his Gifford lectures, is the way in which 
consciousness of “continued existence [and] identity” marks out the “person” from (what 
he calls) the “thing” and the “brute”.27 Such temporal cognizance and investment enables 
“freedom” and “self-determination”.28 The person is aware of, attributes value to and has in 
interest in past and future, as well as the present. He or she is characterised by “both 
memory and expectation” but is determined by neither “past history [n]or present 
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environment.”29 Rather, the person can judge what is good and orient their mental and 
physical existence towards it. Freedom is “determination by what seems good as contrasted 
with determination by irresistible compulsion.”30 
That compulsion may be internal as well as external. “True freedom”, he remarks in The 
Nature of Personality, “is not only or chiefly a freedom from external control, but freedom 
from internal compulsion.”31 It is also, thus, illusory. In a passage that is strangely redolent 
of contemporary commentators like Jonathan Haidt,32 Temple wrote that “there is no single 
will, no one purpose, in me at all”, but that the mind exists in a “state of conflicting 
desires”, a practical agent “largely consisting of inherited tendencies and shaped by 
circumstance of one sort or another”: “The individual is no doubt a unity…but he is all 
manner of different agents, varying according to the tendency or impulse which was last 
stimulated.”33 Personality demands true freedom, which entails “perfect self-
determination”, where all impulses are satisfactorily brought under “the guidance of 
Reason”.34 It thus is “nowhere fully realised except in the Godhead.”35 Human will is always 
in “the process of formation” and “never quite complete”.36 Our character is fluid, 
malleable, “in process of formation”.37 Properly speaking this means that ‘Personality’ 
should only be used of “a wholly self-determined being”, in such a way that would 
effectively “exclude all mankind”. It is simply for the sake of convenience that Temple says 
he uses it of beings that are not fully ‘personal’ in this sense.38 
Persons meant for fellowship 
Temple’s firm association of personality with freedom and self-determination might lend 
itself towards a liberal, even libertarian, anthropology, and thereby a straightforwardly 
‘liberal’ – in Esping-Andersen’s sense of the word –welfare regime. That this is not so is 
underlined by two factors.  
The first, mentioned above, is Temple’s insistence that humans are not truly free, in the 
sense that their will is coerced and compelled by inner conflicts and impulses that distort 
their self-determination. That being so, “discipline or external restraint” rather than 
“necessarily diminishing” freedom may be the means of increasing it.39 “Wise legislation” 
can make people freer. This was the logic behind his letter to Kindersley, in which he 
argued that policies such as those outlined in the Beveridge plan could “be so administered 
as to increase actual liberty”.40  
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Second, there is Temple’s repeated insistence that such freedom was justified by and 
should be oriented towards fellowship.41 “Self-determination” is “the characteristic of man 
as a moral being,” he said in his ninth Gifford lecture, but only because without it humans 
“could never be called into fellowship with God.” Such self-determination “is not the last 
word of human development” but rather must “fulfil itself in the recognition of an Other”.42  
This ‘Other’ is both divine and human. In Citizen and Churchman, the book which sees 
Temple’s enthusiasm for the rights and powers of the state at its zenith, man’s “spiritual 
integrity and his fellowship with God” is the only factor that unambiguously takes 
precedence over his citizenship. The individual “owes allegiance and obedience” to the 
State as the “representative and effective organ” of the largest and most inclusive 
community to which the citizen belongs. It is the “organ for present action”, the 
“custodian” of the community’s “tradition”, and the “trustee for its future”. “All that is 
purely temporal in the citizen, including his animal life, is rightly subject to the State which 
acts for the whole community,” Temple wrote with unguarded enthusiasm. Only the 
citizen’s fellowship with divine is exempt: 
“The State may take his goods in taxation; it may demand that he change his 
occupation, as when it conscribes men in its armies; it may thrust him into a service 
involving certain death. Its right over him is limited only by his conscience and his 
obligation to live in the spirit of fellowship with God.”43 
While nowhere does Temple cast doubt on the ultimate priority of fellowship with the 
divine, he elsewhere accords somewhat greater attention and significance to fellowship 
with other people. Human freedom is oriented to and justified by fellowship with the 
human, as well as the divine, ‘other’. Humans, he states in The Nature of Personality, “are 
born members of society”. We have a “strong social instinct, [and] a desire for the approval 
of our fellows.”44 Stronger still, he says that a human being “cut off from society is not fully 
human”, and even that “our significance and value are almost wholly derived from our 
relation to society”, a statement that, superficially at least, compromises his belief “my 
worth is what I am worth to God”.45 
This was a particular emphasis of his Henry Scott Holland lectures, in which he mapped 
two understanding of human nature on two major “types of political theory”. The first was 
the “Aristotelian” in which mankind is understood as a naturally social animal, and 
government is “a natural consequence of this fact”; the second was “Social Contract” 
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theory, which begins “from the hypothesis of utter and absolute individualism” from which 
basis men initiated forms of governance through contract.46 Temple was uncompromising 
in his rejection of the latter theory, explaining how “it rests on a view of human nature 
which is certainly defective in so serious a degree as to be false,”47 and how the way in 
which many Contact Theorists “have identified Society with the State…is… one great 
heresy”.48 
Temple had not, at this stage of his career, engaged with Maritain’s work. Three Reformers 
had only been published three years earlier and True Humanism, which J.H. Oldham would 
encourage Temple to read, would not be published in English until 1938.49 Temple’s use of 
Thomistic thought is occasional,50 sometimes ambivalent,51 but broadly appreciative.52 
Nevertheless, the firmly Aristotelian, rather than Social Contract, predisposition of the 
Scott Holland lectures inclined him to the Thomistic basis of Maritain’s anthropology and 
enabled him latterly to appropriate Maritain’s personalistic language to express his long-
standing belief in the significance of fellowship. Indeed, as Carter Wood has argued, 
Maritain’s vocabulary of “new Christendom,” “democracy of the person,” “permeation,” 
“secular Christian order” was enthusiastically adopted not just by Temple but by a range of 
British Christian intellectuals during the war and beyond.53  
Christianity and Social Order refers to Rerum novarum, Quadragesimo anno and Maritain’s 
Scholasticism and Politics in its articulation of “freedom” as determined and disciplined by 
“social fellowship”, emphasising in particular Maritain’s “valuable distinction”, between 
‘Personality’ and ‘Individuality’: 
“Of course every person is an individual; but his individuality is what marks him off 
from others; it is a principle of division; whereas personality is social, and only in 
his social relationships can a man be a person. Indeed, for the completeness of 
personality, there is needed the relationship to both God and neighbours. The richer 
his personal relationships, the more fully personal he will be.”54 
As with his discussion of freedom and self-determination, the implication here, particularly 
in the final sentence, is that no humans are truly personal, as no humans have flawless 
personal relationships, either with God or with neighbour. Perfect fellowship, like perfect 
self-determination, is only realised within the Godhead. 
‘What Christians stand for in a secular world’, a late essay by which Temple wished to be 
judged, also emphasises this understanding of personality, drawing out its political 
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implications. Personality is “inherently social”, formed by those groups “small enough to 
enable each individual to feel…that he can influence the quality and activity of the 
group.”55 Temple is alert to how “much democratic thought” seeks to “eliminate or to 
deprecate all associations intermediate between the individual and the State.” The 
“limitless individualism of revolutionary thought” ends up defeating “its own object” and 
becoming “the fount of totalitarianism”. Directly referencing Maritain, Temple argues that 
the nation needed to move from “democracy of the individual to democracy of the person”, 
a form of democracy only sustainable in a society rich with intermediate associations by 
means of which “personality achieves itself”, such as the family, the school, the guild, the 
trade union, the village, the city, the county.56  
Persons as self-giving 
The four Christian Social Principles that Temple articulates in his Pilgrim editorial – 
sacredness of personality, the fact of fellowship, the duty of service, and the power of 
sacrifice – had, by the time of the Scott Holland lectures in 1928 been reduced to three, 
Temple noting, in the third lecture, that sacrifice “lies beyond the sphere of political 
organisation”.57  
This indicates a decisive shift from the views earlier in his career, as they are discussed by 
Alan Suggate58 and Stephen Spencer59, which placed a much greater emphasis on man’s 
duty to sacrifice himself to and on behalf of the state, not simply for national security in 
times of emergency as he intimates in Citizen and Churchman (and allows with qualification 
in Christianity and the State60), but more generally in pursuit of the collective good.  
By Temple’s early reckoning, character was developed through “process of asceticism, self-
sacrifice and devotion to a noble cause”,61 within which the state played a crucial and 
authoritative role. Thus, most dramatically, he pronounced in an early essay entitled ‘The 
Education of Citizens’, “man has no rights except the right to do his duty… and it is only his 
presumed determination to do his duty by the State that makes him a subject of such rights 
as these … [A man’s] whole being is comprised in the fact that he is a member of the State.’62 
Tellingly, at the time of the publication of Christianity and Social Order nearly 40 years later, 
one G. Kitching organised the reprinting of the essay. Temple permitted the reissue but 
described it to Kitching as “a rather undergraduate production” and asked for a note to be 
enclosed which distanced him from his earlier views of state.63 
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Temple became much more cautious and reluctant to cite sacrifice as a social principle, 
stating in his Scott Holland lectures that “the State of our generation has not the same right 
to sacrifice the essential interests of its community as an individual has to sacrifice his 
own.”64 
This important shift noted, the idea that sacrifice – or “self-forgetfulness”, “self-surrender” 
or giving, to use less contentious words that he deploys to a similar effect elsewhere – is an 
important element within the development of persons for Temple should not be overlooked. 
Sacrifice may not be something that the state can demand of its citizens, except in extremis, 
but it is something that citizens can and should demand of themselves if they wish to 
develop their personality.  
“Love is the supreme goal of Personality,” he wrote in The Nature of Personality.65 “Only in 
Love can we realise ourselves.” But “love is self-forgetfulness”, and can only be “be 
produced in us by the love or need of another calling out our love.” “It is misleading,” he 
goes on to say “to speak of self-realisation through self-sacrifice [because] self-sacrifice is 
self-realisation.”66 Two decades later, dwelling on the theme of freedom and self-
determination that featured so prominently in his anthropology in The Nature of Personality, 
Temple said in Gifford Lecture IX that “self-determination fulfils itself in self-surrender to 
that which is entitled to receive the submission of the self.”67  
For all that Temple moved away from his earlier political interpretation of this orientation of 
personality to ‘self-surrender’ – humans may become persons through self-sacrifice but 
that did not mean they had a duty of self-sacrifice as citizens – the principle retained 
important political implications for him, as evidenced by the conclusion of, and his 
reaction to, the report Men without Work. In 1933, Temple had convened a group of 
Anglicans to consider the problems of on-going unemployment and two years later he 
secured money from the Pilgrim Trust for a detailed study into the work that voluntary 
services were doing for unemployed. 
The final report detailed the physical problems associated with unemployment, pointing 
out that whilst “higher allowances alone will solve very few problems…low allowances will 
certainly create them”.68 It proceeded to argue, however, that “it would be wrong to 
attribute the condition of these [unemployed] men directly to unemployment – the real 
cause of their trouble probably lies deeper”, specifically in the “psychological” and “moral” 
problems that the report goes on to examine.69 
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Although circumstances varied, especially between skilled and semi-skilled labourers, the 
core problem was that work provided for most people “the pattern within which their lives 
are lived”, and when this pattern is lost “they have thrown on them a responsibility which, 
in the case of most unemployed men, their working lives have in no way qualified them to 
bear, the responsibility for organising their own existence.”70 Unemployment created a 
psychological purposeless and listlessness which destroyed character. 
Deeper still, however, were the moral problems. Unemployment created financial 
dependence.71 It eroded the respectability of the home, in spite of the “outstanding efforts 
…made to keep up a respectable home.”72 It eroded their “sense of self-respect” and their 
“attitude towards society in general.”73 And – crucially – it eroded their ability to 
contribute to society. At no point did Men without Work question the need for state social 
support. When unemployment occurs, it wrote, “it is essential that the men affected should 
be maintained, as they are, by Unemployment Assistance”.74 However, it was clear about its 
inadequacy, especially if it were a one-way affair. Unemployment Assistance will only be a 
satisfactory system “so long as there is the recognition in the minds of those receiving it 
that the ultimate responsibility of maintaining themselves is still theirs.” Some new 
principle will have to be put into operation, the report opined, “whereby a man is offered 
the chance to give as well as to receive.” In the absence of that, the unemployed man “is losing 
his citizenship.”75 If the fostering of human personality were the final good, the state had a 
necessary but ultimately insufficient role in this. State intervention could physically 
support the unemployed, but it was largely powerless to socialise or humanise them.  
The impact of Men without Work on Temple’s thought was profound, and he wrote in The 
Preacher’s Theme Today (before the report was finally published but after the research had 
been conducted), that  
“I don’t think I ever appreciated, until I looked into this question of unemployment 
in England, how deeply penetrating are our Lord’s words that it is better to give 
than to receive. So long as the work undertaken consists of doing things for the 
unemployed, it is quite unredemptive and leads to no restoration of character. The 
only experiments…which show that effect on character, are those which invite the 
unemployed to give what they can for the community… The unemployed have no 
money to give, but they have themselves to give.”76 
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This self-giving was of a piece with the “self-sacrifice” he spoke of in The Nature of 
Personality and the “self-surrender” he spoke of in the Gifford Lectures. Human personality 
was developed in fellowship and community, more precisely the kind of community that 
allowed, indeed required, people to contribute. The principle of sacrifice, that had been one 
of his core Christian social principles into the early 1920s remained one, because human 
personality was made for and by self-giving, but the implications of that were best worked 
through in local communities, associations and fellowship groups, than by and through the 
State. 
Persons as sinful 
Temple’s conception of the significance of sacrifice to personality remained constant in his 
writings, even as its political implications shifted. His understanding of human sinfulness 
showed greater volatility, growing in significance in his middle and later period.  
This understanding was linked to his conceptualisation of progress and providence. In his 
semi-autobiographical essay, ‘Theology To-day’, written in 1939, Temple wrote of how he 
and his contemporaries “grew up in a stable world.” It may not have been Christian “in any 
adequate sense of the word”, but “it professed Christianity”, and assumed its principles and 
its ethics.77 “When I was growing up there was a general sense of security,” he wrote a few 
years later in ‘Thomism and Modern Needs’. That may have been as “illusory” as the 
nation’s Christianity but “certain principles” were still accepted, among them the sense 
that things were gradually improving. “Progress might be slow, but it was certain.”78 
Temple recognised that such beliefs were rooted in “a most un-Christian belief in 
automatic progress, which was an inheritance from the Rationalists of the eighteenth 
century.”79 The idea that education and scientific discovery would of themselves produce 
increasing conformity to the Christian ethical “standard” of life was a truth held to be self-
evident. It now transpired that it was neither self-evident nor true. Evil, if once regarded 
“as a survival from a passing age”, was now clearly more real and more problematic, and 
redemption more necessary. 
Although Temple intimated that he himself was largely innocent of this comfortable 
progressivism, he was also clear that “we were of necessity infected by [that frame of 
mind]”.80 That ‘infection’ is evident in The Nature of Personality. Within these lectures, the 
human is poised between good and evil, susceptible, but not naturally inclined, to either. 
On the one hand, the “strict form” of the doctrine of Original Sin makes our natural 
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impulses out to be evil; on the other, “moderns” proclaim they are good “and only become 
evil by abuse”. Surely the plain fact, he asks rhetorically, “is that they are neither good nor 
evil, but are the material out of which either virtue or vice is to be made?”81 ‘Fallenness’,82 
for Temple, lies not in any malign inclination of the will but in its weak and conflicted 
nature,83 unwilling to choose what is right and often swayed to choose what it wrong: “We 
could be good if we would, but we won’t; and we can’t begin to will it, unless we will so to 
begin.”84 
This anthropology may have protected him from some of the more naïvely optimistic 
prognostications of the time, but it still allowed him to write, in Mens Creatrix in 1917, that 
“we may expect then that the course of history will continue in the future, as in the past, to 
consist in the conversion of nations, the building of the Christian State, and the 
incorporation of the Christian States within the fellowship of the Church, until at last 
Christendom and Humanity are interchangeable terms.”85  
This view changed from the 1920s. In Christianity and the State, he writes of “the evil will of 
finite beings”86 and four years later, in Nature, Man, and God states that “there is here an 
unquestionable bias of tendency to evil in human nature,” and that “Original Sin 
[does]…not stand for a mysterious doctrine but for an evident and vitally important fact”.87 
This shift appears to have been catalysed, if not necessarily caused, by Temple’s encounter 
with Reinhold Niebuhr. Niebuhr’s Moral Man and Immoral Society was published in 1932, and 
although Niebuhr had different targets in his sights, passages of the book could have been 
written with Temple’s earlier thought in mind.88 Temple makes no mention of Niebuhr in 
Nature, Man and God but he does cite him in the Moody lectures he delivered at the 
University of Chicago in 1935, in which he claims that Niebuhr has “broken new ground 
with disturbing but (as I am convinced) most salutary effect.”89 Temple greeted Niebuhr at 
the 1937 Oxford Conference on Church, Community and State with the words, “at last I 
have met the disturber of my peace,”90 and again appeared alongside him at a student 
conference at Swanwick in 1939 and then commended him to the Malvern conference of 
1941, contrasting his thought with that of St Thomas and Jacques Maritain, neither of 
whom, he contended, had Niebuhr’s appreciation of the power of sin.91 
By the mid-to-late 1930s, Temple’s assessment of human sinfulness was notably darker 
than his remarks in The Nature of Personality, Niebuhr’s more sombre assessment of what 
human collective action was capable of slowly being confirmed by the deteriorating 
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political climate in Europe. In his Chairman’s Introduction to Doctrine in the Church of 
England published in 1937, Temple wrote how “we have been learning again how impotent 
man is to save himself, how deep and pervasive is that corruption which theologians call 
Original Sin. Man needs above all to be saved from himself.”92 In a similar way, in his 
Readings in St. John’s Gospel, his most popular book before Christianity and Social Order, 
published in 1939 and 1940, with reference to John the Baptist’s words, “Behold the lamb of 
God which beareth away the sin of the world”, Temple tellingly commented: 
“How utterly modern is this conception! It is not “sins”… for there is only one sin, 
and it is characteristic of the whole world. It is the self-will which prefers “my” way 
to God’s… it pervades the universe… no individual is responsible for it. It is an 
‘infection of nature’…and we cannot cure it.”93 
It was a note he struck in his private correspondence just as much as his published works, 
and it went hand-in-hand with an (albeit qualified) renunciation of his earlier ideas of 
progress.94 In a famous letter to the philosopher Dorothy Emmet dated 16 July 1942, which 
she quoted in her contribution to Iremonger’s biography, Temple explained that we must 
“completely get away from the notion that the world as it now exists is a rational whole.” 
There was a unity in the world but it was not the unity of a picture “of which all the parts 
exist at once” but of a drama, “where, if it is good enough, the full meaning of the first 
scene only becomes apparent with the final curtain; and we are in the middle of this.” 
Consequently, he went on, “the world as we see it is strictly unintelligible. We can only 
have faith that it will become intelligible when the divine purpose, which is the 
explanation of it, is accomplished.”95 
Temple, at least according to his own assessment, was not given to dramatic changes of 
opinion, although, as his reaction to the republication of The Education of Citizens shows, he 
was certainly aware of his shifting in focus and emphasis. In the letter to Dorothy Emmet 
quoted above, he explained how this “particular modification (in my thinking) to which I 
am feeling driven is not substantial, though I think it is very important.” All of it, he 
believed, was there in his 1933 Gifford Lectures on Nature, God and Man, although he 
admitted that “I don’t think the total presentation in that book or in Christus Veritas 
sufficiently gives this impression of a dynamic process and leaves too much that of a static 
system.”96 When he wrote in ‘Thomism and Modern Needs’, that the modern world now 
had “a profounder understanding of sin”, he was undoubtedly speaking for himself also.97 
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Having been conscious of the human potential for sin in his earlier work, human nature 
poised between and capable of embracing both good and evil, his later work, under the 
shadow of Niebuhr, articulated a more sombre account of human nature, in which the 
human will was sinful not because conflicted or incapable of true self-determination, but 
because it was fundamentally disordered, oriented away from God and neighbour, and 
towards the self. This had wider implications, most acutely on Temple’s formative ideas of 
providence and progress, but also on the moral potential of collective action and, 
accordingly, the capacity of the state to enable and develop human personality. 
Temple’s political theology 
That Temple understood there to be a link between the conception of the human and of the 
proper function of that state has already been shown. Precisely what that looked like is far 
from straightforward, however. This is partly because, like Rowan Williams, many of 
Temple’s contributions to this question were circumstantial – deriving ultimately from 
lectures delivered to specific audiences at specific times – and because, unlike Rowan 
Williams, the wider circumstances in which Temple operated – late Edwardian Britain, the 
Great War, the 1920s, the Great Depression, the emergence of totalitarian states, and the 
Second World War – were violently unpredictable and often simply violent. As a result, 
Christianity and Social Order, Citizen and Churchman, Thoughts in War-Time, and The Church 
Looks Forward and to a lesser extent his Pilgrim essays, The Nature of Personality, Church and 
Nation and Christianity and the State all bear the marks of their particular socio-political 
moment.  
The result is a political theology that, while not merely mirroring the turbulent events of 
his time, does shift in emphasis. More precisely, drawing in the anthropological 
considerations that are central to this thesis, Temple articulates two strands of thought 
concerning the proper function of the state vis-à-vis the provision of welfare, which, while 
not contradictory, do exist in some tension, and correspond to different elements within 
the anthropology laid out above.  
The first, ‘state as provider of welfare’, is better known because outlined in greater detail 
and in better known publications. It takes a particular cue from his understanding of 
persons as free, self-determining and intended for fellowship, and, crucially, living in a 
context in which the contours of a cohesive Christian nation are reasonably clear. It is 
instructive that in a rhetorical flourish towards the end of Christianity and Social Order, 
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Temple answers his own question about the extent to which the “ordering of social life” is 
inculcating the “principle of Fellowship”, by saying “compared with some other 
countries…we find in the British people a magnificent unity”. At the time of writing that 
was arguably true, but it is nonetheless a telling observation, and one that naturally orients 
his political theology towards Esping-Andersen’s social democratic or Scandinavian vision 
of welfare in which there is a premium on cultural homogeneity.98  
The second, ‘state as a broker of welfare’, recognises these anthropological characteristics 
but also pays greater attention to the idea of persons as self-giving but also marked by sin, 
and emerges with greater clarity in his ‘middle-period’, between the late 1920s and late 
1930s. I will deal with each in turn.  
State as provider  of welfare 
Christianity and Social Order, published, like Social Insurance and Allied Services, in 1942, 
outlined a programme of social reform that placed upon the state the primary duty for the 
provision of public welfare and social security. Its final chapter, ‘The Task Before Us’, 
claimed that Christians were “entitled to call upon the Government to set before itself” a 
series of six “objectives”, which comprised a conspicuously specific political agenda for an 
Archbishop, one that only got more so in the “suggested programme” that Temple placed 
in an appendix to the book. 
The programme was grounded in the primary and derivative social principles outlined 
earlier in the book, the latter – freedom, social fellowship and service – corresponding to 
the anthropology outlined above. It was so that citizens could enjoy the freedom that 
allowed them to determine their lives towards fellowship with and service of others that 
Temple placed upon the state the responsibility to guarantee his six objectives. “Christians 
have some clues to the understanding of human nature which may enable them to make a 
more accurate estimate than others of these points.”99 
Although he is clear that the primary duty of Christians is to work to these ends in their 
everyday lives, they also have a duty to become aware of social problems and “to demand a 
remedy” for them.100 They may not be capable of knowing what the remedy is but they are 
“entitled”, he writes by way of introduction to his six objectives, to demand that the 
government pursues these objectives “as steadily and rapidly as opportunity permits”.101 
The impression is of a political theology that envisages a competent and beneficent state, 
advised and equipped with a clear knowledge of the public good, bearing primary 
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responsibility for securing the welfare of individuals and families, through planning, 
regulation, and the allocation of resources.102  
This was a characteristic of his wartime writings. The Church, he wrote in Citizen and 
Churchman, must point to “permanent facts” with which “the Christian conscience cannot 
be content”, such as when people live in conditions “which give wholly inadequate 
opportunities for family life”, when “children suffer from malnutrition”, or when the 
nation is “disgraced by chronic unemployment”. The Church is both “entitled and obliged” 
to “condemn” the society characterised by these “evils”, although it is “not entitled in its 
corporate capacity to advocate specific remedies.”103 Its condemnation was intended to 
stimulate a response, among those who respect the Church’s authority, to seek and to apply 
the remedy. It was particularly focused on its own members who acted as politicians, civil 
servants, business men, or trade unionists, who might “modify the customs and traditions 
of the departments of state or section of society within which they are concerned.”104 In 
short, he concluded, “the church lays down principles; the Christian citizen applies them; 
and to do this he utilizes the machinery of the state.”105 
Summarising the Malvern conference in 1941, he had written how the concern of 
Christians is “with principles and not with policies…The constant proclamation of 
principles is the only way, and a genuinely affective way of fulfilling this responsibility”.106 
Opening his speech at the Albert Hall on 26 September 1942, the first of The Church Looks 
Forward lectures, for which he drew an audience of over 10,000, Temple proclaimed “the 
right and the duty of the Church to declare its judgement upon social facts and social 
movements and to lay down principles which should govern the ordering of society.”107 The 
“function” of Christians was “to watch” politicians, “spurring them on by a criticism of the 
existing order in the light of our principles and checking them by criticism of their 
proposals in the light of our principles.”108 
For all that these wartime lectures and publications make it sound as if Temple were 
prepared to surrender all positive responsibility for the provision (if not the identification) 
of welfare to the state, retaining for church and Christians only the right to critique, make 
demands and work through state structures, there remains hints of a different vision of 
welfare. After all, as he remarked in Citizen and Churchman, the state’s increasing concern 
“with welfare, including the moral welfare, of its citizens”, was in fact moving it on to 
ground “which is the proper province of the Church,” and this move was not without 
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risk.109 “If the Church withdraws from these because the State steps in, it hands over 
channels of spiritual influence, such as schools and probation work, to secular forces,” he 
warned.110 The church cannot retain complete control of welfare provision if the State 
provides the resources, he reasoned, but the result was necessary “co-operation” and 
“compromise” rather the wholesale surrender.111 He struck a similar note in The Church 
Looks Forward, remarking in the fourth of five lectures that “we have got to find the way to 
effect the real marriage of state control with voluntary enterprise, each welcoming the 
other and recognising it in its own place.”112 
Even the wartime publications can, therefore, envisage a mixed welfare settlement – state 
and church (and other associations within civil society) negotiating and working together 
over the provision of welfare which is, properly speaking, the remit of church (and civil 
society) – even if this is only a minor theme during this period. What is noteworthy about 
Temple’s political theology at this time, from the perspective of his anthropology, is not 
the aspects of personhood he carefully integrates into his vision of the state – in particular 
human freedom, fellowship and sanctity – but those that he bypasses, in particular human 
sinfulness. For all that he honoured Niebuhr from the later 1930s for his bracing 
appreciation of the power of sin and, implicitly, for Niebuhr’s attack on the more optimistic 
hopes of the social gospel, this did nothing to deter him from outlining an extensive 
programme of (peaceful) social reform involving substantial state planning that ran 
contrary to Niebuhr’s criticism of “naïve confidence in the moral capacities of collective 
man.”113 
State as broker  of welfare 
If Niebuhr’s influence on Temple’s political theology was not profound, nor was it 
negligible. He, among others, did orient Temple in his ‘middle period’ towards a more 
pluralist understanding of the state than is evident in his wartime work, one that exists to 
broker rather than provide welfare. In their own way, these influences, to which we shall 
turn presently, each developed and directed his existing ideas of personal fellowship and 
service towards being fulfilled in associational activity, on the basis that it was primarily in 
these kind of groups that human personality was nurtured, and that it was therefore in the 
facilitation of such activity that the state found its justification. This was an ultimately 
piecemeal endeavour in as far as it was less worked through than the vision articulated in 
his war-time writings. However, the work and influences of this middle period open up in 
Temple an important, if underappreciated, approach to welfare. 
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As already mentioned, Temple’s writing was sensitive to context, and this is as much the 
case during the middle period of his career as for his wartime publications. Two events in 
the mid-late 1920s were particularly important in this regard. The first was the Coal and 
General Strike of 1926, which revealed to Temple the depth and bitterness of the divisions 
at play within industry and society, disabusing him of any naïve impressions of the 
naturally co-operative nature of the Labour movement, and exposing ecclesiastical 
interference in politics as potentially naïve and even harmful.114 The event, and his 
unfortunate intervention therein, was an experience to which he would subsequently 
refer.115  
The second event was the so-called Prayer Book Crisis of in December 1927, when 
Parliament rejected the Church’s revised Prayer Book, twenty years in the preparation, and 
then did so again six months later.116 This took everyone by surprise, and although the 
material impact was minimal, the conceptual impact was acute, exacerbating divisions 
between those who accepted Parliament’s right to reject the new book, on the grounds that 
the nation was Christian primarily because its standards and values were Christian, and 
those who thought that “Christian values and standards” were not enough and that the 
Church alone should decide its worship, because it was a divine society from which many 
fellow countrymen clearly now opted out. Temple had long supported the Church’s right to 
dictate its own worship, and thus its revision of the Prayer Book, but this sat uncomfortably 
with his conception of a church, nation and state bound tightly together in moral 
homogeneity. These events set the context for a more pluralist approach to state (and 
welfare), in which the influence of Niebuhr, John Neville Figgis and R.M. MacIver was 
evident. 
Temple may have openly praised and embraced the dimension of Niebuhr’s anthropology 
that emphasised the profundity of human sin but, as we have seen, that did not translate 
straightforwardly into his political theology. Temple never believed, as Niebuhr put it in 
his first chapter of Moral Man, that “society is in a perpetual state of war”, emphatically 
rejecting this Hobbesian vision in his Scott Holland lectures.117 Neither Niebuhr’s detection 
of coercion in “all social co-operation on a larger scale than the most intimate social group” 
nor his relentless assault on “naïve confidence in the moral capacities of collective man” 
had any significant impact on Temple’s outlook.118  
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However, Niebuhr’s thinking did influence Temple in as far as it drew attention to the need 
for groups and association on a limited and more human scale. From the outset, Niebuhr 
drew a “sharp distinction” between the moral and social behaviour of individuals and “of 
social groups, national, racial and economic.”119 There is, as he wrote in a later preface to 
Moral Man, a basic difference between the morality of individuals and that of collectives, 
whether races, classes or nations. Whereas the former, and indeed small scale and intimate 
groups, were capable of self-sacrifice, larger groups had “less reason to guide and to check 
impulse, less capacity for self-transcendence, less ability to comprehend the needs of 
others.”120 No amount of “moral antidotes”, “the wisest type of social pedagogy”, 
“patriotism”, class loyalty or even “the religious spirit of love” was enough to moralise the 
group adequately.121 
Truly ethical attitudes are far more dependent “upon personal, intimate and organic 
contacts” than “social technicians” are inclined to admit, and these are simply absent in 
large groups, not least nations that are “held together much more by force and emotion, 
than by mind” and which, because they are so large, have the greatest difficultly in 
achieving “a common mind and purpose” and are therefore almost invariably “unified by 
momentary impulses and immediate and unreflective purposes.”122 Seeing the nation as a 
vehicle for social justice, let alone love, is riskily naïve.123  
Niebuhr’s scepticism towards the nation state as a vehicle for social or personal 
transformation is visible in Temple ‘middle-period’ pluralist conception of the state, and 
has affinities with R.M. MacIver and John Neville Figgis who shaped Temple’s thought in 
the ‘20s as Niebuhr did in the ‘30s. MacIver was an agnostic Scottish political scientist. He 
critiqued thinkers like Leonard Hobhouse and Bernard Bosanquet, both of whom had been 
influential in Temple’s formation, for imagining that a complex, nation-wide state such as 
the UK’s could be modelled on the homogeneity of classical Greece city states.124 The state 
was not the same as society and could not determine every aspect of people’s lives. Rather, 
much more attention needed to be paid to the groups that existed below the level of the 
state. It was MacIver’s definition of the state as “an association which, acting through law 
as promulgated by a government endowed to this end with coercive power, maintains 
within a community territorially demarcated the universal conditions of social order”,125 
that Temple adopted and adapted in Christianity and the State. 
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Temple used MacIver’s definition of the state but was more influenced by the priest and 
political philosopher John Neville Figgis. Drawing on the work of the nineteenth century 
German historian and jurist Otto Gierke,126 the ideas of Lord Acton, and his own studies of 
mediaeval and early modern Christian political thought, Figgis had argued that the 
personality of corporate organisation was a reality, and not simply as a legal fiction or a 
concession from a sovereign state.127 Society was not “a sand-heap of individuals, all equal 
and undifferentiated, unrelated except to the state”, but rather “an ascending hierarchy of 
groups, family, school, town, county, union, church, etc.”128  
“What we actually see in the world is not on the one hand the state, and on the 
other a mass of unrelated individuals; but a vast complex of gathered unions, in 
which alone we find individuals, families, clubs, trades unions, colleges, professions, 
and so forth; and further, that there are exercised functions within these groups 
which are of the nature of government, including its three aspects, legislative, 
executive, and judicial; though, of course, only with reference to their own 
members.”129 
Personality, meaning in this instance the personality of individual humans rather than 
corporate bodies, never emerged “except within one or more social unions”, Figgis argued. 
Personality was “a social fact” and no individual “could ever come to himself except as a 
member of a society.”130 That being so, it was critically important to protect and nurture 
those social unions, in all their forms. “You are not merely John Doe”, he wrote in Churches 
in the Modern State, but as John Doe you “may probably be a member of the Christian church 
by baptism, a Doe by family, an Englishman by [nationality].” All three of the aspects on 
any one individual’s identity are “social institutions, which have grown into you.” The 
person is created by his or her relational associations, whether large (nationality) or small, 
such as being “a member of a school, an alumnus of a college, a sharer in this club, [or] a 
president of that.”131  
The state could help sustain personality but only by sustaining those groups that sustained 
personality. Unlike some of his contemporary pluralists, Figgis did not altogether deny “the 
need for a public power to make and enforce law”. Having emphasised the basic reality of 
groups and corporate identity within society in Churches in the Modern State, he wrote how 
“a strong power above them is needed” to “prevent injustice between them and to secure 
their rights… to regulate such groups and to ensure that they do not outstep the bounds of 
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justice that the coercive force of the state exists.”132 Later, in an appendix, he explained 
how the state existed “to control and limit within the bounds, the activities of all minor 
associations whatsoever.”133 Thus, a pluralist state, at least according to Figgis, is not a 
minimal one but a limited one, which recognises, enables and protects associational 
activity, including the right of groups to constitute and govern their own affairs, rather 
than one that permits or usurps it.134 
Temple had significant reservations with both MacIver and Figgis, most acutely over their 
ecclesiology. MacIver’s concept of the Church as simply another body within civil society 
was untenable to him. The Church is “not a society which people joined as one might join 
the Tariff Reform League, or any other organisation with a specific object”, Temple wrote 
in The Pilgrim in 1924, using the same example that Figgis had done in Churches in the Modern 
State.135 It was not simply another voluntary association, he wrote in 1941. Rather, its roots, 
existence and mission were quite different. “It is the creation of God, and men become its 
members under the impulse of the Holy Spirit through the sacrament of Baptism”.136  
This was closer to Figgis’ conception of the Church, but where Temple differed with Figgis 
was on how far this Church was distinct from the rest of society. Figgis understood the 
Church in the light of the “cardinal fact” of the day, namely “the religious heterogeneity of 
the modern state.”137 The Church was independent of contemporary society, which was 
“organised on a basis [that was] frankly secular”.138 Its duty was to “show forth to the world 
the truth of our being ‘separated’, set apart, a city on a hill, something distinct in aim and 
purpose.”139 For Temple, who was committed to the idea of a national church serving the 
nation as a whole, and alert to the need for a national, spiritual centre of gravity, this was 
insufficient. As he wrote in The Pilgrim, “there must be a spiritual society interlaced with 
the secular society keeping it true to its highest ideals.”140 Or, elsewhere in the same 
publication, “all our welfare depends on rapidly establishing the Christian background of 
economic life.”141 Temple’s ecclesiology was thus a subtle but important influence on his 
view of the state, undermining the pluralism to which Niebuhr, MacIver and Figgis drew 
him. Nevertheless, as Matthew Grimley has written, because pluralism “was a critique of 
the state, not a theory of the state… a habit of thinking, rather than a programme,” Temple 
“could never shake it off altogether, and pluralist perspectives kept breaking through.”142 
This was visible in the later 1910s when he wrote, in Mens Creatrix, that the state must 
remember that “it exists by no other right of title than that of all associations of men,” and 
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is therefore bound “to recognise ‘Personality’ equal in essence to its own in all associations 
or corporate bodies within itself, whether they be religious, educational, economic of any 
other type.”143 Tellingly, he went on to observe in a footnote that he had been reading 
Figgis and Maitland’s translation of Gierke. 
Temple’s pluralist perspective receives its fullest treatment, however, a decade later in his 
Scott Holland lectures. In these, Temple called Hegel’s treatment of the national State a 
kind of “incarnation of the Absolute” “bewildering”, going on to say that although his 
English disciples, at whose feet Temple had once sat, may not have followed their master 
“in his virtual deification of the State”, they were “not far behind”.144 Mankind might have 
been a naturally social animal, his personality formed by community, but community was 
not the same thing as the state. “Under the influence of an a priori theory which identifies 
them, men have attributed to the State what in fact Society was achieving not only without, 
but even despite, the action of the State.”145 
Early in his chapter on the internal relations of the state, Temple mentions the early 
modern Calvinist political philosopher Johannes Althusius, a thinker of central importance 
to contemporary pluralists. Althusius understood the state as a “consociatio consociationum”: 
“its units are not individuals, but the family, the town, the province; and each of these has 
rights of its own anterior to the State as being part of the foundation of the State”.146 
Temple calls Althusius “the natural starting-point of modern inquiry” because he was the 
first modern political theorist to revive “the mediaeval idea of the communitas 
communitatum in a form adapted to the new world which was being born in his 
generation.”147 
The influence of Figgis and behind him Gierke is discernible here. Like Figgis, Temple saw 
associational life as prior and superior to the state.148 Precisely because the state’s 
instrument is coercive rather than persuasive, “the State serves best when it provides the 
liberty and order on which other associations can build, and by which they seek more 
intimate or more particular ends,” Temple writes quoting MacIver’s The Modern State.149  
Temple’s Gifford lectures had an altogether different focus from his Scott Holland ones, 
although they touched briefly, in lecture seven, on the relevant question of the balance 
between universal moral obligations and local, immediate loyalties. The main task of each 
man’s moral life, he said in the lecture on moral goodness, is “to secure that his own self 
counts for no more with him than anyone else’s”, a goal that is achieved by following “the 
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sound principle of checking each narrower loyalty by what is wider.” However, he goes on 
to recognise that “a man cannot do much to serve humanity as a whole directly” but must 
“give his service to his own unit”, although, not, importantly as a cost to larger social units. 
A man should “serve his family, but not at cost to his country, and will serve his country, 
but not as cost to mankind.”150 
It was Men without Work again, with its empirical observations of the value of mutual 
contribution and self-giving to personhood, which steered Temple’s pluralistic personalism 
into its most concrete and political form. As already noted, this report revealed how the 
moral, psychological and physical impact of unemployment varied from one location to 
another, not simply on account of the level of material state support but because some 
areas had a richer and more robust associational life than others. In Leicester, for example, 
those men who had maintained membership of the Boot and Shoe Operatives’ Union in 
spite of being out of work for years, were the most respectable, “not necessarily keeping up 
fancy domestic standards, but feeling, as it seemed, that solidarity with those with whom 
they had once worked gave them a sort of independent status in relation to the community 
as a whole”.151 Similarly, the unemployed of South Wales often avoided the desperation of 
their English counterparts on account of their rich tradition of chapels, trades unions, and 
choirs, which were absent or greatly diminished elsewhere.  
Crucially, associational life could do this whereas the state could not. Men without Work 
remarked how “a gathering of unemployed men may be often heard speaking of the State’s 
duty to maintain the unemployed.” The report went on to ask pointedly, “What is their 
duty in return?”, worrying that “at present that question is unanswerable”, and that 
“unless some sense of duties and obligations can be built up to replace the old that are 
disappearing, a very serious situation will be created.”152 It was such duties and obligations 
that fortified personality. Crucially, however, these were much more readily located in 
voluntary and associational life than between the individual and the state.  
Men without Work reported after the crisis of depression and unemployment had passed but 
nonetheless made an impact on Temple’s thought, building on his pluralistic inclinations 
but drawing out in particular the participatory and even self-sacrificial aspects of Temple’s 
anthropology. “It cannot be too strongly emphasised,” he wrote in a letter to the Times, 
that the help for the unemployed which proved “really redemptive and recreative of 
character” was not the kind of help which simply did things to or for them but, rather, that 
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which “enabled them to realise themselves and fulfil their function as members of the 
community,” and crucially “of whom the community has need.” The “greatest evil” and 
“bitterest injury” of their state, he added, is not “the animal grievance of hunger or 
discomfort, not even the mental grievance of vacuity and boredom; it is the spiritual 
grievance of being allowed no opportunity of contributing to the general life and welfare of 
the community.”153  
People needed to be needed; needed to feel that they were capable of, indeed required to 
make a contribution to their immediate common life. Their “personality” required a 
certain level of material security but this was necessary rather than sufficient. They needed 
to be part of and belong to a wider community but, importantly, to give of themselves to 
the good of that community. This was Niebuhr’s “personal, intimate and organic contacts,” 
and Figgis’ “vast complex of gathered unions” within MacIver’s state as “demarcate[ing] 
the universal conditions of social order”. 
This view is certainly present in Christianity and Social Order, as intimated, but is occluded 
somewhat by that book’s greater emphasis on the role of the state. “Liberty is [made] actual 
in the various cultural and commercial and local associations that men form,” Temple 
wrote in his chapter on derivative Christian Social Principles, in which his defence of 
associational life was clearest.154 People “actually constitute one another” by their “mutual 
influence”. This mutual influence finds its first “field of activity” in the family, and 
thereafter “in school, college, Trade Union, professional association, city, county, nation, 
Church.”155 The State that would “serve and guard” liberty would foster all such groupings, 
“giving them freedom to guide their own activities provided these fall within the general 
order of the communal life and do not injure the freedom of other similar associations.”156 
According to these principles, the State was, or should be, the “Community of Communities 
– or rather the administrative organ of that Community”, society being populated by 
“subordinate functional Councils”, such as those first described in Christianity and the 
State.157  
The limitations of the ‘corporative state’ 
Christianity and the State laid out no “task before us” and had no appendix of specific 
recommendations to the government of the day. There is very little in the lectures that 
lends itself to a specific understanding of what Temple’s more pluralist state might entail. 
This, it should be recognised, was a characteristic of Temple, rather than these lectures. 
Christianity and Social Order was the exception rather than the rule. Even when, years 
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earlier, he had been active in the Labour movement, Temple was always more comfortable 
denouncing the heartlessness of Victorian liberalism and political economy, and 
appropriating the intellectual architecture and language of socialism, than in promoting 
any specific policies. Christian politics required the replacement of the “competition… 
[that] pervades the whole of our life [and] is simply organized selfishness” with the spirit of 
co-operation or, more theologically, of fellowship, he wrote in his early book The Kingdom of 
God.158 It did not necessarily require the nationalisation of land, mines, railways, shipping, 
armaments, and electric power, such as was called for immediately in the Labour Party’s 
1918 manifesto.  
In addition to this, however, Temple never articulated a vision of the state as a broker of 
welfare, by protecting, encouraging and partnering with associations of civil society, in the 
detail he did for the state as a provider of welfare in Christianity and Social Order, because, as 
Grimley rightly observed, the pluralism of Figgis and MacIver only ever tempered his 
thought. 
Temple argued that the state was “an organ of community”, deriving existence and 
“conditional authority” from it, meriting no loyalty other than that which is proper to “the 
national community”.159 The state was servant not master of the community. This did not, 
however, necessitate an overtly antagonistic attitude. On the contrary, the state remained 
necessary to the community. In the final chapter of Christianity and the State, detailing “the 
state in its external relations”, Temple argued the state “is the only necessary organ of the 
community” and its collapse likely “to break up the community itself”. It was thus perfectly 
reasonable to see it as “the organ of national unity…so closely bound up with the 
community that it has almost as irresistible a claim as the community itself.”160  
Temple saw the richness and security of this natural associational life as demanding a state 
that was more substantive and active than Figgis had been content with. “The more 
complex our associational life becomes, the more important is that universal Law which 
the State upholds. Only if the general fabric is firm and reliable is there freedom for 
spiritual, intellectual or commercial enterprise.”161 Thus when Temple argued that, rather 
than being “the guardian of property”, the state is “the fosterer of the growth of 
Personality on which the richness of the common life depends”,162 the practical conclusion 
he draws is that, in addition to protecting property-holders, the state has a duty “to 
provide that every citizen possesses, or can acquire, some property in which to exercise 
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rights”. “A Christian sociology,” he wrote, in call for what sounds like a Citizens’ Income, 
will “desire that every citizen should possess enough property to support bare life even 
though he does no stroke of work for it.”163 
In addition to this confidence in the state, Temple had reservations about the reality of 
pluralism, partly derived from his own experience and partly from Men without Work. The 
latter, for all it emphasised the critical significance of associational life, was cognizant of its 
perils. Associational life, especially when it came in the form of single interest or sectional 
groups could cut people off from the wider community and did not necessarily foster virtues 
of responsibility and self-help. Temple’s own experience, in the very different 
circumstances of the Coal Strike, confirmed this. Associational life needed a strong state for 
its own survival and to prevent a truly common good from splintering into a variety of 
smaller, detached and possibly antagonistic local goods.  
Temple touched on this theme in Citizen and Churchmen six years later. A community of 
communities could be as dangerous as a society of individuals, with the units of self-
interest simply being bigger and therefore more difficult to negotiate. The events of 1926 
cast their shadow here once again. “There is no hope that either side to a dispute will truly 
aim at justice unless there is an over-arching loyalty which checks, and sets in right 
perspective, the sectional loyalty which each party feels so strongly.”164 The driving force of 
sectional loyalty is “very great” and “will not be held in check except by a loyalty equally 
strong to a fellowship of which members of the opposing party are members.”165  
This was the argument Temple repeated in Christianity and Social Order when, in the book’s 
appendix, he returned approvingly to Maritain’s distinction between ‘Democracy of the 
Person’ and ‘Democracy of the Individual’, which had led some “Christian social reformers” 
to favour “the ideal of the ‘Corporative State’”. This, however, “swings the pendulum too 
far”. For all that human personality was fostered by the institutions of associational life, 
people had to be individuals before they were persons. “No citizen expresses through his 
activity in various fellowships the whole of his significance.” To deny the state any reality 
beyond the corporate bodies to which it plays host was to undermine its capacity and duty 
to secure individual liberty. If the state were genuinely to be a community of communities 
it still needed to articulate what kind of community it was. The almost content-less one of 
the pluralists was not enough. If the state were to sustain a rich life of communities, it 
needed some centripetal pull for balance. The state needed to be more substantial. “The 
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scheme of the Corporative State”, he concluded, is like that of Individualism or 
Communism: “unsatisfactory in itself but not without truth.”166 
Over and above such principled objections to the state as mere broker, there were also 
circumstantial and pragmatic considerations to which Temple sometimes referred, to the 
effect that a high degree of centralisation was simply unavoidable in the modern world. In 
a 1935 lecture entitled ‘Faith and Freedom’, he reasoned that “it has been inevitable that 
the need for planning should lead to an increased activity in the economic sphere on the 
part of the National State.”167 A series of “great forces” – the Liberal nationalism of the 
nineteenth century, the centralisation of (the Great) war, the advent of democracy which 
invariably begs the question “What people?” – had converged “upon a single result of 
intensified nationalism”. “When to this cause there is added the stark necessity for 
corporate planning in the economic sphere, we see how unavoidable in our period of 
human history in the new prominence of the State.”168  
One might also speculate that circumstances also nudged Temple’s thinking away from the 
pluralism of Christianity and the State. Just as in the mid-late 1920s, the Coal and General 
Strike, and the Prayer Book Crisis had provoked questions about national homogeneity and 
the Church’s position within the country, so a decade later a series of powerful social 
counterweights – George V’s Silver Jubilee, the Abdication Crisis, the Coronation of the 
devout George VI, the emergence of power states that located their centre of national 
gravity in party, blood, and messianic leadership – pushed Temple, and wider British 
thinking, towards the idea of Christian nationhood and “civilisation”, which found 
powerful rhetorical weight in the war.169 
These considerations, however, were not the cause of Temple’s final scepticism with 
pluralism, which was principled. The ideas of Niebuhr, Figgis and MacIver and, in a 
different way, the findings of Men without Work, steered Temple’s political theology, without 
transforming it. He was too deeply informed by a sense of the need for cohesive 
nationhood, made manifest in multiple cultural, literary, ecclesiastical, social, and political 
ways, ever to embrace the kind of pluralism that ignored such centripetal forces in favour 
of a predominantly or wholly decentralised associational life. For all the Temple could 
agree that the state was a “community of communities”, his final emphasis was on the fact 
that it was a community of communities, a community that was safeguarded by a state that 
was informed to some degree by Christian principles.  




Temple’s conception of welfare state is best, but somewhat misleadingly, known through 
his association with William Beveridge and his wartime publication, Christianity and Social 
Order. This orients our reading of him as understanding the state as best positioned to 
provide welfare to citizens, often directly.  
This, however, is a partial reading of Temple’s political theology, light on which is cast by 
examining his theological anthropology. Temple was clear that a proper understanding of 
the human had to underpin political thought and practice, and a ‘personalist’ theological 
anthropology threads through his writings, albeit without the prominence (or the 
consistency of vocabulary) of Maritain or John Paul II.  
In this, we see how Temple’s conception of inalienable human worth, freedom, fellowship, 
capacity for gift, and sinfulness informs his idea of the state. Not all of these factors are 
equally significant – his discussion of human worth tends to be brief – or equally consistent 
– his conceptualisation of the depth of sin fluctuates with circumstance in a way that his 
understanding of human fellowship does not. Moreover, his conception of the human is 
filtered through his reading of Niebuhr, Maritain, Figgis, and MacIver, whose ideas on 
human sinfulness and on the associational nature of the human, inform, if not quite 
reform, his anthropology. 
The result is an idea of state, firmly grounded in four dimensions of human “personality” 
(his preferred term), which guarantees and provides welfare services, but ideally does so in 
partnership with the church and other associations and voluntary organisations across 
society. These, he recognises, are best placed – through their rooted, localised, small-scale, 
and humanising endeavours – to foster human personality to the greatest extent. 
Accordingly, in the writings of his middle period in particular, Temple articulates a clear 
idea of the state’s primary purpose as enabling and protecting the kind of associational life 
by means of which persons grow and mature; the state, in effect, as a broker for 
associational welfare. However, he is also conscious of the vulnerability of associational life 
and its inadequacy in a world that was inexorably politically and economically centralising, 
and it is this vision, profoundly coloured by the wartime circumstances of his final 
publications, that are now best known. 
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3.  “ The body politic… lives on the devotion of human 
persons and their gift of themselves” : Jacques 
Maritain  
Introduction 
Jacques Maritain wrote to William Temple on 18 March 1943 thanking him for his mention 
of Scholasticism and Politics in Christianity and Social Order and remarking, in passing, that he 
was “especially happy that you indicate your agreement on the discussion between 
Personality and Individuality”.1 This distinction lies at the heart of Maritain’s theo-political 
anthropology and remained a constant in his mature writings, even as he himself shifted 
political allegiance.  
At first appearance, such underlying consistency seems improbable. As John Hughes 
observed, Maritain’s political writings appear varied to the point of contradictory.2 Anti-
modernist, anti-liberal, monarchist, neo-mediaevalist, defender of “high papalist views of 
ecclesiastical intervention in political spheres”, and at one point sympathetic towards the 
views of the Action Française, he became, and is better remembered for being, a champion of 
democracy, pluralism, religious freedom, human rights, and what James Chappel has 
termed his “fraternal Catholic modernism”.3 This is not obvious evidence for an underlying 
consistency. 
In reality, the changes were more cosmetic than profound, exaggerated by a shift in 
rhetoric, from the strident tone of Three Reformers (1925) and The things that are not Caesar’s 
(1930) to the more emollient tone of the 1940s and ‘50s. Rousseau and Descartes never 
stopped being his arch-villains; he just seemed to get less angry about their villainy. From 
the time he was first introduced to the Summa Theologiae in 1908, Thomism was the 
consistent bedrock of his political theology and there are continuities in his thought – a 
focus on the human person, the “primacy” of the spiritual, the consequent (qualified) 
affirmation of religious freedom and antipathy towards secular liberalism – that can 
remain hidden under his more public allegiances. There was, in the words of Bernard 
Doering, an “unbroken continuity” in Maritain’s economic thought, the “whole thrust” 
which was toward “a just and equitable redistribution of wealth,” which, by his reckoning, 
could not be achieved by either totalitarian or democratic capitalist state.4 
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Arguably the most consistent element within all this was Maritain’s insistence that a 
proper humanistic understanding of state, society and civilisation was centred on the 
concept of the person. The city exists for the person “whose destiny is God,” he wrote in 
Three Reformers.5 “Man is by no means for the State. The State is for man”, he wrote in Man 
and the State, quarter of a century later.6 The Christian’s “temporal activity”, he reasoned in 
Integral Humanism, is to generate and sustain social structures that have “as their measure 
justice [and] the dignity of the human person.”7 All in all, no understanding of state or 
society is possible without a prior understanding of the person. 
This chapter draws primarily on Man and the State (1951), The Person and the Common Good 
(1947), Christianity and Democracy (1943), The Rights of Man and the Natural Law (1942), 
Scholasticism and Politics (1940) and Integral Humanism (1936), while also integrating ideas 
from Three Reformers (1925), The things that are not Caesar’s (1930) and Freedom in the Modern 
World (1933) in exploring the way in which Maritain’s theological anthropology informed 
his political theology and in particular his understanding of the proper function of the state 
with regard to the provision of welfare. It argues that, an apparent tension in his 
conceptualisation of individuality and personality notwithstanding, Maritain’s ‘persons’ 
have a materiality and freedom of autonomy (not the same as freedom of choice) that 
should be ordered to the ends of personality, through enabling the distinct human goods of 
communication and gift. 
Anthropology 
Individuality 
Given the centrality of the person to Maritain’s thought, it may seem paradoxical to begin 
with his emphasis on the individual. Yet without recognising Maritain’s understanding of 
the individual, we miss critical elements of his personalism and, in particular, a persistent 
tension that underlies his articulation of how person and individual relate to one another. 
His early book Three Reformers places at the door of its three subjects – Luther, Descartes 
and Rousseau –the sins of modernity, at the heart of which stands an uncritical, subjective 
and solipsistic conception of the individual.8 Luther, we are told, isolated “irremediably 
what is ourselves from what is ‘other’, our spiritual vessel from the surrounding ocean.”9 
Descartes is accused of the “sin of angelism” in which human knowledge is judged 
“intuitive, as to its mode, innate, as to its origin, [and] independent of things, as to its 
nature.”10 By dint of following “the endless inclinations of material individuality,” Rousseau 
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completely broke “the unity of the spiritual self…nothing but egoism remains and there is 
no ego, but only a stream of phantoms.”11 
These three ‘Reformers’ may have been the fons et origo of modernity’s isolation of the 
individual, but they were not guilty of creating the concept of the individual. The existence 
of the human being as individual was not, in itself, in doubt or a problem. Rather, the issue 
lay in the way that the ‘Reformers’ detached the individual from the rest of the created 
order and imagined that human nature was somehow “self-enclosed or self-sufficient”.12 
Grounding his argument in his Thomism,13 Maritain reasoned that being an ‘individual’ was 
simply a case of having discrete material existence. The word “individuality” was simply 
based on the “principle of individuation…by which that which is here will differ from what 
is there”, and was therefore used legitimately of “man and beast, to plant, microbe, and 
atom.”14 As created beings, humans were individuals in the sense that they had “uniquely 
distinct determinations with respect to location in space”, a quality that applied just as 
much to inanimate as to animate things.15  
What that individuality meant for humans depended in part on how it related to 
“personality”, for unlike ‘things’, human beings were also possessed of personality.16 This, 
however, was not always consistently stated in Maritain’s writings, and different 
metaphors present subtly different conceptualisations of individuality. 
Maritain uses several analogies to convey the inter-relationship between individuality and 
personality in the human being. On several occasions, he argues that the human being is 
held “between two poles: a material pole… and a spiritual pole”, the former serving as “the 
material condition and the shadow…of personality”, the latter concerning “personality 
itself.”17 Human society, he reasons in The Person and the Common Good is caught between 
and shaped by the same two poles.18 He uses a similar analogy in Scholasticism and Politics, 
where he suggests that human action “can follow either the slope of personality of the 
slope of individuality”.19 
Such metaphors suggest an antagonistic relationship, in which individuality and 
personality are locked into a zero-sum game, the human being gravitating either to one 
pole or the other, following either one slope or the other. This theme runs through his 
work and is sometimes made explicit, such as when, in The Rights of Man and the Natural Law 
he states that individuality and personality “are distinct in each one of us and… create in us 
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two attractions in conflict within one another.”20 In this understanding, human 
individuality is characterised by a materiality that humans need somehow to transcend. 
Maritain could also use more integrative language and metaphors, however, even within 
the same text, such as when he insisted in Scholasticism and Politics that “I am wholly an 
individual, by reason of what I receive from matter, and I am wholly a person, by reason of 
what I receive from spirit”.21 Individuality is still materiality, but not the kind of materiality 
that exists over and against personality. Here the preferred metaphor is not dual poles or 
alternative slopes but a “painting”, which “is in its entirety a physico-chemical complex, by 
reason of the colouring materials out of which it is made, and a work of beauty, by reason 
of the painter’s art.”22 By this account, the relationship between individuality and 
personality is not one of tension but of complementarity. Humans are individual and 
personal, and the tension comes, in as far as it does, in whether we choose to recognise 
both the “physico-chemical complex” and “a work of beauty”, or only one.23 
This tension in the relationship between individuality and personality manifests itself in 
Maritain’s discussions of human transcendence. This is undoubtedly a key aspect of his 
anthropology, as illustrated by his claim, in Man and the State, that human life “has two 
ultimate ends, the one subordinate to the other: an ultimate end in a given order, which is 
the terrestrial good…and an absolute ultimate end, which is the transcendent, eternal 
common good.”24 By his very nature, or more precisely his “liberty”, the human person 
“transcends the stars and all the world of nature”.25  
However, what this means depends in some measure on what the person is transcending. 
In some instances, this sounds like it is individuality in the sense of materiality. According 
to Maritain, perfect personality is seen only on earth in those who escape earthly things. 
He writes in Three Reformers “truly perfect personality is only found in saints… [who] have 
received by grace, what God possesses by nature: independence of all created things, not only 
in regard to bodies but even in regard to intelligences.”26 This might be put down to the 
generally more animated register of this early book, but Maritain makes a similar point in 
the much later The Person and the Common Good. “Infinitely above the city of men, there is a 
society of pure Persons, who are at the summit of individuality, but without the shadow of 
individuation of matter…Each one is in the other through an infinite communion”.27 
Similarly, in Christianity and Democracy he writes how the person is “immersed in the 
constraints emanating from material nature within and outside man”.28  
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Contrary to this, transcendence is also used to mean the person finding his or her telos with 
God who transcends the created order, rather than escape from that order. The human 
person “is ordained directly to God as its absolute ultimate end”, he writes in The Person and 
the Common Good, an ordination that transcends “every created common good”.29 The 
person’s “proper good” as a person “is achieved in the union of grace and charity with 
God”,30 or as he expressed it in Freedom in the Modern World, it is through communion with 
pure Personality of the Holy Trinity, in whom “the idea of personality reaches the 
plenitude of Pure Act.”31 
In spite of the tension in Maritain’s various metaphors for describing human individuality, 
and its relation to personality and transcendence, it seems that the ‘integration’ model is 
closer to Maritain’s true view. For all that certain passages appear to imply otherwise, 
materiality is not generally treated as something to be escaped from, but rather something 
to be ordered to the ends of personality. As he says explicitly in Scholasticism and Politics, 
“material individuality is not something bad in itself… what is bad, is to let this aspect of 
our being predominate in our actions.”32 This lies at the heart of the difference between 
anthropocentric and theocentric humanism that dominates Integral humanism, the former 
seeing man himself as “the centre of man, and therefore of all things”, thereby implying “a 
naturalistic conception of man and of freedom”; the latter seeing God as the centre of man, 
and implying “the Christian conception of man, sinner and redeemed”.33  
Freedom and autonomy 
Maritain’s persons are thus individuals, but more than individuals, marked out, in the first 
instance, by their freedom and autonomy.  
Maritain uses a range of words to define this characteristic of personhood: “freedom”, 
“choice”, “independence”, “liberty”, and “autonomy”, supplemented occasionally by “will”. 
The word person, he writes in Three Reformers, is “reserved for substances which, choosing 
their end, are capable of themselves deciding on the means, and of introducing series of 
new events into the universe by their liberty; for substances which can say after their kind, 
fiat, and it is so.”34 The New Christendom for which he argues in Integral Humanism must, 
among other things, respect “the freedom of autonomy of persons, a freedom that is one 
with their spiritual perfection”.35 “Society’s common work”, he writes in Scholasticism and 
Politics, “has its chief value in the freedom of personal expansion.”36 
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Such freedom is apt to be misunderstood. It is not freedom from the constraints of being 
part of the created order – or, rather, it should not be (Maritain sometimes infelicitously 
sounds as if it might be).37 Nor is it freedom of choice, per se, a distinction (between that and 
“freedom of autonomy”) he tries to draw in Freedom in the Modern World.38 Properly 
speaking, according to Maritain, the freedom of choice is ordered to freedom of autonomy. 
Free choice is not an “end in itself” and to treat it as such is to condemn man “to recurrent 
acts of choice without ever being able to commit himself”, launching him into “a dialectic 
of freedom which destroys freedom”. Freedom of choice, when untethered from “reason” 
or any conception of man’s true “last end”, tends merely “to dissipate in indefiniteness and 
indecision his personality, his freedom, and his capacity for love tends.”39 Contrary to such 
exhausting and depersonalising deliquescence – and contrary to what “many modern 
followers” of Kant think – freedom of choice is merely “a prerequisite to moral action; it 
does not constitute it”. The reason to choose is in order not to have to choose, to embrace 
willingly the bond of love – “for love is always a bond” – that is the true human end and 
good. 
As one of the parentheses above indicates, Maritain is at pains to stress how his 
conceptualisation of freedom of autonomy owes nothing to Kant. Indeed, a few years later, 
in a footnote in Integral Humanism, pertaining to his use of the phrase “freedom of 
autonomy”, he refers readers to his earlier book Freedom in the Modern World, in the process 
pointing out that he uses the phrase “in a sense at once Aristotelian and Pauline, but in 
nowise Kantian”.40 
The reason for Maritain’s insistent distancing himself from Kantian autonomy is two-fold. 
First, Maritain’s conceptualisation of freedom (or autonomy) are ultimately directed to and 
satisfied by an end that is God. Perfect freedom of autonomy, he writes in Freedom in the 
Modern World, is found in “sanctity”, for sanctity “embraces the freedom… of always 
choosing the Good”.41 After all, he reasons, “how can one make a fresh act of choice when 
one is at last in possession of that which one has chosen in preference to all?” Maritain’s 
freedom of choice is a vital tool in the development of personality, but “it will not survive 
before subsisting Good seen face to face”, for to choose something other when one is in that 
situation is simply to turn away from the person’s final good.42 
Second, and closely linked, Maritain is reluctant to ground human personhood in what he 
calls “Kantian” autonomy, because it is in the union of human autonomy and the Good that 
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human dignity resides. As he says in The Rights of Man and the Natural Law, “a person 
possesses absolute dignity because he is in direct relationship with the Absolute, in which 
alone he can find his complete fulfilment.”43 Society must be ordered to this understanding 
of the person – “there is in each human person a transcendent end, to which society itself 
and its common work is subordinated”, as he expresses it in Scholasticism and Politics44 – and this 
understanding of the human person is not exhausted by the idea of freedom as autonomy 
but requires the an understanding of persons deploying their freedom in such a way as to 
enable communication and gift.  
Communication and gift 
In his essay on ‘The Human Person and Society’, published in Scholasticism and Politics 
Maritain explains that the “subjectivity” of the person has nothing in common “with the 
unity without doors and windows of the Leibnitzian monad.”45 Such isolation might be the 
essence of individuality, but it is inimical to personality: “the person cannot be alone”.46 
Rather, personality demands “the communications of intelligence and love”: 
“Because of the very fact that I am a person and that I express myself to myself, I 
seek to communicate with that which is other and with others, in the order of 
knowledge and love. It is essential to personality to ask for dialogue.”47 
Communication with the “other” is “essential” to the development of personality. Here 
again, however, we catch a glimpse of the tension in Maritain’s model of individuality and 
personality. He reasons, in The Person and the Common Good, that “personality tends by 
nature to communion” in two ways.48 The first of these is “its inner urge to 
communications of knowledge and love.” This is a natural and good human inclination, one 
that sees the human person “overflow into social communications” in those two key areas, 
knowledge and love. The second, however, sounds a slightly different note, namely 
“because of its needs or deficiencies, which derive from its material individuality.”49 We appear 
to see here an example of how material individuality is a deficiency rather than a sufficient 
foundation for personality itself, thereby turning communication from a natural 
outpouring of the person’s orientation to communion to being a palliative for the 
individual’s material incompleteness. 
Maritain uses the formulation of “knowledge and love” to describe the substance of human 
communion on several occasions, the first of this pair indicating the exchange of that 
which we know about ourselves and the world, the second indicating the gift of self itself to 
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the other.50 Love, he writes, aims at the “centre”, the “deepest reality, the most substantial, 
hidden, existing reality in the beloved”. This centre is “inexhaustibly a source of existence, 
of goodness and action, capable of giving and of giving itself.”51 “In order to be able to give 
oneself,” Maritain reasons, “one must first exist… as a thing which subsists and which by 
itself exercises existence.”  
This essential connection between personality, love and self-giving is underlined in The 
Rights of Man and the Natural Law, in which Maritain writes of “the radical generosity 
inscribed within the very being of the person” and describes how it is “through love [that 
man] can give himself freely to beings who are, as it were, other selves to him.”52 He also 
offers more concrete examples of what it means later in the same essay in Scholasticism and 
Politics, when he explains that “when man gives his life for the community’s sake, he 
accomplishes through an act of such great virtue, the moral perfection by which the person 
asserts his supreme independence as regards the whole.”53 It is through complete self-
giving of this nature, even to the point of sacrifice, that the personality is made perfect. 
The parallel with Temple’s view, articulated for example in The Nature of Personality, that 
“self-sacrifice is self-realisation” will be apparent. 
A still more specific example is offered in a later essay in that collection, ‘Action and 
Contemplation’, in which Maritain draws the reader’s attention to the capacity for the 
structures of work and society to foster or undermine personality. Thus, for example, “you 
can give high wages to a workman for work manifestly useless – for instance, the task, 
which used to be imposed on convicts, of digging holes and then filling them up – and this 
workman will be driven to despair. It is essential to human work that it be useful to men.”54 
This is a telling example, not simply because it comes close to the empirical findings of Men 
without Work, and Temple’s theological reflections thereon, but also because it again reveals 
how the idea of personality as fostered by communication and gift can manifest itself in 
social and economic reality. As far as Maritain is concerned, this is no peripheral issue. 
“Man is both homo faber and homo sapiens, and he is homo faber before being in truth and 
actually homo sapiens,” he writes in the same essay. 
An important consequence of this understanding of the person as formed by 
communication and gift is Maritain’s recognition of the fluidity inherent in personality. 
Whereas the individual is a fixed entity, the “freedom of autonomy”, such as Maritain 
describes at the heart of personality, is not, and is capable of development or retardation. 
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Contrary to Rousseau, in Three Reformers, “man is not born free55, he becomes free; and he 
only gains his liberty on condition that he serves.”56 “Just as he is at the lowest level of 
intellectual beings,” Maritain says in Freedom in the Modern World, “so is he also the lowest 
level of personality…personality in the case of man is precarious and always in peril and 
must be achieved by a kind of progress.”57 A truly Christian humanism, he writes in Integral 
Humanism “does not immobilise man, either for good or evil… but [acknowledges that] in 
his inwards and spiritual being, man is still a nocturnal sketch of himself, and that before 
attaining to his true lineaments – at the end of time – he will have to pass through many 
moltings and renewals.”58 In several essays in Scholasticism and Politics (‘The Human Person 
and Society’ and ‘The Thomistic Idea of Freedom’59) he emphasises the dynamic nature of 
personality and that, accordingly, “the human person, he is but a person in embryo… Man 
must win his personality, as well as his freedom.”60 
Sin 
Despite the fact that Temple critiqued the Thomistic tradition for not adequately 
conveying “the awful pervasiveness and penetrating potency of sin in all departments of 
human life”,61 he shared something of Maritain’s conception of human sinfulness. Temple 
critiqued the “Continental Reformers” for having so interpreted the Fall of Man as to leave 
in fallen human nature “no capacity for recognising divine truth [and] all faculties 
vitiated”, a position that found its “logical expression in the doctrine of Karl Barth.”62 
Maritain similarly bemoaned how under Calvinism “there is no longer any free will, it has 
been killed by original sin”, and complained of the “primordial antihumanism” of “the 
Barthian position”, which in essence effected “a doctrine of annihilation of man before 
God.”63  
If Maritain had no sympathy with the idea of total human depravity, he was equally 
withering about the “romantic optimism” which ascribes to the people “a judgement which 
is always just and instincts which are always right.”64 As early as Three Reformers in 1925, he 
wrote that “it is a flagrant absurdity…to treat men as if they were perfect, and the 
perfection which has to be acquired…as a constituent of nature itself.”65 “It is difficult not 
to perceive in the work of Freud a punishment,” he wrote in an essay on ‘Freudianism and 
Psychoanalysis’ in Scholasticism and Politics, a punishment that was inflicted “upon the pride 
of that conceited, pharisaic personality, which rationalism had built up as an end supreme 
in itself.”66 
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Between these two poles of ‘Barthian anti-humanism’ and ‘Romantic optimism’, it is not 
always clear whether Maritain associates sin with human individuality (or, more precisely, 
with the result of undue and wilful dwelling on individuality at the expense of personality), 
or whether he sees it as something fundamentally alien and sinister to the human 
condition, even an active force within human history. 
Maritain raises the possibility of this latter option in Freedom in the Modern World, with “a 
serious question which we venture to call the question of the Evil One as an actor in 
history…the devil hang[ing] like a vampire on the side of history.”67 This is not a theme one 
hears much of in his writings, and he openly rejects what he calls “a satanocratic conception 
of the world and of the political city” in Integral Humanism, arguing that it “amounts finally 
to regarding nature and its external structures as abandoned by God to the principate of 
the devil.”68 Nonetheless, the possibility of sin as an invasive, alien presence within the 
human being, if not an actual agent like “the Evil One”, remains a live one. 
In contrast with this, Maritain more often sounds as if sin is closer to a falling short of 
natural and good human ambitions, rather than the active choice of evil. He writes in 
Scholasticism and Politics that “the nature of human will…necessarily desires – it cannot, as 
soon as it exercises itself, help desiring – beatitude.”69 Evil, he says in The Person and the 
Common Good, arises when “in our action, we give preponderance to the individual aspect of 
our being”.70 
On occasion, this can sound as if the wound of sin is not, in fact, that deep and might be 
successfully treated by educational or political medicine. Thus, for example, he writes in 
The Rights of Man and the Natural Law, that the person is “an animal gifted with reason” but 
that because the part of “animality” is “immense”, we need “a work of education” to 
“tam[e] the irrationality to reason”, and “develop the moral virtues [that] must constantly 
be pursued within the political body.”71 Similarly, he writes in Integral Humanism, in a 
passage that underlines his difference from Reinhold Niebuhr, that while it is “absurd to 
expect of the body politic that it make all men, individually taken, good and fraternal to 
one another”, it is entirely right to seek “social structures, institutions, and laws which are 
good and inspired by the spirit of fraternal love,” which in their construction “powerfully 
orient the energies of social life toward such a friendship.”72 
Conversely, there are moments when the wound of sin is deeper, both more pervasive and 
ineradicable. Thus, he writes viscerally in Christianity and Democracy – after the war – about 
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“the immense burden of animality, of egoism and of latent barbarism that men bear within 
themselves,” a formulation that sounds closer to “the awful pervasiveness and penetrating 
potency of sin” that Temple found wanting in the Thomistic tradition.73  
Maritain’s political theology is, thus, firmly grounded in his understanding of personality, 
albeit one that is beset by a certain tension over the relationship between individuality and 
personality and, in a shadow fashion, by a certain ambivalence over the depth and severity 
of the wound of sin within human nature. Persons are individuals, and although there 
remains some uncertainty about the extent to which materiality is something to be 
transcended or not, his most consistent view is that personality simply presupposes the 
spatio-temporal materiality of being an individual.  
Maritain has no doubts that personality is a spiritual good, in the sense that it is fulfilled by 
communion with God and cannot be fully realised on temporal earth. There is some lack of 
clarity over how far human sin is an invasive, alien and debilitating factor within this 
development of personality or how far it is simply part of human materiality. Again, his 
most consistent view is that sin is not the debilitating anti-humanist force he reads in the 
Reformed tradition, but a persistent failure inherent in mankind’s animal nature. Either 
way, he is consistently dismissive of the idea of human perfection or perfectibility, and 
believes that true human personality is found in the gift of self in communication that is 
enabled by human materiality and freedom. 
Political Theology 
Theological anthropology as the criterion for political theology 
As noted at the outset of this chapter, Maritain was explicit in his repeated insistence that a 
true concept of the human person needed to underpin any just and humane state, society 
and civilisation. There are points in his writings in which he makes that link clear and, 
indeed, in some instances he draws a direct link between specific aspects of his theological 
anthropology and certain political ideologies.  
Early on in Freedom in the Modern World, he emphasises how his conception of human 
freedom and its capacity to inhibit or foster human personality was a profoundly political 
question, and proceeds to align three distinct “philosophies of freedom” with 
contemporary socio-political arrangements.74 In the first, freedom of choice is an end in 
itself, generating a polity “that one may call liberal or individualist”. The concentration on 
this limited conception of freedom, and the attendant confusion of ends and means, means 
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that “essential values” of “social justice and the common good” are forgotten, and the 
“absolute right of each part to realize its choice tends naturally to dissolve the whole in 
anarchy”, save only for the “the construction of a positive system of social machinery”.  
In the second, freedom of choice is “rightly” abandoned for “freedom of autonomy”, but 
this is an autonomy conceived “as a type of transitive action, expressing itself in 
production and control; in material accomplishment.”75 Here, freedom “of the individual” 
gave way “before the grandeur of the common task”, as orchestrated “at the hands of 
political community itself or of the State”,76 meaning, in effect, that ultimate ends are as 
“imperialist or dictatorial” as those generated by the first philosophy of freedom.77  
The third freedom, which is grounded on a true understanding of human personality, 
orders society “not to the freedom of choice of each citizen” (as does the first) or to a 
narrowly temporal common good which is deemed ultimate and sufficient (as does the 
second) but to a “common good [that] is intrinsically subordinated to the eternal good of 
individual citizens.”78 
In a similar vein, although moving away from the explicit question of freedom, Maritain 
located his conceptualisation of the state between his understanding of the individual and 
the person. In as far as he is “a material individuality”, ‘man’ is part of the temporal state and 
cannot assert his good over it,79 he enters into society “as part whose good is inferior to the 
good of the whole.”80 But in as far as he is a person, the state is at his service, ontologically 
inferior to him and ordered to protect and serve the development of his personality.81 “By 
reason of his destination to the absolute, and because he is called upon to fulfil a destiny 
superior to time…the human person… surpasses all temporal societies … society exists for 
each person and is subordinated to it.”82  
Maritain’s understanding of the person generates a powerful antagonism to (bourgeois) 
liberalism which can be evidenced in virtually all of his major works throughout this 
period.83 Such liberalism conceives of the individual “as a little God”; “ground[s] everything 
in… the absolute liberty of property, business and pleasure”; eviscerates society of any 
“common task”; reduces “the community to an atomised mass of individuals confronted”; 
and “inevitably ends in étatisme, the hypertrophy and absolute primacy of State”; 
confronting the individual “with an all-powerful State” or producing “the omnipotence of 
the state”.84 There is no question of its compatibility with the personalist vision of human 
nature. 
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In a similar fashion, the capitalism spawned of liberalism is also dehumanising. Here his 
criticism is less visceral and concentrated primarily in one publication, Integral Humanism. 
Capitalism, Maritain reasons, is not without its virtues. Indeed, its objective spirit is one “of 
exaltation of the active and inventive powers, of the dynamism of man and of the 
initiatives of the individual”.85 Its major vice, however, comes from its monetized 
conceptualisation of the human. Under capitalism, the poor man exists not as a person but 
“only as an instrument of a production that yields profits”, whilst the rich man “exists only 
as a consumer (for the benefit of the capital that this same production serves).”86 
Personality is thus made subservient to capital, and in order to maintain “the monster of a 
usurious economy”, it becomes necessary “to tend to make of all men consumers.”87 
In as far as “the effort to deliver labour and man from the domination of money is an 
outgrowth of the currents released in the world by the preaching of the Gospel”, as 
Maritain claims in Christianity and Democracy, capitalism is anti-Christian and anti-
humanist.88 Unlike liberalism, however, whose anthropological misconception seems 
unredeemable, capitalism seems more like the wrong system erected on salvageable 
foundations. The task is to substitute for an economic system “based on the fecundity of 
money”, a “‘personalistic’ civilisation and a ‘personalistic’ economy”, with such 
“reorganisation… on a structural and cooperative principle” needing to come from below 
“according to the principles of personalist democracy… [and] emanating from them and 
their free unions and associations”.89 The solution to capitalism is not, in other words, to 
seek a “collectivist” economy, which comprises the third live option that Maritain firmly 
rejects.  
Maritain’s objection to collectivisation – ‘nationalisation’ or ‘socialism’ are better terms 
because, as we shall note, Maritain in fact commends certain forms of collectivisation90 – 
will be reasonably obvious, as it generates a system in which the conditions for the 
development of personality are severely undermined, if not altogether erased. He is 
prepared to acknowledge that “nationalisation” can be “opportune or necessary in certain 
cases”, and he recognises, in The Rights of Man and the Natural Law, that Christians and 
socialists have made common, or at least proximate, cause in England.91 However, he also 
recognises that for all Christianity and nationalisation might seem fellow travellers, there 
remains a grave “temptation” from “old socialist concepts”, to grant “primacy to economic 
technique,” and, by the same token, to entrust everything to the power of the State, 
administrator of the welfare of all, and to its scientific and bureaucratic machinery.”92 
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Accordingly, in so far as nationalisation is permissible, Maritain insists that it should also 
be exceptional, “limited to those public services so immediately concerned with the very 
existence, order, or internal peace of the body politic that a risk of bad management is then 
a lesser evil than the risk of giving the upper hand to private interests”.93 
In this way, his theological anthropology in/validates various political systems, to a greater 
or lesser degree. Maritain can, however, be more positive and constructive in outlining the 
kind of “political action” demanded by his conceptualisation of the person, which he 
describes in Scholasticism and Politics as having a “specific end [in] the common good of the 
earthly city.”94  
The communion that is central to Maritain’s conceptualisation of personality orients him 
away from any utilitarian or aggregative understanding of the good, a point that he 
repeatedly emphasises.95 The good sought through “political action” is not only the 
material security and comfort of every person – though, as we shall note, Maritain is very 
clear about the need for this – but the shared good that is inherently relational and cannot 
be ignored or individuated. At the same time, the temporality of the common good invites 
humility and self-restraint. While rejecting pessimistic or anti-humanistic views of human 
nature and potential, Maritain is nonetheless clear that Christian temporal activity “is not 
to make of this world itself the kingdom of God”, but rather to make of this world “the 
place of a truly and fully human earthly life”, one “whose social structures have as their 
measure justice, the dignity of the human person.”96 Maritain labels it as “an ultimate end 
in a relative sense”, as being something that is “intended to foster the higher ends of the 
human person”, without ever imagining it can be equated to the final human good.97  
This understanding of the temporal common good leads Maritain towards two more 
concrete goals, which he describes in Integral Humanism as “material and moral 
development” and in Christianity and Democracy and “welfare and freedom”.98 The first of 
these entails a certain level of material security, or, as he describes it in various works, a 
“progressive liberation from the bondage of material nature”, from “the diverse forms of 
economic and social bondage”, and “the pursuit of liberation from want, from fear and 
from servitude.”99 The second, by contrast, refers to conditions necessary for relational or 
associational health, what he describes in Christianity and Democracy as “the pursuit of the 
primary conditions and primary associations which are the prerequisites of a free life”, “of 
the superior possessions of culture and the mind”, a kind of “human plenitude” that is 
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perfectly realized “only by great love and the incessant gift of self.”100 In short, this two-
fold responsibility reflects a vision of political action as securing the material and the 
associational infrastructure to enable the development of human personality.  
Precisely what this entails institutionally and how it is to be achieved are not questions 
that Maritain deals with in any systematic way, although there are pointers throughout his 
work. Thus, when, in The Person and the Common Good, he outlines “that which constitutes 
the common good of political society”, he lists, somewhat enthusiastically:  
“the collection of public commodities and services – the roads, ports, schools, etc., 
which the organisation of common life presupposes; a sound fiscal condition of the 
state and its military power; the body of just laws, good customs and wise 
institutions, which provide the nation within its structure; the heritage of its great 
historical remembrances, its symbols and its glories, its living traditions and 
cultural treasures…. it [also] includes the sum of sociological integration of all the 
civic conscience, political virtues and sense of right and liberty, of all the activity, 
material prosperity and spiritual riches, of unconsciously operative hereditary 
wisdom, of moral rectitude, justice, friendship, happiness, virtue and heroism in the 
individual lives of its members.”101 
This is a capacious and, it must be said, somewhat unhelpful list, particularly when it comes 
to assessing how and by whom the temporal common good is to be sought. Maritain is 
reluctant to pin his theological colours to any political mast in this respect, repeatedly 
insisting that the personalistic conceptions he has drawn do not dictate any particular 
policy or even polity: 
“There exists a judgement of Catholicism about the duty to work on behalf of 
international peace and of the principles of social justice; but this judgement does 
not suffice to tell me what I should think of the law of the 40-hour week and of the 
statute of the League of Nations. It is my business to judge these problems as a 
Catholic…but without pretending to speak in the name of Catholicism.”102 
This is perhaps a little misleading, however, as Maritain had already written in Integral 
Humanism that it will be necessary “to elaborate a social, political, and economic 
philosophy which does not simply stop at universal principles, but which is capable of 
descending to concrete realisation.” This will presuppose “a vast amount of delicate work” 
but this work, he says, “has already begun; the encyclicals of Leo XIII and Pius XI.”103 In 
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other words, for all the necessary trepidation in translating his concept of the personal into 
specific political ideas and institutions, the message is proceed with caution, rather than 
not at all, and in particular proceed with a careful understanding of the structure of political 
society that he offers in Man and the State. 
The Political Structures for Personality 
Although Maritain recognises in the opening pages of Man and the State that various 
concepts he explores in that book – community, nation, society, body politic, and state – 
are “nomadic… shifting and fluid”, he also draws a critical distinction early on which he 
traces, albeit sometimes faintly, through his discussion.104 This is the distinction between 
what is exemplified by “community” and what is exemplified by “society”. The former, he 
explains, is “more of a work of nature and more nearly related to the biological”; the latter, 
by contrast, “is more a work of reason, and more nearly related to the intellectual and 
spiritual properties of man.”105 
The distinction is not, it is important to point out, that one is natural and the other is not. 
Maritain is clear that, for example, political society (which he also calls the “body politic”) 
and, within that, the state are wholly natural phenomena, the need for humans to organise 
and establish institutions of political authority being no less natural than the ethnic, 
geographical or linguistic solidarities around which communities form. 
Rather, the distinction between the two lies in the idea of ‘givenness’. A community forms 
around a given focus of loyalty which serves as the reason for, and catalyst of, its 
solidarity.106 It is a product of “instinct and heredity”.107 Thus, according to Maritain, the 
nation – not, importantly, the nation-state – is an example of a community. The nation is 
something “ethico-social: a human community based on the fact of birth and lineage… a 
community of people who become aware of themselves as history has made them…and who 
love themselves as they know or imagine themselves to be, with a kind of inevitable 
introversion.”108 A national community is formed round the pre-existing dimensions of 
blood or history or, as he might have added, soil.  
That does not make the nation homochromatic. On the contrary, Maritain sees it as “a 
community of communities, a self-aware network of common feelings and representations 
that human nature and instinct have caused to swarm around a number of physical, 
historical and social data.”109 The nation is made up of other communities worthy of the 
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name, most clearly the family, but also other regional, local, linguistic, and ethnic 
communities. 
This view of the nation as community does not mean it is wholly independent of, or 
indifferent to, ideas and structures of “society”. On the contrary, it is not uncommon, 
Maritain reasons, for a political society to give rise “naturally…to a national community of 
a higher degree”, so that “the Nation here depends on the existence of the body politic” 
rather than the other way round. In effect, at its strongest, the State can cause the Nation 
to form, the obvious example of this being a “multi-national Federation of States” such as 
the United States (in which Maritain had now settled) which “is at the same time a 
multinational Nation.”110 
If community forms around a given object of loyalty, society is formed round a chosen or 
attained one.111 As with community, “social life as such brings men together by reason of a 
certain common object.”112 That noted, in society “personal consciousness retains 
priority.”113 In a society the object is “a task to be done or an end to be aimed at, which 
depends on the determinations of human intelligence and will.”114 Thus, illustrates 
Maritain, whereas regional, ethnic, and linguistic groups, and social classes are examples of 
communities, the business firm, the labour union, and scientific association are examples of 
society.115 
As, of course, is the state, although Maritain takes care in delineating this particular 
society, and especially how it relates to the wider “body politic” or “political society”. For 
Maritain, as noted, the body politic is a society rather than a community. However, from 
the outset there is a tension in this signalled by his description of political society as being 
both “required by nature and achieved by reason”.116 This positions the body politic in a 
liminal zone in which the cause of its existence is pre-existent (which would orient it 
towards being a community) whilst the form of its existence is dependent on the exercise 
of human choice and reason (thereby making it a society). This manifests itself in certain 
characteristics of the body politic, such as Maritain’s explanation that “justice is a primary 
condition for the existence of the body politic, but Friendship is its very life-giving form.”117 
Such a dual characteristic does not alter the moral content or purpose of the body politic, 
but it does create some confusion over how that is to be achieved. Does the body politic (as 
opposed to the various communities and societies that subsist within it) require solidarity 
and fellowship (“Friendship”) in order to serve its ends, or is it grounded primarily in the 
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securing of justice, in which case such immediate conditions of solidarity and fellowship 
should be irrelevant? Put more bluntly in Maritain’s preferred terms, does the body politic 
live on justice alone, or on justice and friendship?  
As just noted, this will inform how the body politic should achieve its ends, rather than 
what those ends are. Here Maritain is clearer. Using terms familiar from his theological 
anthropology, Maritain writes that “the political task is essentially a task of civilisation and 
culture, of helping man to conquer his genuine freedom of expansion or autonomy”.118 
After the fashion of the New Christendom Maritain envisaged in Integral Humanism, that 
“task” is now a specifically secular one, a temporal common good that knows its limits. 
That temporal common good is not a neutral, objective or value-less good. “Such a body 
politic Christianly inspired…would have its own social and political morality, its own 
conception of justice and civic friendship, temporal common good and common task, 
human progress and civilisation, vitally rooted in Christian awareness.”119 But it would 
nonetheless remain a firmly earthly good. “The final aim and most essential task of the 
body politic or political society… it is…to better the conditions of human life itself.”120  
If this is the final goal of the body politic, Maritain is also clear that for all it might be 
autonomous, the body politic is plural, and that the end that is proper to it is to be achieved 
by recognising and supporting those communities and societies “whose essential rights and 
freedoms are anterior to itself.”121 This is where Maritain’s distinction between the body 
politic and the state comes in. Maritain writes in Man and the State that unlike the various 
societies and communities that populate a nation, and indeed unlike the nation itself, the 
State does not have a corporate personality. “The notion of moral or collective personality 
applies in a genuine manner to the body politic”, he states in a footnote.122 “Both the people 
and the body politic are subjects (or holders) of rights”.123 By contrast, that “same notion of 
moral personality” does not apply to the State.”  
He makes a similar point, even more forcefully, regarding “sovereignty”, pulling apart the 
familiar phrase “sovereign state” with the same force he does “nation state”. Neither of the 
two elements inherent in the concept of sovereignty, according to Maritain – “a natural and 
inalienable right to supreme independence and supreme power” and “the absolutely and 
transcendently supreme character of that independence and power” can “by any means” be 
ascribed to the State.” The State “is not and has never been genuinely sovereign.”124 
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Neither sovereign nor possessed of moral personality or rights, the state according to 
Maritain is “a merely abstract entity”.125 “Superior” to the “other organs or collective 
parts” of the body politic, it is not, however, superior “to the body politic itself”.126 This 
combination of inferiority and superiority is grounded in the theological anthropology 
outlined above: the state as superior to individuals that populate it, but inferior to, and in 
the service of, their emergent personalities, and the societies and communities by means of 
which they emerge. “The State is… at the service of the body politic as a whole”.127 
Maritain tries to spell out what this service comprises. The state, he explains, is that part of 
the body politic “especially concerned with the maintenance of law, the promotion of the 
common welfare and public order, and the administration of public affairs”.128 It is “an 
impersonal lasting super-structure…bound by law and by a system of universal 
regulations.”129 Its “concrete… principle function” is “to ensure the legal order and 
enforcement of the law”.130 Its “final aim” is “the common good of the political society.”131  
While this definition, or series of definitions, falls short of the concrete elaboration of 
social, political, and economic philosophy that he called for in Integral Humanism, it does 
allow Maritain to identify when the state is failing in its duties. Thus, he is clear on the 
unacceptable extremes that correspond to the philosophies of freedom outlined in Freedom 
in the Modern World, namely the state’s abnegation of its responsibility for the temporal 
common good on the one hand, and the its undue accretion of power and significance, 
verging on its sanctification, on the other. 
Of the first, Maritain writes, in sentiments that Temple would echo, that from the latter 
years of the nineteenth century onwards, state “intervention” has been “needed to 
compensate for the general disregard for justice and human solidarity that prevailed” 
before.132 Accordingly, the growth of the state “as a rational or juridical machine and with 
regard to its inner constitutive system of law and power, its unity, its discipline”, and, in 
the twentieth century, “as a technical machine and with regard to its law making, 
supervising, and organizing functions in social and economic life” are, Maritain reasons, 
“part of normal progress” – not something against which we should automatically 
complain.133 
Unfortunately, however, this growth legitimated certain latent self-aggrandizing 
tendencies, epitomised by Hegel, whom Maritain criticises, as “the prophet and theologian 
of the totalitarian, divinised State,” leaving the legacy of a hyperactive state, which 
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wrongly “ascribe[d] to itself a peculiar common good.”134 As a result, the aforementioned 
primary duty of the state, namely the enforcement of social justice, is now “inevitably 
performed” with “abnormal emphasis on power of the State” which finds itself having to 
make up “for the deficiencies of a society whose basic structures are not sufficiently up to 
the mark with regard to justice.”135  
In response, Maritain identifies the “most urgent endeavour” for democracies as being the 
development of “social justice” and the improvement of “world economic management”, 
without simultaneously allowing “too many functions of social life [to be] controlled by the 
State from above.”136 Put another way, the task involves the reconstruction of what 
Maritain calls “the paternalist State”, which not only supervises the common good (which 
he claims is “normal”), but which actively manages and controls it.137  
Man and the State does not go into much detail as to what this might look like, but it does 
give an indication when Maritain writes that  
“in order both to maintain and make fruitful the movement for social improvement 
supported by the State, and to bring the State back to its true nature, it is necessary 
that many functions now exercised by the State should be distributed among the 
various autonomous organs of a pluralistically structured body politic.”138 
It is to the details of those “many functions”, specifically those related to the provision of 
welfare, to which we now turn. 
The State and the Temporal Common Good 
Maritain outlines three key and linked constructive ideas for the state that honours a 
personalistic anthropology: the socialisation of the economy; the securing of a rich, 
devolved, and multidimensional social ecology of associational activity; and the recognition 
and upholding of rights as a means of safeguarding human dignity. Each of these, in its own 
way, speaks to Maritain’s vision for a welfare state, a subject he only rarely tackles directly. 
Economic socialisation, Maritain is clear, is not the same as nationalisation. It seeks not to 
ignore or replace private interest, but to “purify…and to ennoble [it].”139 It is, in effect, the 
structural recognition “of the ‘common use’ on which Thomas Aquinas has laid particular 
stress”.140 It is to be effected by several means, supreme among which is the principle of co-
ownership. Socialisation refers to the process of “social integration” through which 
“association in a single enterprise extends not only to the capital invested, but also to labor 
and management…All persons and various groups involved are made participants in some 
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form or other of co-ownership and co-management.”141 The objective is not – like 
nationalisation or communism – to remove ownership of property or goods from people, 
and not – like capitalism – to acquiesce to the limitation of ownership “to a small number 
of privileged ones”, but rather but “to give to each person the real and concrete possibility 
of acceding…to the advantages of the private ownership of earthly goods.”142 Such a 
localised, personalistic form of ‘socialisation’ recognises “the sense of the dignity of work”, 
which replaces “the contempt of the owning classes for the manual labourer” that is 
alleged to be inherent to capitalism.143 
Such “undertakings” are to be run locally, “on the spot, by private enterprises co-ordinated 
with one another and by the various communities of the very people concerned.” 
Maritain’s is a vision of what he calls “progressive decentralistaion” or “‘destatisation’”, in 
which the state’s role is not to “plan” or “manage” this activity but to offer it “support”.144 
This phrase is left undefined in Man and the State, although Maritain gives some indication 
of what it might entail in The Rights of Man and the Natural Law, when he talks of “the right to 
a just wage”, the system of “joint ownership and of joint management [that] will replace 
the wage system”, and the “freedom to organise”.145 In other words, the role of the state in 
securing the socialised economy that Maritain sees as properly honouring the theocentric 
personalistic humanism that underpins his politics is in securing the legal infrastructure – 
framed largely in terms of rights – “from which a new economic organisation will emerge”. 
The second key idea – that of securing a rich, devolved, and multidimensional ecology of 
associational activity – is, in some regards, an extension of Maritain’s socialised economy 
into wider social spheres. The former, in the words of The Rights of Man and the Natural Law, 
is a vision of “an ‘associative’ ownership of the means of production”; the latter a “pluralist 
pattern of social life”, characterised by “the free initiative of and mutual tension between 
the particular groups, working communities, co-operative agencies, unions, associations, 
federated bodies of producers and consumers, rising in tiers and institutionally 
recognised.”146 
This vision, for which, like Temple, he refers both to Harold Laski and R.M. MacIver, is one 
in which society is marked by extensive, localised, group activity, what he calls in Integral 
Humanism an “organic heterogeneity in the very structure of civil society”.147 These bodies 
would exist of their own right, “independent of the State and subject only to the general 
dispositions concerning the right of free association.”148 They would, accordingly, have the 
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“greatest autonomy possible.”149 In the “economic sphere” at least, each group “would exist 
as a moral person… endowed with as much autonomy as the organisation of the social 
whole will allow.”150 
Here Maritain is elaborating on the principle of subsidiarity, to which he refers, via 
Quadragesimo Anno, in Integral Humanism.151 According to Man and the State, “everything in 
the body politic which can be brought about by particular organs or societies inferior in 
degree to the State and born out of the free initiative of the people should be brought about 
by those particular organs or societies.”152 The state’s role thereby becomes one of 
“arbitrage”153 or “regulation”154, controlled by the nation and ordered to realisation of the 
common good, in which such groups “play a consultative role”.155 
As the above quotation from Integral Humanism indicates, Maritain envisages this pluralism 
to be natural, “organic”, with “its own spontaneous life”.156 This vision, however, is 
vulnerable to the potential challenge of ‘deep diversity’. What, if anything, provides the 
centripetal force that counterbalances the centrifugal effect of pluralism, thereby 
sustaining the “organic heterogeneity” of associational democracy? 
Integral Humanism proposes, at considerable length, an answer to this in Maritain’s vision of 
a New Christendom, whose unity is no longer that of “the same faith and the same 
dogmas.”157 In contrast to the religious unity of the Middle Ages, the party-based unity of 
Italy or Germany, or the proletariat-based unity of Russia, the unity of a personalist 
democracy is a unity “of orientation, which proceeds from a common aspiration” and is 
“based on a general sense of direction, a common orientation”, “a simple unity of 
friendship”.158 It is “a minimal unity” although one that, Maritain remarks in a footnote 
without any real evidence or reason, “is much superior to that of the liberal-individualist 
city, which is null to tell the truth… and exists only as mechanical unity assured by the 
dominance of the State.”159 
That claimed, he nonetheless seems unsure about it, as implied by his subsequent 
admission that “the simply unity of friendship…does not suffice to give a form to this social 
body.”160 Maritain’s vision of rich associational pluralism is predicated on some sense of 
social homogeneity or unity. “A genuine democracy implies a fundamental agreement 
between minds and wills on the bases of common life… it must bear within itself a common 
human creed, the creed of freedom.”161 However, his proposed “unity of friendship”, or as he 
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puts it in Freedom and the Modern World “unity of Becoming or of orientation” is itself, it 
appears, dependent on deeper foundations that it cannot itself sustain.162  
This unity apparently “springs from a common aspiration” and “gathers elements of 
heterogeneous culture…into a form of civilisation which is fully consonant with the eternal 
interests of human personality and with man’s freedom of autonomy.”163 That, however, 
sounds like a rather substantial set of assumptions – “common aspiration… eternal 
interests of human personality… freedom of autonomy” – which are seemingly rooted in a 
Christian worldview that Maritain assumes will somehow underpin the new minimal unity. 
Unlike Temple, whose commitment to the established church always provided a significant 
concrete centripetal force to counterbalance the potential centrifugalism of pluralism, 
Maritain struggled to identify a unity that would sustain his pluralist democracy. His idea 
of a rich, devolved, and multidimensional ecology of associational activity as the vehicle for 
the provision of welfare is therefore essential to his visions but also vulnerable to the 
accusation that it presupposes the ethical solidarity that will cohere and sustain it. 
The third key idea – the recognition and upholding of rights as a means of safeguarding 
human dignity – is one that appears least complicated in Maritain’s writing. Maritain’s 
wholesale favouring of rights, from a natural law basis, will seem contentious. Samuel 
Moyn, charting the development of human rights in the 1930s and ‘40s, wrote that “nearly 
all histories of the political language concur that the rise of rights in political theory 
occurred after and because of the destruction of the Thomistic natural law tradition.”164 
Maritain, however, had no hesitation in making the link between natural law and human 
rights, as Moyn acknowledges.165  
The simple reason, articulated at greatest length in The Rights of Man and the Natural Law is 
that “the human person possesses rights because of the very fact that he is a person.”166 
Talk of human dignity “means nothing” if it does not signify that by virtue of natural law, 
“the human person has the right to be respected, is the subject of rights”.167 The move from 
having the right to be respected to having rights is smooth for Maritain, as is the move 
from having rights to having the specific, concrete rights judged necessary for him to 
“fulfil his destiny” that Maritain enumerates at considerable length in the book. These are 
firmly distinguished from the notion of rights articulated by Kant and Rousseau,168 
grounded in natural law, “rooted in the vocation of the person”, and correlated, at least 
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notionally, to the “notion of moral obligation”.169 They are also extensive, Maritain’s 
“résumé” of them taking up three pages at the end of The Rights of Man and the Natural Law. 
Here, Maritain divides them into three categories – the rights “of the human person as 
such”, the rights of the “civic person”, and the rights of the “social person” – the first 
group encompassing existence, liberty, family life, property, and the like; the second 
participation in political life, equal suffrage, equal rights, etc.; and the third the right to 
choose work, form trade unions, earn a just wage, and “to relief, unemployment insurance, 
sick benefits and social security.”  
Maritain acknowledges that rights do not in themselves make real his vision of personalist 
democracy. “The advocates of a liberal-individualistic, a communistic, or a personalist type 
of society will lay down on paper similar, perhaps identical, lists of the rights of man.”170 
What makes a difference is the particular ordering of those rights.171 Advocates of a 
“liberal-individualistic type of society” will see the mark of human dignity first and 
foremost “in the power of each person to appropriate individually the goods of nature in 
order to do freely whatever he wants.” Those of a “communistic type of society” will see it 
in “the power to submit these same goods to the collective command of the social body in 
order to ‘free’ human labour (by subduing it to the economic community).” Personalists, by 
contrast, will see it “in the power to make these same goods of nature serve the common 
conquest of intrinsically human, moral, and spiritual goods and of man’s freedom of 
autonomy.”172 So it is that Maritain sees the development of human personality as being 
best secured by the recognition and protection of human, civic and social rights, the state 
having a regulatory function in the socialised economy and civil society, but also being 
responsible for the protection of these rights, and in particular a personalist ‘ordering’ of 
them – although precisely what that might look like is left undefined.  
Conclusion 
Our reading of Maritain enables us to build on the picture of the connection between 
theological anthropology and the welfare state that we began in the work of William 
Temple. In many ways, there is important complementarity between the two.  
Both trace, and emphasise the significance of, the link between theologically-informed 
anthropology and a theory of the (welfare) state, underlining how a proper approach to the 
latter demands serious engagement with the former. Both draw out a multi-dimensional 
conception of that personhood, although this is at least in part because Maritain’s thought 
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influenced Temple’s from the 1930s, shaping and supplementing his longstanding ideas 
about personality and fellowship. Both have a somewhat equivocal understanding of the 
depth of the wound of sin for human character and behaviour. Both articulate theological 
anthropologies that understand the person as aspiring to freedom and autonomy (properly 
understood); both discern him/her as created for and only satisfied by relationship with 
others; and both see him/her as fulfilled ultimately in the act of self-giving. Both set out a 
consequent conception of the (welfare) state in which a rich ecology of associational 
activity is the primary vehicle for the delivery of welfare. Both advocate the ‘socialisation’ 
(to use Maritain’s word) of the economy and the potential for partnership and co-operative 
ventures for both economic and welfare activities. And both envision the state as 
performing the role of broker or co-ordinator for this associational activity. 
All that noted, Maritain’s thinking augments and refines Temple’s in some important ways. 
Maritain has a more developmental anthropology than Temple, more alert to the ways in 
which personhood grows (or is retarded) by communication and relationship. He has a 
more (or at least more consistent) understanding of the human as homo faber, and therefore 
a more fully formed conception of the dignity and significance of work as a factor within 
‘welfare’ that honours personhood. And Maritain also has a clearer, if not unproblematic, 
idea of the separation of the different political structures involved in the formation of 
personality: community, nation, society, body politic, and state. In this respect, beyond any 
other, Maritain stands separate from Temple, whose theology and context oriented him to 
a closer identification of nation, society, body politic, and state, albeit one that fluctuated 
in his adult lift according to circumstances such as war, coronation and Prayer Book Crisis. 
Maritain, inhabiting the political words of secular France and US, and the intellectual world 
of Thomism, could not fall back on such a close church-state-nation nexus. Conversely, 
however, that nexus did at least supply Temple with an underlying political ethic which 
Maritain’s discussion of the ethical basis of a personalist democracy lacks. 
Although Maritain never attains the political precision of Temple’s Christianity and Social 
Order, he does locate his vision of a personalistic, associational welfare along the geo-
political spectrum of the time, between liberal and totalitarian ideologies, while also being 
somewhat more precise about what such a welfare state entails (albeit explored through 
the lens of rights):  
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“the right freely to choose his work… to form vocational groups or trade unions… of 
the worker to be considered socially as an adult… of economic groups…and other 
social groups to freedom and autonomy… to a just wage… the right to work… the 
right to the joint ownership and joint management of the enterprise and to the 
‘worker’s title’… the right to relief, unemployment insurance, sick benefits and 
social security.”173 
Superficially, as with Temple, this might read as an unqualified approval for ‘the’ post-war 
welfare state, albeit with the qualification set out in the introductory chapter that there is 
no such thing as the welfare state. Maritain was certainly clear about the need for what we 
might call, without undue anachronism, universal social security. It is this that lies behind 
his quoting John Courtney Murray in the footnotes in Man and the State (without comment 
but, we can safely assume, without disagreement): “the modern ‘welfare-state’, simply by 
serving human welfare, would serve the Church better than Justinian or Charlemagne ever 
did.”174 His articulation of the rights due to the person, at the end of The Rights of Man and 
the Natural Law lends itself to a similar reading.  
However, this would be to downplay the agential, relational, and self-giving aspects of his 
personalistic anthropology and also to pay insufficient attention to his repeated clarity 
about how the human’s primary needs were material and spiritual. Persons were moral 
agents, made for the free exercise of their autonomy, ordered to sociality and 
communication, with one another and with God, and fulfilled in their capacity for self-
giving. No welfare state that treated them primarily as recipients or objects of material 
security fully honoured that personhood, just as no state that failed to respect the freedom 
of the church and of other non-state associations to serve this personalistic temporal 
common good could be acceptable.  
1 Lambeth Palace Library records, MS. 4515, 100 
2 Hughes (2010) 
3 Chappel (2018), esp. chapters 3 and 4 
4 Doering (1985), pp. 64-72.  
5 Maritain (1928), p.22 
6 Maritain (1951), p. 13. 
7 Maritain (1936), p. 221. See also Maritain (1951), p. 10; Maritain (1940), p. 66; Maritain (1944), p. 77. 
8 Maritain (1928), p. 84. 
9 Maritain (1928), p. 47. 
10 Maritain (1928), pp. 54, 56.  
11 Maritain (1928), p. 99. 
12 Maritain (1940), p. 2. 
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4: “ The meaning of that body [is] the reciprocal self-
gift of persons” : John Paul II  
Introduction 
“I devote my very rare free moments to a work that is close to my heart”, then Cardinal 
Karol Wojtyła wrote to his friend Henri de Lubac in February 1968. This, he said, was “the 
metaphysical sense and mystery of the person”. The “evil of our times”, he went on to 
explain, “consists in… a kind of degradation, indeed a pulverization, of the fundamental 
uniqueness of each human person.” It as an evil of the “metaphysical” rather than just the 
moral order, which required not “sterile polemics” but “a kind of recapitulation of the 
inviolable mystery of the person.”1 
Borne of his experiences under Soviet influence in post-war Poland, this focus on the 
mystery and dignity of the human person was central to Wojtyła’s intellectual and personal 
concerns throughout his life. “The two totalitarian systems which tragically marked our 
century…I came to know…from within,” he wrote in an essay marking the 50th anniversary 
of his priestly ordination, “so it is easy to understand my deep concern for the dignity of 
every human person.”2 
According to Richard Spinello, from the time he was a young priest in Krakow, Wojtyła’s 
was “disturbed by questionable trajectories in anthropology.”3 “When I discovered my 
priestly vocation,” he wrote in Crossing the Threshold of Hope, “man became the central 
theme of my pastoral work”.4 This matured through the years of the Second Vatican 
Council and beyond. According to Jarosław Kupczak, Wojtyła made “extensive 
contributions” to the drafting of Gaudium et spes in 1965, and he quoted the document 
frequently in his later encyclicals,5 placing particular emphasis on its insistence that “man 
is the source, the center, and the purpose of all economic and social life”.6 He later praised 
the “Christological character” of the “anthropological revolution” that Vatican II brought 
about, going on to state that “the anthropology that lies at the heart of the entire Conciliar 
Magisterium”7  
The year after he wrote to de Lubac, he published, Osoba i czyn, translated a decade later 
into English under the title The Acting Person: A Contribution to Phenomenological Anthropology. 
He pledged in his inaugural mass as Pope “to serve Christ and with Christ’s power to serve 
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the human person and the whole of mankind”.8 His first papal encyclical, Redemptor hominis 
was devoted exclusively to theme of Christian anthropology. He saw the “correct view of 
the human person and of his unique value” as the guiding principles of Pope Leo XIII’s 
Rerum novarum and, thereafter, “of all of the Church’s social doctrine”.9 There is, in short, a 
clear continuity of focus in John Paul II’s thinking, not only a focus of topic – “the 
metaphysical sense and mystery of the person” as he told de Lubac – but also of message, 
with, as we shall see, ideas of human createdness, transcendence, rationality, agency, 
relationship, and gift are visible throughout his pre-papal and papal writings. 
That said, there are two caveats that merit attention and help explain the specific focus of 
this chapter. The first is that while there was indeed continuity in the anthropological 
focus of Karol Wojtyła/ John Paul II’s thought, there was less continuity – or at least more 
variety – in the source and foundation of that thought.  
Wojtyła’s intellectual genesis has been much written about.10 His first doctoral thesis was 
on St John of the Cross and his statement there that “the human person comes to know God 
as a Divine Person a ‘subject’ in a reciprocal relationship of mutual self-giving” is 
recognisable in his later, papal writings.11 That said, although John Paul II never repudiated 
the influence of St John of the Cross, Aquinas, or the phenomenologist, Max Scheler, on 
whom he wrote his ‘habilitation’ thesis, the early foundations of his personalism did shift, 
after Vatican II and, in particular, when he becomes pope, and adopted a much more 
scriptural and more Christocentric focus than his early writings.  
In his pre-Vatican II writings, Wojtyła operates in a similar register to Jacques Maritain, 
although he references Maritain only infrequently and, at least according to Michael 
Novak, cannot really be understood “within Maritain’s framework.”12 Afterwards, or at 
least by the time he becomes pope, Wojtyła is more biblical in focus, his Wednesday 
Catechesis on the theology of the body for example, being grounded in a forensic study of 
the scriptures in general, and Genesis 1-3, Matthew, 1 Corinthians, and Ephesians in 
particular. 
A similar point may be made of the renewed Christocentric foundation of his anthropology. 
His encyclicals repeatedly emphasise that “man and man’s lofty calling are revealed in 
Christ through the revelation of the mystery of the Father and His love”,13 and he 
repeatedly quotes the phrase from Gaudium et spes, that he judged to be foundational, that 
“only in the mystery of the Incarnate Word does the mystery of man take on light.”14 
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This consequence of all this is a rich and complex foundation for his anthropology, 
comprising the spirituality of St John of the Cross, “a realist metaphysic of the person 
enriched by phenomenology”, and – the emphasis of his papal period - the revelation of 
God in scripture, especially the opening chapters of Genesis and the gospels, whence his 
Christocentric personalism arises.15 This chapter will engage primarily with the last of 
these partly because although the dignity and mystery of the person was central to John 
Paul II’s thought from the 1940s, its social, political and economic implications are only 
spelled out in any detail within his papal writings; and partly because John Paul’s more 
scripturally-grounded conceptualisation of the person distinguishes him from Temple and 
Maritain and thus add a new and important dimension for this thesis. 
Karol Wojtyła was not, of course, deaf or indifferent to the wider implications of the 
metaphysical anthropology in his earlier writings. Indeed, ministering in post-war Poland 
as he did, he could not but have understood the political ramifications of his theological 
and philosophical anthropology. As the wider context of letter to de Lubac with which this 
chapter opened intimates, it was political circumstances that concentrated his long-
standing focus on the dignity and mystery of the human. However, for all that his deep 
aversion to the overbearing and omnipresent state has its roots in his pre-papal years, 
during those years the wider implications of his anthropology tended to be limited to 
spiritual, emotional, sexual, and marital issues. It was only in his papal encyclicals, and 
other contemporary writings, that he drew explicit connection between theological 
anthropology and political thought and practice, with particular reference to the welfare 
state, or as the English translation of Cenetesimus Annus calls it, the Social Assistance State.  
When he does do this, he does it forcefully. He claims in Centesimus annus that “the 
fundamental error of socialism is anthropological in nature.”16 In Memory and Identity, he 
locates the cardinal error of utilitarianism, over which certain understandings of free-
market capitalism have been erected, in its anthropology, in particular its unwarranted 
conviction “that man tends essentially towards his own interest or that of the group to 
which he belongs.”17 In Evangelium vitae, he writes that it is upon the recognition of “the 
sacred value of human life” that “every human community and the political community 
itself” is (or should be) founded.18 In an address to the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences 
in 1997 he repeated a claim he made in Centesimus annus, to the effect that “democracy is 
only possible ‘on the basis of a correct conception of the human person’”19 He believed that 
at the root of environmental degradation lay “an anthropological error”.20 In short, what 
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we have in John Paul II’s papal writings, is a body of work which, while drawing on a 
foundations of Thomism, phenomenology and Juanist spirituality, focuses primarily on a 
Christocentric reading of scripture and offers a sustained exploration of the seminal link 
between theological anthropology and political thought.  
Theological Anthropology 
John Paul II’s papal corpus is significant. This, in combination with his sustained interest in 
the dignity and mystery of the person, makes for extensive source material and warns 
against making hubristic statements about a definitive picture of his theological 
anthropology. This chapter draws on a limited number of key texts (papal encyclicals, 
relevant addresses to the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences, and several other 
significant works published during his papacy) and draws out three paired themes – 
createdness and transcendence, rationality and agency, relationality and gift – from those 
writings. This list could be greater. For example, I mention only briefly, in the context of 
agency, his discussion in Redemptor hominis of humanity’s “sharing in Christ’s kingly 
mission” and this conception of royal domination could conceivably be expanded. 
Alternatively, it could be shorter, as there is subtle overlap between a number of these 
categories, which will be highlighted below. The six I have chosen, however, offer a 
sufficiently broad, accurate and critical picture of John Paul II’s rich understanding of 
personhood, and while the pairing is an analytical device, rather than being self-evident in 
the source material itself, it enables me to draw out the more significant themes within his 
theological anthropology (in particular those that correspond with Temple, Maritain, and 
(as we shall see) Williams’ theological anthropologies) and develop the key materials from 
which a coherent, constructive Christian theology of the welfare state can be developed in 
the concluding chapter. 
Persons as created  
The human person, in John Paul II’s anthropology, is a created, corporeal being. This is not 
the most significant aspect of his anthropology, at least judged by emphasis, but it is worth 
mentioning first as without it, John Paul’s powerful emphasis on the transcendent nature 
of the person is in danger of giving legitimacy to the kind of ‘self-creation’ and moral 
relativism that is wholly alien to his thinking. The person’s capacity for transcendence 
requires an emphasis on his created, dependent corporeal nature in order to prevent it 
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from drifting off into subjectivism, just as its created nature needs an emphasis on 
transcendence in order to prevent it sliding into pure materialism. 
The person has “a bodily and a spiritual nature”, the pope writes in Sollicitudo rei socialis, a 
nature that is “symbolized in the second creation account by the two elements: the earth, 
from which God forms man’s body, and the breath of life which he breathes into man’s 
nostrils.”21 This dual nature should not be read as ‘dualist’. The human person is not made 
of two different things – flesh and spirit – but is rather a unity that must be understood in 
both physical and spiritual terms. Spinello describes this vision as one of “nondualistic 
wholeness”,22 alternatively, in the term preferred and detailed by Denis Alexander, we 
might describe it as one of a dual-aspect monism.23  
As a created being, man is “therefore in complete ontological and ethical dependence upon 
the Creator”, he writes in Dives in misericordia.24 There is an unhealthy way of understanding 
human dependence, most visible in the “dialectical materialism” at which the pope takes 
aim in Laborem exercens.25 There, man is no longer the subject (of work) but is understood 
and treated as dependent on that which is material, thereby undermining his agency and 
freedom. In contrast, God being wholly other to the created order means that mankind’s 
complete dependence on him is not only compatible with his dignity, but a foundation of it. 
Createdness also means temporality. “Time has a fundamental importance” in Christianity, 
he wrote in his 1994 Apostolic Letter Tertio millennio adveniente.26 God’s truth and salvation 
unfold in time, and, as he says in Evangelium vitae, man’s “life in time… is the fundamental 
condition, the initial stage and an integral part of the entire unified process of human 
existence.”27 Again, as with dependency, this is something that is apt to be misunderstood 
as limiting rather than enabling the person’s transcendence. But temporality should not be 
understood in opposition to eternity. The pope insists, quoting Gaudium et spes in his book 
Memory and Identity, that “man’s horizons are not limited only to the temporal order”, and 
that “while living in the context of human history, he preserves intact his eternal 
vocation.”28 
Contrary to some contemporary ideologies against which John Paul writes, it is human 
createdness that provides the basis for personal freedom and relational integrity. Some 
“moralists”, he writes in Veritatis splendor, conceive of freedom as “somehow in opposition 
to or in conflict with material and biological nature, over which it must progressively 
assert itself.”29  
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Similarly, relationship with others is grounded in mutual corporeality, the body being the 
site and foundation for the encounters through which personality is developed. The body 
should be “perceived as a properly personal reality, a sign and place of relations with 
others,” rather than others being seen as an impediment to true meeting of minds, or 
“reduced to pure materiality… a complex of organs, functions and energies to be used 
according to the sole criteria of pleasure and efficiency.”30 
Understanding this prevents the person from sliding towards an illicit subjectivism or 
autonomy, through which “only the person who enjoys full or at least incipient autonomy 
and who emerges from a state of total dependence on others” is judged a true subject of 
rights or through which the other is considered “an enemy from whom one has to defend 
oneself” thereby losing any reference to common values or a universally binding truth.”31 
In this way, John Paul draws a link from an erroneous conception of the human person, 
which downplays our created nature, through misconceptions of the human good, as being 
unduly subjective or autonomous, to those political systems (in this case liberal or 
libertarian) that ultimately fail and dehumanise the persons they should be fostering.  
Persons as transcendent 
Karol Wojtyła made transcendence one of the three characteristics of the human person in 
The Acting Person.32 The theme remains a major one in his papacy for the foundational 
reason, as he expresses it in Dominum et vivificantem, his encyclical on the Holy Spirit in the 
Life of the Church and the World, that man is made in the image of “the Triune God, who 
‘exists’ in himself as a transcendent reality of interpersonal gift” – a formulation that 
encapsulates not only the theme of transcendence but also those relationality and gift, 
discussed later, illustrating the interpenetration of these qualities.33  
As noted, it is helpful to understand the human capacity for transcendence as ‘paired’ with 
the pope’s emphasis on human createdness, as without it human corporeality degenerates 
into being mere materiality, the human becoming an object like any other in creation. 
Humans bear the image of God and are thereby created for more than is available in their 
material context. To deny God is to deny man his “true greatness”, namely “his 
transcendence in respect to earthly realities”, the crime of which atheism and 
Enlightenment rationalism are guilty.34 Human transcendence is cognitive and relational; 
man can know the eternal, can know God, and is capable of participating in him, albeit 
imperfectly, on earth.  
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As we shall note in the section on rationality, John Paul has a high view of human reason, 
the ability of which to grasp metaphysical truth is a mark of human dignity. “Metaphysics 
should not be seen as an alternative to anthropology”, he insists in Fides et ratio. The 
“factual and the empirical” do not exhaust the human understanding of reality. Whether in 
the form of truth, beauty, moral values, other persons, in being itself, or in God, the human 
person senses the call of “the absolute and transcendent” which opens up “the 
metaphysical dimension of reality” before him. Our capacity to know this transcendent and 
metaphysical dimension “is true and certain, albeit imperfect and analogical”, as is human 
language’s capacity to express “divine and transcendent reality in a universal way”, again 
albeit “analogically”.35 
The person is not simply capable of knowing the transcendent truth, however but also “a 
privileged locus for the encounter with being.”36 Knowledge does not destroy mystery but in 
fact reveals it more clearly, showing how man’s supreme calling is “to share in the divine 
mystery of the life of the Trinity”, he says, quoting Vatican II’s Dei Verbum.37 The fullness of 
life to which man is called “exceeds the dimensions of his earthly existence, because it 
consists in sharing the very life of God”, he writes in Evangelium vitae.38 Or, expressed more 
prosaically and functionally, as he puts it in Laborem exercens, God’s “salvific plan” is for 
people “to deepen their friendship with Christ” and, by means of work, to “participates in 
the activity of God himself”.39  
Persons as rational 
John Paul II had a high view of human rationality, the foundation of which he saw as being 
a “desire for truth” that is intrinsic to human nature. The human has a “ceaselessly self-
transcendent orientation towards the truth”, he writes in Fides et ratio, his major encyclical 
on the subject.40 Indeed, he goes as far as to say that “one may define the human being, 
therefore, as the one who seeks the truth.”41 Absent the truth, humans lose the lodestar of 
their personhood, their “state as person” ending up “being judged by pragmatic criteria 
based essentially upon experimental data”.42 
The pursuit of truth is enabled through human reason. “In this their nobility consists”.43 
The pope is clear that human reason is “not restricted to sensory knowledge.”44 Rather, it 
has a “transcendent capacity”, again referencing Gaudium et spes and its assertion that man 
is right to judge that in “his intellect he surpasses the material universe,” on account of 
sharing “in the light of the divine mind”.45 Romans 1 is, of course, a key text here, and John 
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Paul states that “this important Pauline text affirms the human capacity for metaphysical 
enquiry”.46  
For all John Paul’s belief that the human orientation towards truth and capacity for 
transcendent reason is a source of personhood and dignity, he also recognises limitations. 
None of these is in any way fatal and none seriously qualifies the pope’s high view of reason 
as part of human nature, but they are worth noting if we are to avoid reconstructing his 
anthropology in a way that makes it unduly rationalistic. 
First, John Paul never imagines that human reason’s capacity to grasp transcendent truth is 
sufficient or an alternative to revelation. Thus, for all that reason can discern the existence 
of God or an objective moral order, revelation “proposes certain truths which might never 
have been discovered by reason unaided.” John Paul does not think they are a priori 
“inaccessible to reason” – what revelation reveals is not in itself unreasonable – but in 
practice human reason is inadequate to the task and needs the assistance of revelation. 
Thus the notion of “a free and personal God”, the reality of sin, the notion of the person “as 
a spiritual being”, and his inherent “dignity, equality and freedom” are all revealed truths, 
intelligible to reason if not obvious to it.47  
Second, in section 48 of Veritatis splendor, on the place of the human body in questions of 
natural law, the pope stresses that “reason and free will are linked with all the bodily and 
sense faculties,” and argues against the idea that the body is “extrinsic” to the person.48 In 
other words, despite reason’s capacity to transcend the material and access truth in excess 
of that which the material world provides, John Paul still identifies a link between the 
created person and his exercise of reason. 
Finally, while drawing on Romans 1 as evidence of reason’s capacity for transcendence, he 
explicitly acknowledges the Apostle’s teaching that “their thinking became futile and their 
foolish hearts were darkened.” Through this original sin of pride, which deceived us into 
thinking ourselves “sovereign and autonomous”, reason was “wounded” and became 
“more and more a prisoner to itself.”49 The pope is quick to say that the incarnation 
“redeemed reason from its weakness, setting it free from the shackles in which it had 
imprisoned itself”, but the extent to which human reason is restored here and now is as 
unclear, as is the parallel question of human moral agency. 
Thus, human rationality is a key element within John Paul II’s anthropology and he has a 
high view of what human reason is capable. However, he is also alert to its dependent, 
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created and wounded nature and, for all he sees the human orientation to truth as a source 
of human dignity, this remains distinct from the modernist championing of human reason 
as the unique, distinct and ennobling human characteristic. 
Persons as effective moral agents 
A minor theme within John Paul II’s encyclicals – in as far as he engages with it briefly in 
Redemptor Hominis, Evangelium vitae and Veritatis Spledor (the latter two in the same form) – 
is the Christ-like kingly responsibility of the human person. Referencing Gregory of Nyssa, 
John Paul locates man’s kingship in the imago dei, being made “in the image of the One who 
governs the universe… created to exercise dominion over the world.” 50 This is a daunting 
call, even if such royalty is “not absolute, but ministerial”, through which man 
“participates by his dignity in the perfection of the divine archetype.” However much 
human capacity to fulfil that role may be lost by the fall, it, like human rationality, is 
restored by the life of Christ. Man is called to participate in Christ’s threefold “mission” – as 
Priest, Prophet and King51 – which in this case means sharing in the “kingly function – the 
munus regale – of Christ himself”, as John Paul says in his first encyclical, referencing Lumen 
Gentium.52 Human moral responsibility is Christ-like in its ministerial dominion. 
This ‘kingly’ role echoes a major theme within Wojtyła’s pre-papal corpus. In his Lublin 
lectures Wojtyła stated that “the person’s awareness of being an efficient cause of [his] 
deeds” is the fount of his awareness of the ethical value of any action, and of the value of 
any human subject.53 The three characteristics of the human person outlined in The Acting 
Person – transcendence, integration, participation – each emphasises how it is self-
possession, agency or self-determination that elevates the person and makes self-
transcendence possible. The language and theological foundations here are very different 
from that which we read in the papal encyclicals, but the emphasis on personhood 
entailing effective moral agency remains constant throughout John Paul’s writings. 
A clear and (for our purposes) pertinent example of this can be seen in John Paul’s 
discussion of personal, social and ‘structural’ sin in his 1984 Apostolic exhortation 
Reconciliatio et paenitentia. Here he is clear that sin “is always a personal act”.54 The 
individual may be “conditioned, incited and influenced” by powerful external factors. He 
may be subjected to “tendencies, defects and habits” in his personal condition. And such 
factors may “attenuate… his responsibility and guilt.” However, the truth of faith, which is 
“also confirmed by our experience and reason”, is that the human person is free, and 
denying the moral responsibility is ultimately to deny their “dignity and freedom”.55  
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This does not mean sin cannot be judged “social” or even “structural”. In one sense all sin 
in social, in as far as sin invariably affects others. In a second sense – John Paul is specific in 
his categorisations at this point – some sins are specifically social in that they constitute a 
deliberate attack on rights, freedom, honour or dignity of another person. Within this 
category lie the sins of commission or omission on the part of political, economic or trades 
union leaders, and of workers: the former for failing to strive for the proper “improvement 
and transformation of society”; the latter “through absenteeism or non-cooperation” 
failing their industries, families and wider society.56 
A third, vaguer but still licit understanding of social sin is that of unjust relationships 
between “various human communities”, such as classes or nations. In such instances, “it 
has to be admitted” that the vast and generalized nature of the relationship generates an 
anonymity, with causes that are “complex and not always identifiable.” Here, “social sin” 
has an obvious and permissible “analogical meaning” but this must, nonetheless, “not 
cause us to underestimate the responsibility of the individuals involved.” Ultimately, cases 
of social sin are always the result of “the accumulation and concentration of many personal 
sins… The real responsibility lies with individuals.”57 
Talk of social sin becomes illicit when it is placed in opposition to personal sin in such a way 
as minimises or abolishes the latter. According to this view, inherent in the Marxism about 
which John Paul clearly is speaking at this point, “practically every sin is a social sin”, in 
the sense of only being a social sin. Moral guilt is directed away from “moral conscience of 
an individual” and towards “some vague entity or anonymous collectivity such as the 
situation, the system, society, structures or institutions.”58 Such an understanding of “social 
sin” fails to honour the moral agency that is fundamental to John Paul II’s anthropology. 
John Paul’s conception of the human is both moral and rational. To be human is to pursue 
truth through reason, and to exercise moral agency responsibly. Each is a defining human 
characteristic, grounded in our creation in the image of a God who is truth and our 
redemption through Christ who exercises royal authority over creation. Although both 
moral agency and rational powers are wounded by sin, that wound is not fatal but rather 
healed – though how far is not clear – by Christ. 
Persons as relationally constituted 
Human relationality is central to John Paul’s anthropology. Every man is his “brother’s 
keeper”, he writes in Evangelium vitae. We are entrusted to one another according “to the 
4: John Paul II 
112 
 
law of reciprocity in giving and receiving, of self-giving and of the acceptance of others”. 
Our freedom “possesses an inherently relational dimension”.59 According to Redemptor 
Hominis, we write our personal histories through the “numerous bonds, contacts, 
situations, and social structures linking” us with others, a formulation that is prevented 
from sliding into subjectivism by the caveat that this self-narration is not only in keeping 
“with the openness of his spirit within” but also “with the many diverse needs of his body 
and his existence in time.”60 
As with transcendence, man’s relationality has a cognitive and existential dimension. 
Humans acquire knowledge – both of self and of wider created order – through 
relationship. In the first of these “biblical man” discovered that he could understand 
himself “only as ‘being in relation’ – with himself, with people, with the world and with 
God.”61 In the second, as the pope articulates at length in section 31 of Fides et ratio, humans 
acquire language, cultural formation, and “a range of truths” through the relationships 
into which they are born. Human development invariably shapes and reforms these 
inherited elements, but there remain “many more truths which are simply believed than 
truths which are acquired by way of personal verification.” Humans are innately truth-
seeking beings, as we have seen, but the truths they hold – whether inherited or acquired – 
come via trusted, as well as tested, relationships. “The human being – the one who seeks 
the truth – is also the one who lives by belief.”62 
This relationality is inevitably tied up with the communicative nature of the human, 
although, as we shall see, this is less of an emphasis within the theological anthropology of 
John Paul II than within that of Rowan Williams. The face of every person constitutes “a call 
to encounter, dialogue and solidarity”, he writes in Evangelium vitae, although the only 
encyclical that explores this dialogic nature in any detail is his 1995 letter on ecumenical 
relations, Ut unum sint.63 Here John Paul specifically grounds the “dialogue” that is inherent 
in ecumenical dialogue in personalism, the human capacity for dialogue being “rooted in 
the nature of the person and his dignity.”64 Dialogue is an “indispensable step” along the 
path towards “human self-realization” both in a “cognitive dimension” – John Paul points 
out the etymological origins of dialogue lie in the logos – and in an “existential dimension”. 
It involves “the human subject in his or her entirety.”  
Dialogue also, according to John Paul II, presupposes “a desire for reconciliation” and for 
“unity in truth”,65 a clarification that might shed light on why the topic receives less 
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emphasis in his encyclicals. The pope’s high view of human reason and the call of truth 
implies a lesser role for dialogue, because, although humans learn and know through 
relationship, the power of the truth, the authority of revelation, and the capacity of human 
reason leave less space for the negotiation and concession that is inherent in true dialogue. 
As we shall note in the following chapter, both the style and content of Rowan Williams’ 
theology allow for a more open dialogical element within the human relationality that lies 
central to their theological anthropology. 
Where John Paul II is closer to Williams in his conceptualisation of relationality is in his 
broad understanding of what constitutes communication. Here, the pope is clear, for 
example in Evangelium vitae, that communication cannot be limited to “verbal and explicit, 
or at least perceptible” communication. To do so would be to exclude those capable of such 
communication, like the unborn, the dying, and the “radically dependent” from the 
category of persons possessed of human dignity. Communication includes the verbal and 
the explicit, but also “the silent language of a profound sharing of affection”.66 Through 
such tacit, corporeal, dependent communication, humans enter into the relationships that 
deepen and develop their personhood, in the same way as they do through verbal and 
formal communication.  
Persons as gift 
Gift is central to the human need and capacity for communication and relationship. As John 
Paul says in Ut unum sint, quoting Lumen Gentium, “dialogue is not simply an exchange of 
ideas [but] in some way it is always an ‘exchange of gifts’.”67 However, it is also profoundly 
connected to the other elements of the pope’s theological anthropology outlined above and 
is as close to a summary of that anthropology as one can hope for from such a large and 
rich corpus of writing. John Paul says in Dominum et vivificantem that the Holy Spirit enables 
man ever more “fully to find himself through a sincere gift of self” [emphases added], a 
phrase adopted from Gaudium et spes that he also uses, in one form or another, in Evangelium 
vitae,68 Veritatis splendor,69 Centesimus annus,70 and Ut unum sint71 and which, he says, “can be 
said to sum up the whole of Christian anthropology.”72  
The created order, and in particular human life, is best understood as gift. The Holy Spirit, 
he writes in Dominum et vivificantem, is “uncreated gift” from whom derives “all giving of 
gifts vis-à-vis creatures (created gift): the gift of existence to all things through creation”.73 
The core of the Gospel, he writes in Evangelium vitae, is the presentation of human life – the 
inseparable connection “between the person, his life and his bodiliness” – as “a life of 
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relationship, a gift of God”.74 Creation is an economy of gifts that finds its “fons vivus” or 
fountain of life, as the pope puts it in Dominum et vivificantem, in the eternal, uncreated gift 
of the triune God.  
If creation can be understood as gift, so can the human capacity for transcendence. Indeed, 
transcendence is precisely the gift of the self to God. God himself is gift, enabling gift.75 The 
cross is, as well as the self-communication of God to man, “the call to man to share in the 
divine life by giving himself”.76 Christ’s blood, “poured out as the gift of life” reveals to man 
that his vocation “consists in the sincere gift of self.”77 Man is alienated “if he refuses to 
transcend himself and to live the experience of self-giving”.78 It is through this “free gift of 
self” – a gift “made possible by the human person’s essential ‘capacity for transcendence’” – 
that man truly finds himself”.79 
God’s gift of creation and his gift of himself in Christ to man, restoring his regal authority, 
generates the foundations for man’s moral agency and responsibility. Life on earth may be 
only a penultimate, rather than an “ultimate” reality, he writes in Evangelium vitae, “but it 
remains sacred, entrusted to us, to be preserved with a sense of responsibility and brought 
to perfection in love and in the gift of ourselves to God and to our brothers and sisters.”80 
Similarly, the Gospel is both “a great gift of God and an exacting task for humanity.” In the 
gift of life and of redemption, “God demands that [man] love, respect and promote life. The 
gift thus becomes a commandment, and the commandment is itself a gift.81  
Because human rationality has an inherently relational element, whereby what we know 
cannot but be affected by who and how we know, it too is captured under the idea of gift.  
Truth is attained “not only by way of reason but also through trusting acquiescence to 
other persons”. That being so, the capacity and decision “to entrust oneself and one’s life to 
another person” are not only “among the most significant and expressive human acts” but 
also fundamental to the human quest for truth.82 Similarly, revelation, while in no sense 
unreasonable, is not “the product nor the consummation of an argument devised by human 
reason”, but “appears instead as something gratuitous.”83 Thus it is in “faithful self-giving” 
that humans not only achieve “security”, but also find “a fullness of certainty”.84  
The centrality of gift to relationality will be clear from this: human relationality is the 
expression of love made possible through the gift of self to the other. “Precisely because 
man is a personal being,” he wrote in Memory and Identity, “it is not possible to fulfil our 
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duty towards him except by loving him.”85 And love, as John Paul says in Evangelium vitae, 
again quoting Gaudium et spes, is “a sincere gift of self”.86  
Nowhere is this seen more clearly than in sexual love, about which John Paul wrote and 
spoke a great deal both before and after becoming pope. Human sexuality and procreation 
“reach their true and full significance” in light of the idea that “the meaning of life is found 
in giving and receiving love”87 To be a human person is to be a physical body the gift of 
which to the other in spousal love is the paradigmatic gift of the self. As he says in his 
Theology of the Body, “this union carries within itself a particular awareness of the meaning of that 
body in the reciprocal self-gift of the persons.”88 Rather than the “depersonalized” and 
“exploited” constructions of sexual love all too familiar in the contemporary world, in 
which sex becomes the occasion for “self-assertion and the selfish satisfaction of personal 
desires and instincts”, true sexual love is the supreme moment of human gift: “the sign, 
place and language of love…of the gift of self and acceptance of another”.89  
If sexual love is the supreme occasion of gift between humans, the Eucharist is that 
moment between God and man, “the gift par excellence… of [Christ] himself, of his person in 
his sacred humanity, as well as the gift of his saving work”, as he wrote in his last encyclical 
Ecclesia et Eucharistia.90 “The source and summit of the Christian life”, according to the 
encyclical, itself quoting Lumen Gentium, the Eucharist can be seen to integrate many of 
dimensions of his theological anthropology.91 Taking the bread and wine as gifts of 
creation, the Eucharist is the gift of Christ’s love and obedience to the Father, “given for 
our sake, and indeed that of all humanity.”92 The means of sharing in Christ’s sacrifice in 
the inner life of God enables the faithful to participate in it “and inexhaustibly gain its 
fruits”, in so doing “creat[ing] human community”.93 It is the paradigmatic expression of 
self-giving,94 through which the human person is made new and whole as he is drawn into 
the life of God. 
Political Implications 
As noted earlier, John Paul was clear about the link between anthropology and politics and, 
in particular, between erroneous anthropology and harmful political ideologies and 
practices. The “fundamental” errors of socialism, utilitarianism and environmental 
degradation were “anthropological in nature”, just as a properly functioning and just 
democracy, market economy or state required a correct understanding of the human. 
Sometimes the link between the created, transcendent, rational, moral, relational, gift-
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oriented person and the political system in which he flourishes (or does not) is made 
explicit; more often it is implicit. Either way, it is always there. Political thought and 
practice, like moral theology, “requires a sound philosophical vision of human nature.”95 
John Paul’s link between theological anthropology and political thought and practice takes 
two forms, critical and constructive, and the remainder of this chapter will deal briefly 
with the former of these before dwelling in greater detail on the latter as a way of filling 
out what John Paul saw as the proper function of the state vis-à-vis the provision of 
welfare. 
The critical form 
John Paul repeatedly emphasises that the church is not a political community or society, 
and is not bound to any political system, commonly referencing Section 77 of Gaudium et 
spes in the process.96 The Church has no political models to present,97 is “not competent to 
undertake scientific analyses… [and] does not wish to support any theoretical model for the 
explanation of social phenomena, nor any concrete social system”, as he told the Pontifical 
Academy of Social Sciences in 1994.98  
There is an important caveat. The church “does not propose economic and political 
systems or programs”, as he wrote in Sollicitudo rei socialis, “provided that human dignity is 
properly respected and promoted, and provided she herself is allowed the room she needs 
to exercise her ministry in the world.”99 She respects “the legitimate autonomy of the 
democratic order” and “is not entitled to express preferences for this or that institutional 
or constitutional solution”, as he puts it in Centesimus annus, on the basis that her proper 
contribution to the political order lies in “her vision of the dignity of the person”.100  
This, as we shall note later, is something of an underclaim. John Paul can be clear and 
explicit in his advocacy of specific political, social and economic arrangements, even if he 
self-consciously stops short of “solutions”. Nevertheless, this is not simply rhetoric. On the 
basis that the grounds of its political participation lies in respecting and promoting human 
dignity, or “safeguard[ing]… the transcendence of the human person”101 or “keep[ing] 
intact the image and likeness of God himself”102, the Church’s social teaching offers, what 
Centesimus annus calls an “indispensable and ideal orientation”, by means of which it can 
judge (in)valid political ideas and systems.  
This criticism is levelled primarily at uncritical affirmations of the state and the market, 
“Marxism” and “socialism” on the one hand,103 “liberal capitalism” on the other.104  This is, 
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of course, a long-standing double-fronted assault for Catholic Social Teaching, as we saw in 
the previous chapter on Maritain. Indeed, it is coeval with the modern tradition. As John 
Paul says in Centesimus annus, “Rerum novarum criticizes two social and economic systems: 
socialism and liberalism.”105 In his words of Sollicitudo rei socialis, “the Church’s social 
doctrine adopts a critical attitude towards both liberal capitalism and Marxist 
collectivism.”106 In both instances, the political critique is anthropological in nature.  
Marxism and socialism are marked by many practical problems, such as suppressing 
economic initiative, breeding passivity and dependence, encouraging “submission to the 
bureaucratic apparatus”, and denying human choice and responsibility.107 At their heart, 
however, lies the misconceptualisation of the person as a purely material, passive and self-
oriented object. The “essential core” of Marxism, he writes in Dominum et vivificantem, can 
be traced to the struggle between the flesh and the spirit of which St Paul writes in 
Galatians 5 and Romans 8. The battle is between man’s “limitation and sinfulness, which are 
essential elements of his psychological and ethical reality” and, from God, “the mystery of 
the gift, that unceasing self-giving of divine life in the Holy Spirit.”108 The ensuing struggle 
is repeated in every historical era and in our own the “flesh” takes the form of the 
“dialectical and historical materialism” that Marxism has “carried to its extreme practical 
consequences”.109 In dialectical materialism, John Paul explains in Laborem exercens, man is 
not the subject of work but “a kind of ‘resultant’ of the economic or production relations 
prevailing at a given period.”110 Ultimately, it is the denial of man’s agency, his subjective 
relationality, his capacity for transcendence and his fulfilment in the gift economy of God 
that lies at the heart of Marxism’s failure. 
The pope’s critique of liberal capitalism is more contentious, not least as, in the wake of 
Centesimus annus, a number of commentators read in the encyclical a largely uncritical 
affirmation of liberal capitalism. Thus, for example, while acknowledging that it would be 
“tendentious” to interpret Centesimus annus “as a full-fledged endorsement of ‘liberalism’”, 
Russell Hittinger still stated that the encyclical, “makes a decisive turn toward the liberal 
model of the state,” and offered a model that “closely resemble[d] the modern, Anglo-
American understanding of the political state.”111 This confusion – the fact that John Paul 
can state bluntly that the Church’s social doctrine adopts a critical attitude towards liberal 
capitalism while commentators can simultaneously read an affirmation of the liberal 
capitalist state in (the last of) his social encyclical(s) – is borne partly of John Paul political 
method in his encyclicals. As Daniel Finn has observed, rather than analysing conflicts “by 
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comparing and contrasting competing goods, [John Paul] tends to make strong affirmations 
about goods on both sides of an argument as well as denunciations about the dangers 
attendant to each.” The result is that those on each side of the political spectrum are able 
to hear enough of what they agree to find in the pope’s political theology an affirmation of 
their position, while ignoring his simultaneous critique.112 
Such ambiguity can be addressed by careful appreciation of the precise way in which he 
defined his terms. Answering the rhetorical question about whether capitalism should be 
the global goal following the collapse of communism, the pope carefully explained that if 
capitalism is taken to be an economic system “which recognizes the fundamental and 
positive role of business, the market, private property and the resulting responsibility for 
the means of production, as well as free human creativity in the economic sector,” then 
“the answer is certainly in the affirmative.”113  
If, conversely, capitalism “favours only those who possess capital and makes work only a 
means of production”, as he told the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences in 1996, or if it 
entails “considering human labour solely according to its economic purpose”, it is not 
acceptable.114 In particular, as he warned the Pontifical Academy the following year, just 
because socialist planned economies damage civil and economic freedoms, this does not 
justify models that are diametrically opposed. “Unbridled” markets erode common values, 
compromise the ecological balance, and generate an “anthropological void”. The human 
price of the “amazing economic vitality” of the market economy “left to unconditional 
freedom” is simply too high.115 
Such errors come from ignoring the truth about human nature, or, as he puts it when 
describing Pope Leo XIII’s critique of late nineteenth century capitalism, from detaching 
the understanding of human freedom “from the duty to respect the rights of others”, 
orienting it away from the demands of responsibility, relationality and gift, towards “a self-
love which leads to an unbridled affirmation of self-interest”.116 
Plenty of contemporary Catholic commentators, such as those represented in the volume of 
essays entitled Catholic Social Teaching and the Market Economy, insist the structures of a 
liberal capitalist state need not foster such self-interest but actually are best placed to 
honour and serve the moral agency that is key to John Paul’s anthropology.117 However, it is 
not irrelevant that in the passage in Centesimus annus in which John Paul attempts to 
4: John Paul II 
119 
 
disambiguate his use of the term capitalist, he says that it might be more appropriate to 
speak of a “business economy”, “market economy” or simply “free economy”.118  
That noted, and however much critics would point out that liberal capitalism and 
consumerism are not the same thing, it is important to note that in section 36 of Centesimus 
annus, John Paul highlights consumerism as among the “specific problems and threats 
emerging within the more advanced economies”. The two are not synonymous and it is 
quite possible to operate a “market economy” without succumbing to the sins of 
consumerism.119 However, he is clear that “of itself, an economic system does not possess 
criteria for correctly distinguishing” between true human needs and the artificial ones that 
“hinder the formation of a mature personality.” Consumption, employment and 
investment are all in need of moral discipline, and the generation of lifestyles marked by 
“the quest for truth, beauty, goodness and communion with others for the sake of common 
growth” lies beyond capitalism’s ability. Thus, however licit market economies might be, in 
contrast to the Marxist-socialist system John Paul’s condemnation of which is unqualified, 
such an economy requires careful ethical policing to prevent its eroding the personhood it 
is capable of fostering.  
The constructive form: work 
However clear John Paul is in his anthropological criticism of deficient political ideologies, 
it is important to emphasise that his vision of the state is not merely a middle way between 
the two inadequate alternatives. “The Church’s social doctrine is not a ‘third way’ between 
liberal capitalism and Marxist collectivism,” he wrote in Sollicitudo rei socialis.120 His 
conceptualisation of the state, like the church’s social doctrine, “constitutes a category of 
its own”, not “an ideology”, but rather a response to the Gospel teaching on man and his 
vocation, “which is at once earthly and transcendent”. This response is, I argue, essentially 
three-fold, at least when it comes to the question of ‘welfare’, the three pillars of John 
Paul’s conceptualisation of the state’s duty vis-à-vis welfare, in the light of his theological 
anthropology, being work, family, and (what I shall term) associational solidarity. But the 
greatest of these is work, “a key, probably the essential key, to the whole social 
question,”121 as he told the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences. 
Work is the focus of John Paul’s first social encyclical, Laborem exercens, its root in his 
understanding of the person made explicit in the letter’s opening blessing: “Man is made to 
be in the visible universe an image and likeness of God himself, and he is placed in it in 
order to subdue the earth. From the beginning therefore he is called to work.”122 A material 
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moral agent that is simultaneously part of and transcends the created order, man is made 
for work, a characteristic that “distinguish[es him] from the rest of creatures.”123 
The good of work is two-fold, objective and subjective. The former involves the “dominion” 
over and “master[y]” of creation,124 “transforming nature”,125 and serving God as his agent 
in bringing order to a creation disordered by sin. The latter involves the transformation of 
the self, man’s “fulfilment as a human being”, the “virtue” of work enabling him to become 
“more a human being”.126 John Paul is clear that the latter has priority over the former, a 
priority justified by his personalistic anthropology: “the value of human work is not 
primarily the kind of work being done but the fact that the one who is doing it is a 
person.”127 The result is that however true it may be that man is destined for and called to 
work, “in the first place work is ‘for man’ and not man ‘for work’,” a conclusion of immense 
significance when it comes to the justification for state intervention in the market.128 
It is from this foundation of work, grounded in his theological anthropology, that John Paul 
builds up a critical appreciation of the market economy that is central to his 
conceptualisation of welfare. Laborem exercens, and later Centesimus annus, is critical of the 
way in which work is treated as a commodity, and man “an instrument of production”, 
thereby ignoring and undermining the dignity proper to the person. This leads him to 
“reaffirm the value of manual labour” and criticise substantial salary differences.129 He 
critiques “the human price” of globalisation.130 He condemns the “unbridled market” for 
creating “an anthropological void”131 and insists that deregulation is judged according to its 
effect on “the primacy of the human person.”132 He argues, in Centesimus annus, that just “as 
the person fully realizes himself in the free gift of self”, so ownership of goods is morally 
justified in as far as it generates “opportunities for work and human growth for all.”133 He 
argues, more controversially, for “the priority of labour over capital”, on account of labour 
being a “primary efficient cause”, with capital only “a mere … instrumental” one,134 even 
while he insists, in the following section of Laborem exercens, that labour can “in no way… be 
opposed to capital or capital to labour.”135 Overall, he advocates the terms “business 
economy”, “market economy” or “free economy” in place of “capitalism”136 and insists that 
the market is “appropriately controlled by the forces of society and by the State, so as to 
guarantee that the basic needs of the whole of society are satisfied.”137 
It is in this way that the state’s principle function in attending to the welfare for society lies 
in its supervision and regulation of the market economy to ensure that the person’s 
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primacy, agency, dignity, and capacity to realise himself through the “free gift of self” is 
honoured. It is a crucial and non-transferable role, contrary to those who thought they 
found in the pope’s stridently anti-Marxist message a fellow advocate a heavily 
deregulated, ‘neo-liberal’ state, but it is also an indirect role, as John Paul emphasises in 
chapter 48 of Centesimus annus. The state’s duty may be to “oversee[…] and direct[…] the 
exercise of human rights in the economic sector”, but the “primary responsibility” within 
this duty lies not with the state itself but with the “individuals” and the “various groups 
and associations” that comprise “society”. Were this not so, the state would be ineluctably 
drawn into “controll[ing] every aspect of economic life”.  
The pope outlines this essential, if indirect, responsibility in varying degrees of specificity. 
The role of the state is to guarantee “individual freedom and private property”,138 to defend 
those “collective goods” that constitute the “essential framework for the legitimate pursuit 
of personal goals”,139 such as “a stable currency and efficient public services”,140 and 
generally to determine “the juridical framework within which economic affairs are to be 
conducted”.141 
Such a list has allowed some commentators to claim that the Pope “reserves juridical 
language” for the state’s responsibilities, and “does not confuse it with the societal and 
cultural spheres in which the language of solidarity is most appropriate.”142 There is some 
measure of truth in this, in as far as (as Hittinger states) the “order of justice” that John 
Paul envisions as a state responsibility is “narrow and specific” in the sense that it is to 
facilitate a “myriad of cultural, religious, and social activities which bring about the 
solidarist ends which…are in accord with the social nature of man”, rather than securing 
such solidarist ends directly itself.143  
However, this formulation is liable to incline the reading of John Paul II’s vision of the state 
towards the minimal, and is undermined in part by the pope’s subsequent remarks to the 
Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences to the effect that the duty of the state is to “subject 
market laws to solidarity,”144 and in part by the sheer range, depth and detail of the state’s 
proper intervention, which seems to go beyond a narrow reading of ‘juridical’. 
Thus, John Paul repeatedly emphasises that it is the duty of the state to minimise 
unemployment and ensure maximal participation in the economy. Understanding the state 
as what he calls an “indirect employer”, John Paul writes in Laborem exercens that the state 
must “make provision for overall planning with regard to the different kinds of work.”145 
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Economic policies, he wrote in Centesimus annus, should be aimed “at ensuring balanced 
growth and full employment.”146  
Precisely what this entails is not entirely clear, perhaps because John Paul himself appears 
to modify his view slightly during his papacy. In the early 1980s, state “planning” seems to 
envisage substantial activity, such as the “discovery” (and presumably also the 
encouragement) of “the right proportions between the different kinds of employment,” 
such as “work on the land, in industry, in the various services, white-collar work and 
scientific or artistic work.”147 Similarly, in section 14 of Laborem exercens, he is prepared to 
countenance nationalisation of industries,148 albeit critically and with reservations.149 This 
seems more interventionist than he is willing to countenance a decade later at the time of 
Centesimus annus, in which he writes that the state has a duty is to sustain business 
activities by “creating conditions which will ensure job opportunities”, by “stimulating 
those activities where they are lacking”, by intervening with “monopolies… or obstacles to 
development”, and by supporting business activities “in moments of crisis.”150 
That recognised, we should not make too much of this apparent shift in position vis-à-vis 
state intervention in the economy. His advocacy of intervention in Laborem exercens is 
limited and caveated, and his preference, when it comes to the “socialisation” of industry, 
is not for straightforward nationalisation but for finding means to “associate labour with 
the ownership of capital” and producing a wide range of intermediate bodies “with 
economic, social and cultural purposes” that would exercise “real autonomy with regard to 
the public powers”.151 Similarly, in Centesimus annus John Paul is able to envision the State 
exercising “a substitute function” in the economy, albeit “in exceptional circumstances”, 
such as when social sectors or business systems “are too weak or are just getting under 
way, and are not equal to the task at hand.”152 Moreover, five years after the publication of 
Centesimus annus, he told the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences that it was the duty of 
the State (and of businesses), “to create a better distribution of tasks among all workers,”153 
a sentiment that would not have been out of place in Laborem exercens. 
Either way, however much state intervention John Paul II does envisage, it is clear that he 
places upon the state a significant indirect and on occasion direct responsibility for 
protecting the welfare of persons by means of securing an economic climate conducive to 
maximal, meaningful employment. Moreover, the employment must be directed to the true 
good of the human person, rather than mere economic growth. The state (and society) 
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“must ensure wage levels adequate for the maintenance of the worker and his family, 
including a certain amount for savings.”154 It must legislate against “forms of exploitation”, 
especially of vulnerable workers, immigrants and those “on the margins of society”.155 It 
must guarantee (presumably meaning, legislate for) “‘humane’ working hours” and 
“adequate free-time”, alongside the right “to express one’s own personality at the work-
place without suffering any affront to one’s conscience or personal dignity,156 and the right 
to a working environment that is “not harmful to the workers’ physical health or to their 
moral integrity.”157  
If, for whatever reason, full employment is not possible, it is the state’s responsibility to 
protect the welfare of potential workers “through unemployment insurance and [the] 
retraining programmes” necessary for their reintroduction into the productive economy.158 
No less important, and in a relatively rare example of John Paul outlining a unmediated 
welfare relationship between state and citizen, he writes in Laborem exercens, that the state 
has an obligation to provide unemployment benefits, “suitable grants indispensable for the 
subsistence of unemployed workers and their families”, a duty justified as springing from 
the “fundamental principle” of “the common use of goods.”159 In a similar vein, Laborem 
exercens advocates that pension and old age insurance should be made available, alongside 
healthcare, in the form of accident and “medical” assistance that should be “easily available 
for workers”, and that as far as possible “it should be cheap or even free of charge.”160 These 
last three rights are framed as responsibilities primarily of direct employers but given the 
state’s duty to secure an economy that recognises and serves the human person in, they 
become indirect state responsibilities also.  
Thus, in addition to the basic ‘juridical’ framework for a free market, and in addition to 
fundamental duty to provide “for the defence and preservation of [those] common goods 
such as the natural and human environments” that cannot be safeguarded by market forces 
alone,161 John Paul envisions a state whose main responsibility for the welfare of citizens is 
substantial but indirect, mediated through its role of securing a market that is free but that 
respects and protects the human person in all his dimensions.  
The constructive form: family 
The second pillar of John Paul’s understanding of state and welfare is the family, although 
as with his writing on work, in an indirect way. The family is not to be understood as a 
direct ‘provider’ of the kind of ‘services’ that we popularly associate with welfare, except 
perhaps of education and then only to a limited degree, but it is the essential incubator of 
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human personhood, and therefore an institution that the state must respect, protect and, 
when appropriate, aid. 
Many of the themes of John Paul’s theological anthropology are evident in his discussion of 
the family, and can be seen in his 1994 Letter to Families, written to mark the United Nation’s 
declaration of that year as the International Year of the Family. It is “through the body” 
that man and woman form the “communion of persons” that defines the marriage that lies 
at the heart of the family: “the genealogy of the person is inscribed in the very biology of 
generation.” 162 The “primordial model” of the family is found “in the Trinitarian mystery 
of [God’s] life”, the relational “we” of the Trinity being “the eternal pattern” of the human 
“we” in general, but specifically of the “we” of marriage.163  
The “covenant” of marriage, to use the language of the Second Vatican Council that John 
Paul quotes, is the basis for the self-giving of man and woman to each other.164 The person 
realizes himself “by the exercise of freedom in truth”, though this freedom is not licence 
“to do absolutely anything” but “means a gift of self”, necessitating “an interior discipline 
of the gift”, which is enabled through the “communion of persons” we find “at the very 
heart of each family”. This is nothing less than “the very heart of the Gospel truth about 
freedom.”165 The person cannot be developed, even understood, without the concept of 
family, which stands “at the centre and the heart of the civilization of love”, with 
significant implications for nation, state, and welfare.166  
John Paul identifies what he calls an “almost organic link” between the family and the 
nation in his 1994 Letter to Families.167 He makes the same point in his 2005 book Memory and 
Identity, when he roots legitimate patriotism, the kind that “leads to a properly ordered 
social love”,168 in the fourth commandment169, and roots both family and nation as 
“‘natural’ societies” that have their origins in the particular bonds of “human nature”.170 
Although very clear that the family must in no way be instrumentalised to serve any 
allegedly greater good, he does, in his Letter to Families, place upon it the duty of linking the 
growing person with their wider national or ethnic culture. “In one sense,” he says 
carefully, no doubt alert to how such sentiments were used by what Chappel calls the 
‘Catholic paternalists’ of the inter-war period, “parents also give birth to children for the 
nation, so that they can be members of it and can share in its historic and cultural 
heritage.”171 
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If the family should “in one sense” serve the nation, it should, in another, be served by the 
nation’s state.172 This is where the family’s primary welfare role is introduced. The basic 
“cell” of society, families “are the first and most important educators” of children, 
education understood not simply in the sense of passing on knowledge but in a holistic and 
personalistic sense, “a unique process for which the mutual communion of persons has 
immense importance”.173  
Families are not, however, competent to deliver this single-handedly.174 Accordingly, it is 
the responsibility of the state to assist or “play a role” in helping families in their duty of 
education, families sharing their “educational mission” with other “individuals or 
institutions.” This is not solely the role of the state: John Paul is careful to emphasise that 
“state assistance” should not exclude “private initiatives”.175 Nor it is a risk-free one: the 
pope is at pains to stress that “excessive intrusiveness” on the part of the State is 
“detrimental” and constitutes “an open violation of the rights of the family”. The “self-
sufficient” family “should be left to act on its own”, and only when the family is not self-
sufficient “does the State have the authority and duty to intervene.”176 As elsewhere, but 
perhaps with particular acuteness, the “mission of education” must be carried in 
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity.177 
In a similar fashion, and linking families back to the importance of work, the state must 
ensure that work serves the family (just as it does the person), rather than vice versa. The 
family, he writes in Laborem exercens, is not only the “the first school of work”, in as far as it 
nurtures the young in virtues necessary for productive labour, but also “a community made 
possible by work.178 This means intervening in the economy to minimise the 
unemployment that is “one of the most serious threats to family life”.179 It means 
advocating – although it is not clear whether this also means legislating for – just 
remuneration for the work of those who are responsible for their families. This can take the 
form of a “family wage”, which he defines in Laborem exercens as “a single salary given to 
the head of the family for his work, sufficient for the needs of the family without the other 
spouse having to take up gainful employment outside the home”. Or it can take the form of 
other social measures such as “family allowances” or “grants to mothers devoting 
themselves exclusively to their families”, the sum of which should correspond to the actual 
needs of those “not in a position to assume proper responsibility for their own lives.”180 
This obviously means children although in Centesimus annus he also explicitly includes the 
elderly, in order to “strengthen relations between generations”.181 
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It was a theme he returned to in his later addresses to the Pontifical Academy of Social 
Sciences,182 one of which sees one of his more positive assessments of state welfare 
provision. Whereas once it was the duty of the community to ensure that each person had 
“his just share in the fruits of work and in all circumstances live[d] with dignity”, a duty 
that was borne of the natural “solidarity between generations”, in the industrial age, states 
set “up social welfare plans” to assist families, with particular regard to young people (via 
education) and older ones (via pension funds for retirees). It is fortunate, he goes on to say, 
that “a sense of responsibility has developed in people thanks to a real national solidarity, so 
as not to exclude anyone and to give access to a social benefits coverage to all”, a sentiment 
that emphasises the reciprocal relationship between family, nation, and state, the first 
helping generate the second’s solidarity that allows the third second to justify and 
discharge its responsibilities to the first.”183 He struck a similar note the following years, 
inviting those with the responsibility for government to tackle the potentially deleterious 
side-effects of globalisation (the dominant focus of his addresses to the Academy) and to 
put in place “systems of solidarity that take into account the changes caused by 
globalisation.”184  
John Paul’s discussion of the family vis-à-vis the state provision of welfare thus adopts a 
similar line as his discussion of work. In both instances it is what we might call 
‘intermediary bodies’ – direct employers, the family – who have primary duty of serving 
the good of the person that lies at the heart of welfare. In both instances, the state is called 
in to assist and supplement the efforts of those bodies, but in both instances there are red 
lines drawn by the principle of subsidiarity that it must respect except for exceptional 
circumstances and then only temporarily.  
The constructive form: associational solidarity 
A final pillar of John Paul’s understanding of welfare, standing alongside work and family, 
is what we might call ‘associational solidarity’.  
As with families, although to a less pronounced extent, human personhood is nurtured by 
the associational activities of civil society. As he says in Centesimus annus, it is “in 
interrelationships on many levels that a person lives, and that society becomes more 
‘personalized’.”185 In a warning that would become increasingly pertinent over the coming 
years, the pope said that opportunity for such solidarity was often “suffocated” between 
the two poles of the state and the marketplace.186 The person does not exist simply as “a 
producer and consumer of goods, or as an object of State administration”, but as a being 
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“who seeks… and strives to live in [the] truth”, his understanding of which is realised and 
deepened “through a dialogue which involves past and future generations.”187 The 
solidarity of association, just like the subjective value of work and the life of the family, 
developed and nurtured personhood and was thus a pillar of social welfare. 
John Paul does not have a correspondingly fixed and established vocabulary, as he does for 
work and family, when it comes to defining associational solidarity, and he casts his 
definitional net wide: “economic, social, political and cultural groups”,188 “the different 
communities [of] family, … cultural milieu, associations, the nation and the community of 
nations”,189 “nations themselves, communities, ethnic or religious groups, families or 
individuals.”190 However, within this mixture, three emerge as having clearer outlines and a 
clear role vis-à-vis the provision of welfare. 
John Paul’s full-throated endorsement of the activity of trades unions and workers 
organisations, audible in all three major social encyclicals but particularly so in Centesimus 
annus, was another factor that marked him off from some of his free-market supporters. 
Trades unions were “an indispensable element of social life, especially in modern 
industrialized societies,” up to and including strikes and work stoppages which he 
recognised in Laborem exercens as a “legitimate” if “extreme” measure.191 To deny workers 
freedom to organize and to form unions was a denial of their fundamental human rights, he 
wrote in Sollicitudo rei socialis.192 Trades unions were “decisive” in negotiating contracts, 
minimum salaries and working conditions for employees, he claimed in Centesimus annus.193 
They enabled workers to “express themselves” and develop an “authentic” and more “fully 
human” culture of work.194 They “defend workers’ rights”, protect “their interests as 
persons” and offer “a wide range of opportunities for commitment.”195 All in all, partly 
through the ends of a more just and fairer workplace and economy, and partly through the 
participatory means of commitment and collaboration, trades unions were an essential 
vehicle for developing the personhood at the core of welfare. 
Alongside trades unions and similar workers’ organisations, John Paul cites cooperatives, 
though only in Centesimus annus, as examples of associational solidarity. In the context of 
Leo XIII’s Rerum novarum, which John Paul’s encyclical was written to commemorate, the 
pope explains how the injustices of the market were addressed by society beginning to 
organise itself “through the establishment of effective instruments of solidarity”. Within 
this process, Christians made a notable contribution “in establishing producers’, 
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consumers’ and credit cooperatives”, and through promoting “general education and 
professional training” by means of which human dignity was protected and the common 
good established.196  
Thirdly, he talks of “charity” as a critical element. Here, the terminology is especially 
tendentious as, in debates about welfare, “charity” can be used, both appreciatively and 
critically, as precisely that which precludes any form of state intervention. Yet this is not 
the sense in which it is used by John Paul who, in line with familiar Catholic teaching, does 
not so much oppose charity to the state, as treat the proper relationship between the two 
as an instantiation of the principle of subsidiarity. 
This is illustrated by his discussion in section 88 of Evangelium vitae in which he advocates 
the promotion of vocations and implementation of “long-term practical projects” that 
respond to the Pauline summons to “to bear each other’s burdens”.197 Writing of the first 
stage of life, he advocates centres “for natural methods of regulating fertility”, marriage 
and family counselling agencies, and “centres of assistance and homes” in which new life is 
welcomed, where the activity is carried out “in accordance with an anthropology 
consistent with the Christian vision of the person” and in particular where every decision 
is guided “by the ideal of the sincere gift of self.” Writing of times of hardship, 
maladjustment, sickness or rejection, he advocates programmes and communities for 
treating drug addiction, residential communities “for minors or the mentally ill”, and care 
and relief centres for AIDS patients. Such “associations for solidarity”, especially those 
dedicated to serve the disabled, “are eloquent expressions of what charity is able to 
devise”. Finally, writing of the end of life, he says it is “again charity” that finds the “most 
appropriate” means of enabling the elderly, particularly those unable to care for 
themselves, and the terminally ill “to enjoy genuinely humane assistance” and receive an 
adequate response to their material and other needs, such as “their anxiety and their 
loneliness.”  
In such end of life issues, the role of families is “indispensable” yet insufficient, families 
needing much help “from social welfare agencies” and “suitable medical and social services 
available in public institutions”, such as palliative care facilities. More broadly, the welfare 
of the young, old, dying, infirm and needy merits the support of the state but in line with 
the principle of subsidiary, which sees families, “communities” and “associations for 
solidarity” doing what they can “in order to meet their problems in a truly human way”.198 
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The “ Social  Assistance State”  
Living most of his life in the shadow of a hyperactive and oppressive state, John Paul II had 
persistent and significant reservations concerning the state’s welfare role. This was most 
obviously the case in section 48 of Centesimus annus where his assessment of the “new type 
of State, the so-called “Welfare State” is passively critical. He talks of the “vastly expanded” 
range of state “intervention” over recent years, acknowledging that this has happened (“in 
some countries”) in order to respond better to many needs and demands, by remedying 
forms of poverty and deprivation unworthy of the human person. 
However, critics have made “harsh criticisms” of its “excesses and abuses”, dubbing it the 
“Social Assistance State”. In John Paul’s terms, its “malfunctions and defects” are the result 
of an “inadequate understanding” of the tasks proper to the State and, behind that, the 
nature and good of the person the state must serve. He spells this out. 
Too readily, the Social Assistance State ignores the principles of subsidiarity, thereby 
“depriving society of its responsibility”, leading to “a loss of human energies” and “an 
inordinate increase of public agencies” and “an enormous increase in spending”. Perhaps 
most pertinently, although they may be well intentioned, such public agencies are 
dominated “more by bureaucratic ways of thinking than by concern for serving their 
clients,” which ultimately undermine the unique transcendent dignity and call for self-gift 
that lies at the heart of every person. People’s true needs go beyond the material and are 
best understood and satisfied by those who are closest to them:  
“One thinks of the condition of refugees, immigrants, the elderly, the sick, and all 
those in circumstances which call for assistance, such as drug abusers: all these 
people can be helped effectively only by those who offer them genuine fraternal 
support, in addition to the necessary care.”199 
The pope made a similar point in an address to a French synod in the same year, outlining 
what he saw as two major problems with the Social Assistance State. First, such a state all to 
easily reduces the particular needs of the needy to “to general categories”, such “confused 
egalitarianism” obscuring the special requirements of, for example, large families, people 
with disabilities, the elderly, refugees or immigrants. Secondly, in a warning that roots his 
attitude to welfare back into his anthropology, he claims that state assistance of this nature 
reduces and weakens “the ‘personality’ of society”, attempting to counter growing “gaps in 
social solidarity” left by society’s increasing “individualism” and “atomization” through 
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“coercive structures and bureaucratic mechanisms,” in so doing replacing one form of 
dehumanisation with another, the state undermining the personhood of citizens in attempt 
to address the market’s undermining of them.  
“To achieve the common good in a way that is truly human,” he writes, “there must be a 
proper balance between the co-responsibility of the members of society and the 
commitment of the state.”200 The welfare state must serve the person, not vice versa, and it 
is to do so by means of the intermediate categories of work, family and associations of 
solidarity. 
Conclusion 
John Paul II contributes significantly to our cumulative picture of theological anthropology 
and its implications for the welfare state, both affirming and adding to the ideas emerging 
from the work of Temple and Maritain. The affirmative elements will be clear. John Paul 
firmly and repeatedly underlines the necessary connection between our understanding of 
the person and the state. His anthropology is emphatically multi-dimensional. He 
highlights createdness, transcendence, agency, and relationality as fundamental to human 
nature and good in much the same way as do Temple and Maritain, albeit with particularly 
strong emphasis on transcendence and agency. His consequent emphasis on the 
importance of meaningful and just patterns of work, and of the institutions of 
“associational solidarity”, in the form of trades unions, cooperatives, and charitable 
endeavours, as the primary vehicles for providing ‘welfare’ is similarly consonant with the 
ideas of Temple and Maritain. 
That recognised, his contribution to the discussion goes beyond straightforward 
affirmation. First, John Paul II’s papal writings and speeches add a more explicitly biblical 
and, indeed, Christological approach than either Maritain or Temple. From Redemptor 
hominis on, John Paul clearly roots his idea of the human in scripture, predominantly the 
early chapters of Genesis and the gospels, in a way that is largely absent in the work of 
Temple and Maritain. 
Second, John Paul places a particularly strong emphasis on human reason, on agency, and 
on the human commission share “Christ’s kingly mission” on earth, as foundational to 
personality. Reason and agency are embodied, fallible, and can be socially distorted, and 
the pope is careful to eschew any hubristic notions of rationality. Nevertheless, his 
emphasis on reason in particular is somewhat less evident in Temple and Maritain (and 
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indeed in Rowan Williams’ work), and it goes some way to explaining the focus John Paul 
puts on human agency. 
Third, John Paul clearly shares and affirms Temple’s and Maritain’s conception of the 
human as gift, but his theology of gift is notably more foundational and more fully worked 
through than theirs. Gift is a repeated emphasis in his papal writings, explicitly linked to 
the Trinity, creation, gospel, cross, Eucharist, the meaning of human life, and personal 
“certainty and security”.201 In John Paul II, we get a more comprehensive picture of how the 
idea of the person as gift captures and encompasses the entirety of human nature and the 
human good. 
Fourth, John Paul is less ambivalent about the impact of sin in human affairs, 
acknowledging and determinedly tracing human sin to the person, albeit sometimes 
greatly obscured and exacerbated by structural and cultural contexts. For all that sin may 
be understood, in the right light, as ‘social’, ultimately for John Paul it is more obviously 
personal than for Temple or Maritain (or, as we shall see, Williams). This does not mean its 
impact on human nature is more severe or deleterious, however. John Paul never 
articulates an understanding of sin comparable to Temple in the late 1930s or to Maritain’s 
musings, in Freedom in the Modern World, about “the question of the Evil One as an actor in 
history.”202 Rather, the pope’s conception of sin is rooted finally in the person, but in a way 
that wounds our personal capacity for rationality, relationality and gift, rather than 
obliterates them. 
These distinctive elements of John Paul’s anthropology – as well, of course, as his somewhat 
different political context, and his utterly different formative experiences – inform his 
theology of the state. The result is that, although his conception of the welfare – or ‘social 
assistance’ – state is recognisably that of Temple and Maritain, he is fundamentally more 
antagonistic to the idea of a welfare state, by no means uncompromising in his hostility but 
more noticeably critical of its legitimacy, processes and results.  
Importantly for our purposes, however, this antagonism conveys itself not simply 
negatively, through scepticism concerning the function of the state, but positively, through 
his singular and thoroughly worked through conception of the role of work and of the 
family in securing human welfare. Again, neither of these elements is at odds with the ideas 
of Temple and Maritain, but John Paul’s emphasis on both does introduce a new note into 
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our discussion of how a multi-dimensional theological conception of personhood should 
inform our theology of the state. 
John Paul II clearly, therefore, shares many of the foundational elements of anthropology 
that this thesis highlights – the material, social, transcendent, and ultimately gift-oriented 
nature of the human – and endorses a number of their implications – in particular the 
centrality of associational activity to the ‘provision’ of welfare. However, he also adds 
important new dimensions and emphases, in his rational, agential, and sinful 
understanding of the person, and in his articulation of work and family as foundational to 
welfare. 
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5: “ The self is not because of need but because of 
gift” : Rowan Williams  
Introduction 
“To engage in such a debate about the nature of citizenship is also, and inevitably, to open 
the door to a deeper debate”, Rowan Williams told the House of Lords on 16 June 2010, a 
debate that is “about the very nature of how we define the human person”.1 Although 
Williams’ focus on human personhood was less pronounced in his archiepiscopacy than 
was John Paul II’s in his papacy, the connection he drew between it and its contemporary 
political implications was frequently more explicit.2 In his 2010 Isaiah Berlin lecture he 
spoke about how society needed to “allow consideration of what sort of human character is 
being formed by its public practices”, evidencing among these the closure of libraries and 
galleries, “employment regimes that reward patterns of work that undermine family life”, a 
culture of “unmanageable debt”, scapegoating of refugees, and social policy that cuts public 
care budgets and centralises and bureaucratises medical and nursing care.3 In short, he was 
frequently at pains to emphasise the practical and political implications of our, usually 
submerged, anthropologies.4 
Within this context, the implications of Christian anthropology were made clear. “I’m more 
and more persuaded that it’s impossible to have anything resembling an intelligent 
discussion in the political and social realm without struggling to clarify what we actually 
believe about human beings,” he remarked to the Welsh Assembly in 2012, in a speech that 
was perhaps his most explicit archiepiscopal statement on the necessity of the link 
between (Christian) anthropology and politics.5 He repeatedly made this link, and grounded 
it in specifics, whether that was with regard to economic policy,6 the law,7 the 
environment,8 human rights,9 or, as we shall note below, the proper function of the state 
vis-à-vis the provision of welfare.  
All that noted, however, a repeated and even specific link between Christian anthropology 
and policy is not the same as a clear one. This is not simply the familiar point about 
Williams dense and difficult prose style. Nor is it simply a consequence of the 
circumstantial and occasional, rather than systematic, origins of many of his interventions, 
although this is undeniable.10 Mike Higton observed in 2011 that much of Williams’ 
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theology “is found in places other than the printed page… [in talks in] particular situations 
where…he is making connections with specific lives”, and this applies especially so to his 
more political engagements.11 Moreover, such collections of Williams’ thought that do exist 
are self-consciously presented as loose and disparate collections. Williams describes his 
book On Christian Theology in its preface as “some kind of collection of scattered pieces”.12 
Faith in the Public Square, his collection of archiepiscopal lectures, is not offered as “a 
compendium of political theology” but only “a series of worked examples”.13 
Lack of systematisation does not mean lack of coherence. Higton noted that when writing 
his book on him, he flipped between Williams’ earliest and latest writings and found 
himself “on familiar territory: the theological vision…was entirely recognisable”.14 When it 
comes to the topic of this thesis, one can see this clearly in Williams’ first published work, 
‘The Theology of Personhood: A Study of the Thought of Christos Yannaras’, published in 
Sobornost in 1972, in which he remarked that “personhood is not a part of human nature, it 
defines natures, it is the ‘ontological starting-point’ for understanding nature… existence 
can only be perceived in persons”, a sentiment instantly identifiable with his later work.15 
This combination of a deeply thought-through and coherent, but unsystematic approach 
could account for Jonathan Chaplin’s justifiable comment that “the link between 
[Williams’] rich vision of the embodied relational person and his account of plural social 
institutions [is] somewhat vague.”16 However, it is also important to recognise that this lack 
of clarity is more intentional than this judgement might indicate, reflecting Williams’ 
deliberate and theologically-grounded determination to maintain a degree of openness in 
all his pronouncements. 
This is a repeated theme in Williams’ writing, with roots in his understanding of language, 
of creation, of revelation, of theology, and of Anglicanism. At one point in his book on 
Dostoyevsky, written on sabbatical while at Canterbury, Williams quotes Dostoyevsky 
(quoting Tyuchev) to the effect that “a thought once uttered is a lie”.17 It is a sentiment that 
could be appropriated for Williams himself. “When you try to tidy up an unsystematised 
speech, you are likely to lose a great deal”, as he writes in the prologue to On Christian 
Theology.18 
Dostoyevsky’s novels understand and depict the diabolical “as that which seeks to end 
history and speech”,19 his narratives attempting to show “what divine creation might be 
like”, namely “by creating a world in which the unexpected and unscripted is continually 
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unfolding, in which there is no imposed last word.”20 In effect, in Williams own words, 
“there is nothing sayable that cannot be answered or continued or qualified in some way or 
another”.21 
As with the nature of language and creation, so with revelation and the business of 
theology. “Revelation decisively advances or extends debate [and therefore] extends rather 
than limits the range of ambiguity and conflict in language,” he wrote in his essay ‘Trinity 
and Revelation’.22 “It poses fresh questions rather than answering old ones.” Theology is, or 
should be, a conversation, marked by the “two essential features” of conversation, namely 
the “recognition of an ‘unfinished’ quality in what has been said on either side, and the 
possibility of correction.”23 “What we know, if we claim to be Christians,” he wrote in 
‘Trinity and Pluralism’ “is as much as anything a set of negotiations.”24  
It is also, by Williams reckoning, a particular characteristic of Anglicanism. “Theological 
language”, he wrote in his volume of essays Anglican Identities, “is a difficult, always 
incomplete, corruptible, but unavoidable enterprise”, no more so than with the “inventor 
of that distinctive Anglican mood … [of] ‘contemplative pragmatism’”, Richard Hooker.25 
This Anglican “mood”, according to Williams, “embraces a fair degree of clarity about the 
final goal of human beings”, but allows room for “a good deal of reticence as to how this 
ought to work itself out”, alongside a “scepticism as to claims that we have found 
comprehensive formulations.” The result, he writes in the Introduction to that volume is “a 
theologically informed and spiritually sustained patience” in which Anglican theologians 
“do not expect human words to solve their problems rapidly” – or, one is tempted to add, at 
all.26 
This approach generates a certain apophatic style in his political work, in which, for all his 
rich and coherent (if unsystematised) reflection on the implications of Christian 
anthropology for politics and society, Williams is more comfortable naming what is not 
rather than what is, talking about the ideologies, systems and cultures that a Christian 
anthropology would proscribe than those it might prescribe. Thus, for example, he began 
his speech to the Welsh assembly saying “Rather than saying what community is, I’m going 
to begin by saying what community isn’t, and see where we get to with that.”27  
So it is that, for carefully considered reasons, Williams’ rich, broad, nuanced, and subtle 
reflections on Christian anthropology, and his clear and repeated insistence on their 
significant, specific and meaningful implications for politics, economics, law, and welfare, 
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do not result in anything approaching an agenda for change. Rather, they provide the 
plumb line against which inadequate social constructions can be measured and corrected, 
in such a way as generates unfinished but truer social and political institutions.  
This chapter, like preceding ones, is structured between an analysis of Williams’ 
anthropology and its consequences for his understanding of the (welfare) state. It draws 
out those aspects of personhood that Williams most clearly shares with the other figures in 
this thesis, such as createdness, responsibility and the final orientation to ‘gift’, but it 
supplements them with several elements that are distinctive to Williams’ anthropology, 
such as the emphasis on the omnipresence of communication within creation (as opposed 
to simply being a facet of human sociality or relationality), and the significance of mystery 
and imagination to personhood. Building on this multi-dimensional theological 
anthropology (Williams being the only figure here discussed explicitly to use the concept of 
multi-dimensionality), the chapter than points to what this means for his ideas of 
interactive pluralism, his conviction that the state needs to act as a morally ‘thick’ broker 
within the community of communities over which it presides, and the implications this has 
for the provision of welfare. 
Anthropology 
Williams’ anthropological discussions are marked by the features mentioned above, 
tending towards the apophatic and the unsystemised.  
His concept of the human person (a word to which we shall turn) is often defined against 
those contemporarily popular concepts – the soul, the self, the individual – that he sees as 
limited and problematic articulations of what it is to be human. Human essence is not 
captured by talking of the ‘soul’, in the sense of early modern philosophy, “an immaterial 
individual substance”.28 “Modern ethics and theology alike have been haunted by a 
presence usually called the authentic self,” he wrote in his essays on ‘Interiority and 
Epiphany’, an agent “whose motivation is transparent, devoid of self-deception and of 
socially-conditioned role playing”.29 This, he insists, is an “intellectually shaky and… 
morally problematic” fiction, the self not being a core of authenticity that we reveal “by 
peeling away layers” but instead “an integrity one struggles to bring into existence.”30 “I 
have avoided speaking of the human individual”, he said in his William Temple lecture” 
because doing so fails to recognise how the human life is “thoroughly embedded in 
corporate practices and common life.”31 
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The self and the individual are unhelpfully “one-dimensional” conceptualisations, to pick 
up a metaphor he deploys in his 1972 essay on Christos Yannaras and to which he returns 
in his later writings. “Community…assumes that the ‘other’ for whom you’re taking 
responsibility is a three-dimensional person”, he told the Welsh Assembly in 2012.32 
“Communities of conviction” should actively engage in political life, he said in a lecture in 
Westminster Abbey in 2008, “simply so that we should go on having three-dimensional 
persons in public life.”33 That this is more than a conventional metaphor is captured in his 
lecture to the TUC in 2009, in which he spells out the need to attend to, seek and protect a 
“‘three-dimensional’ humanity” that is centred on family and imagination and “mutual 
sympathy” in society.34 
A slightly different scheme is sketched out in his James Gregory Lecture in 2015. Here, 
contending against reductive and abstracted understandings of consciousness, which in 
their own way are as problematically-attenuated as concepts of the self or the individual, 
he advocates an understanding of consciousness that is located, relational, narrative, and 
“bound up with language”.35 
These different classifications in their own ways highlight themes that have been 
consistently (if not systematically) present in Williams’ anthropology, and while one must 
always recognise Williams’ reluctance to close down discussion through definition or 
systematisation, I will appropriate them to outline three key “dimensions” to Williams’ 
anthropology. Prior to doing so, however, I want to explore briefly how these dimensions 
are not restricted to Williams’ concept of the human but rooted in, and reflective of, his 
wider understanding of creation. 
Creation 
That the human is created, in the sense of being a material element within the material 
created order, is a familiar theme in Williams’ writing. “The body is the organ of the soul’s 
meaning,” he said in a lecture on human rights to the LSE, “the medium in which the 
conscious subject communicates.”36 “We relate to one another as bodies,” he observed in 
the 2012 Theos lecture.37 Consciousness is “a matter of charting lines of relation with other 
material agents”, he said in 2015.38 
Similarly, the understanding that humans are created in the sense of being intrinsically 
dependent on other (material) agents and situations is a familiar and long-standing 
concern.  To be human is “to be a creature, a part of the world, a moment in a pattern, 
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dependent on others, dependent on ourselves”, he wrote in The Truce of God in 1983.39  
“Finite being… is marked by dependence: to exist as a discrete subject of predication is to 
depend,” he said in The Edge of Words thirty years later.40  
It is important, however, to root this materiality and dependency in Williams’ wider 
discussions on creation in order to show what human materiality and dependency mean to 
him, and, in particular to clean up a persistent “philosophical myth” that he names in The 
Edge of Words, namely the “habit of opposing purely active subject to passive object”. Rather 
than dividing the world into stuff that has and deals with meaning (agents like our selves) 
and stuff that doesn’t (objects and processes in the world), thereby viewing consciousness 
as “a somewhat embarrassing excrescence on the surface of rational material processes”, 
Williams’ insists that “material objects and the material world as such are always 
‘saturated’ with the workings of the mind” and “any and every event in the world is 
potentially a communication of infinite intelligence.”41 In Williams’ view, “matter itself” is 
invariably and necessarily communicative”, rather than being passively “moulded by our 
minds into intelligible structure.”42 Creation is not a dead stage on which humans play, but 
itself communicative of precisely the same divine nature that finds its clearest 
manifestation in the species in which God was incarnated.  
Thus, “creation is itself an act of communication, a form of language”, an idea that to which, 
he points out, Eastern Christian thought is especially sensitive.43 It is known by God before 
it is by any human, that “what I see is already ‘seen’ by, already in relation to, some reality 
immeasurably different from the self I know myself”, and therefore there is an essential 
unknowableness, or mystery to it.44  
Beyond creation’s innate communicativeness and its otherness, it is also marked by being 
gift. Understanding God “as trinity, intrinsic self-love and self-gift”, establishes that 
creation “while not ‘needed’ by God, is wholly in accord with the divine being as being-for-
another”.45 God is the one who “eternally… generates what is other”. There is in his 
“heart…what you might call the energy of difference, an outpouring of life into otherness”.  
Creation is “an act of divine self-giving, the bestowing of God’s activity in and through what 
is not God”.46 
Thus, the idea of understanding humans as created is not simply a way of emphasising their 
irreducible materiality and dependency. By embedding that understanding within 
Williams’ wider understanding of creation (and of God), he subverts familiar assumptions 
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pertaining to materiality and dependency – that both are somehow inert or wholly reliant – 
and introduces concepts of communication, mystery and self-gift that are central to his vision 
of human personhood. I will structure my following discussion of Williams’ anthropology 
on these three ideas, remaining conscious that this is not a cost-free tidying-up of his 
thought, and risks underemphasising other important concepts in his anthropology, such 
as temporality, emergence, and imagination. Accordingly, I will make wider reference to 
such concepts in the discussion. 
Communication 
As noted, Williams’ understanding of creation is inherently communicative. “The more we 
reflect on speech and its claims to represent the environment”, he wrote in the 
introduction to The Edge of Words, “the more our universe looks like a network of 
communication.”47 
It is important to understand communication here in its widest sense, not simply speech. 
Because the created order is not passive, inert matter but saturated with communicative 
activity of God, all things, and in particular all agents, are “capable of ‘speaking’ and 
bestowing something of the creator.”48 Thus, the human body itself “speaks”, is “a 
language”, “receiv[ing] and digest[ing] communication”,49 participating in the on-going 
conversation that is intrinsic to the material, created world. 
This has implications for human personhood and community, but before that, the 
foundational nature of communication says something about the core of human identity, 
human dignity, and rights. Although Williams unequivocally rejects the idea of any 
irreducible isolated core to human identity, he nevertheless repeatedly emphasises how 
the human person is addressed by God before he or she is addressed by, or addresses, 
anyone or anything else.50 In the light of that, others have a “standing before God”, which is 
“invulnerable to the success or failure of any other relationship or any situation in the 
contingent world.” Here resides the dignity I am mandated to respect.51  
This is a foundation for Williams’ understanding of human rights and also human 
community.52 Our environment is “irreducibly charged with intelligibility,” in such a way 
so that “we are oriented to picking up and decoding intelligible messages.”53 Indeed, that 
orientation is essential as, in much the same way as I am spoken into existence by God’s 
word, we develop into persons through communication. “We speak because we are spoken 
to and learn to become partakers in human conversation by being invited into a flow of 
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verbal life that has already begun.”54 Language – or, more broadly, communication – is an 
inherently relational practice. “It is simply and literally impossible for us to learn and use 
language without acknowledging dependence.”55 
This is an inherently messy and agonistic process. As he says in his essay ‘Interiority and 
Epiphany’, “the exchanges of conversation and negotiation are the essence of what is going 
on” rather than some “unsatisfactory translations of a more fundamental script.”56 On the 
one hand, such negotiation forces us, in the face of the existence of the other, to abandon 
our “illusions of control, [our] passion for ‘scripting’ the language used around me”. On the 
other, if that encounter with the other becomes too contentious, it risks apprehending the 
other “as a threat or a rival”.57 
Communication, then, is fraught with challenges. God may not “emerge” into personhood 
because he “is personal”, as Williams intimated in his early review of Yannaras, but human 
personhood is more fragile and emergent.58 This introduces an important sub-theme in 
Williams’ anthropology, namely the temporal and developmental nature of human 
personhood. 
Selves are not timeless any more than they are immaterial. Rather, as he says in Lost Icons, 
“the self lives and moves in, only in, acts of telling.”59 This communication is sequential, 
‘selfhood’ existing in time. “To know how to be human…requires us to take very seriously 
the fact that we are historical beings, shaped by our past… we are never in a state of pure 
rationality.”60 This has particularly important implications for our contemporary consumer 
culture with its adulation of the unencumbered, uncoerced and eternally unaffected self. 
“The controlled self, making its dispositions in a vacuum of supposed consumer freedom 
and determining the clothing in which it will appear, is a fiction.”61 
The unattached, atemporal, consumerised self is a fiction, and a destructive one at that. 
True persons develop and learn, an emphasis that is part and parcel of Williams’ focus on 
communication, and brings to the fore the seminal point that persons are relationally-
constituted. It is by communicating with others in time, and learning from that messy and 
always open-ended process of communication, we develop our personhood.  
Thus, Williams asserts that true self-knowledge lies not in “lonely introspection” but by 
“meditating on the relations in which we already stand”, relations that we did not choose.62 
The “common enterprise of humanity” is something that “is being constantly learned”.63 A 
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person is “that kind of reality, the point at which relationships intersect, where a 
difference may be made and new relations created”.64  
This relationality is what “human beings are made for… where the deepest springs of our 
humanity are to be found.”65 Moreover, it is rooted in the belief that “God’s own self is 
already a pattern of loving relationship: the Trinity of Father, Son and Spirit”.66 It is central 
to the Christian narrative, whereby Christians are engaged “in Christ, in constructing each 
other’s humanity”.67 And it has serious social and political implications as it means, firstly, 
there cannot be “a human good for one person or group that necessarily excludes the good 
of another person or group”68 but also that people must learn not through “being lectured” 
or absorbing universal principles but “by growing up in dependable communities, in 
families, in local communities and associations where they know they’re taken seriously.”69 
Mystery (and imagination) 
Williams’ personalism is grounded in the theology of Vladimir Lossky, on whom he wrote 
his doctoral thesis, and the Eastern Orthodox Tradition more broadly.70 The same influence 
is visible in the attention Williams pays to the fundamental mystery and unknowability of 
the human person. Lossky, he said in his 2012 Theos lecture, is arguing for an essential 
mysteriousness about the notion of the person in the human world, an essential 
mysteriousness that one can’t simply deal with by listing it in a number of things that are 
true about us.”71 
This is implicit in his engagement with communication and relationality outlined above. If 
the person is spoken to and known by God prior to any human or earthly actions, that 
means that there is something of that person that is always prior and inaccessible to other 
persons. “Whenever I face another human being, I face a mystery” he said in a lecture on 
‘Public Religion and the Common Good’ in 2007. No-one, no matter how “beloved”, can ever 
be completely “‘captured’, even in decades of relationship.”72 
The fact that we are, finally, “not transparent” to one another, and that my personhood is 
forged by “converse and exchange” with others, also implies that my own personhood is a 
mystery, ultimately hidden from me, through the process of being formed through 
communicative interaction with “opaque” others.73 This generates another reason for the 
openness that saturates Williams’ theology as he says that this should “enjoin a consistent 
scepticism about claims to have arrived at a final transparency to myself.”74 
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It is important to stress that such mystery and openness are not shortcomings or problems 
to be overcome in Williams’ anthropology but constitutive and creative elements. To be 
human is to be unknowable, unfinished, and endlessly generative. It is, in short, to be 
creative and imaginative. 
As with Williams’ emphasis on communication, this stress on creativity is explicitly rooted 
in the nature of God. “Creativity in the created world becomes then a mirror of God’s 
nature” he said in a lecture on ‘Creation, Creativity and Creatureliness’.75 In the light of 
that, human creativity “is most fully and freely expressed as humans when we, as artists, 
stand back and let be”, that “letting be” being, in fact, a “hugely laborious business”. 
The danger with this articulation is that it might give the impression that creativity is the 
task of artists, or that creativity and the imaginative life is something that should or could 
be limited to a particular area of human society, say the creative industry. This is 
emphatically not Williams’ view, as he goes on to say in the same lecture: “campaigning 
about debt or fair trade is creative, it is an exercise of what our humanity is called to”. 
Moreover, the fact that he made this point explicitly in an address to the Trades Union 
Conference underlines the seminally important role that human creativity plays on 
‘ordinary life’.76  
This emphasis on the essential creativity of human nature is further underlined by the 
deployment of one Williams’ most characteristic words, ‘imagination’, together with its 
suffixes (usually ‘social’ or ‘moral’) or it cognates (usually ‘imaginative’).  
Given Williams’ major interest in literature and the arts there is an obvious forum here for 
his recognition of the centrality of the human imagination.77 Art, he wrete in a lecture on 
Maritain, is foundational in maintaining the openness and mystery of creation. It 
challenges “the finality of appearance…not in order to destroy but to ground, amplify, 
fulfil.”78 George Bell was to be lauded for, among other things, his “passionate optimism 
about the possible convergence of the Christian faith with the artist’s imagination’.79 More 
broadly, as he remarked in his book on Dostoyevsky, no system of “perceiving and 
receiving the world can fail to depend upon imagination.”80 
As with creativity, imagination is emphatically not a human characteristic limited to 
‘imaginative’ industries but intrinsic to the good – and collective good – all human persons, 
including in their quite specific social, economic and political contexts. Williams places the 
entire cultural analysis in his book Lost Icons on how contemporary society has lost 
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“clusters of convention and imagination…of possible lives or modes of life”, the loss of 
these being, he contends, the consequence of a “single, focal area of lost imagination”, 
which he calls the soul.81  
Accordingly, the health of concrete practices of political and economic life suffer, 
depending as they do on their recognition and nurturing of the imagination that is central 
to the human person. Thus, he told a Q&A on the subject in Holy Week 2008 that politics 
could not survive without “moral energy and imagination” generated by faith (or, more 
precisely, “faith of one sort or another”).82 The British labour movement, he told the TUC, 
had an honourable record in its commitment to “humane values, to humane relationships 
and intelligence and imagination.”83 The work of developing credit unions, he repeatedly 
remarked at the opening of the Waltham Forest one in 2004, was one of imagination.84  
Gift (and responsibility) 
The third aspect of Williams’ anthropology that I have chosen to highlight – the person as 
gift – is, of course, closely linked with the previous two. The very nature of communication, 
through which the person is formed, involves gift and receipt of self and other. Similarly, 
“God’s self-forgetting in creation” is the foundation and model for any human act of 
creation: “the creative artist is doing a kenotic job.”85 That noted, it is worth drawing out 
Williams’ ideas on gift separately, partly because they comprise a substantial amount of his 
anthropology and partly because they link clearly and explicitly into the foundations of his 
political anthropology.  
The concept of gift is rooted in Williams’ idea of God. “The life of the infinite is eternally 
relation and gift,” he wrote in his 2018 book on Christology, “the endlessness of a mutual 
outpouring of life and bliss”.86 Understanding divine wisdom is impossible without 
“understanding of divine self-giving... self-surrender”.87 The events of Jesus’ life should be 
“grasped as the radical self-dispossession of God.”88 The person is found ultimately in the 
supreme and total act of self-giving of the cross.  
Creation is to be understood in the same light, “an act of divine self-giving, the bestowing 
of God’s activity in and through what is not God.”89 This understanding of creation as gift 
reflects and informs Williams’ ideas concerning the natural communicativeness of the 
material, and finds a particularly penetrating expression in the Eucharist, which “hints” at 
the “paradox” that “material things carry their fullest for human minds and the 
bodies…when they are the medium of gift.”90 Although Williams only very rarely makes 
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references to John Paul II, this is a sentiment with direct parallel in the pope’s description 
of the Eucharist as “the gift par excellence… of [Christ] himself, of his person in his sacred 
humanity,” in Ecclesia et Eucharistia.91 
And naturally – not least because “there is a truth about human beings [that] God has 
revealed…in Jesus Christ and revealed himself in that action” – this concept of God, 
wisdom, Christ, and creation as gift lies at the heart of human dignity, personality and 
self.92 “Human dignity,” Williams remarked, “is not simply about what is owed to us and 
what is given to us.” Moreover, “it’s also about what each has to give.”93 Everyone is (and 
should be) able “to give to others, to have the dignity of being a giver, being important to 
someone else.” Human personality is “above all, committed to receiving and giving.”94 “The 
self is,” he says in Lost Icons, “not because of need but because of gift.”95 
It is worth engaging in a brief parenthesis here on the topic of agency, partly because it was 
a significant aspect of John Paul II’s anthropology; partly because it plays a significant role 
in popular and political debates about welfare, particularly among those on the political 
right; and partly because Williams does look seriously at the question of agency, doing so in 
the context of locating human identity, dignity and personality in the concept of gift. 
Few would put Williams on the right of the political spectrum, so it is telling that, when he 
does discuss agency, he has a strong view on the topic. Religious faith, he says in his 
William Temple lecture, “assumes that human fulfilment is something that an agent, a 
human subject, owns.”96 Such fulfilment is “connected with” the choices people make and 
the lives they live, and especially is predicated on not having one’s life “defined for you by 
the power or agency of someone else.” Fulfilment cannot be defined by others, still less be 
seen as “a commodity” provided by them. What matters, he told the National Council for 
Voluntary Organisations in 2004, is “acquiring a sense that you have made yourself 
responsible for how you see the world… You have found a place to stand and have become 
the subject of your moral life.”97 In this light, in a sentiment with obvious relevance to our 
topic, he says that “welfare is not about someone else’s responsibility to make me happy 
[but] is about releasing the self for well-being, to shape and discover that well-being with 
other selves and other agents.”98 
This might conceivably be heard as a Thatcherite view, and it is instructive that in a House 
of Lords debate in 2008 he referenced 2 Thessalonians, which Margaret Thatcher famously 
quoted in her speech to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in May 1988. In the 
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debate, Williams claims that Christian morality was about the “equipping of people for the 
exercise of their human dignity as citizens”, citing Paul’s Thessalonian commendation of 
generosity to the poorest and “responsibility on the part of those who can work to do so 
and to support themselves and their families.” The exercise of such agency, such 
responsibility, is critical to personal dignity and common welfare. “Giving to others is part 
of a process that enables those others to grow in their own dignity and to become givers in 
their turn.”99 
Where this reading does diverge from the familiar individualistic or Thatcherite one, is that 
is runs in strict parallel to Williams’ clear emphasis on human dependency. As noted, to be 
human it to be known, addressed and loved by God prior to exercising any agency, and to 
be born into webs of communication and relationship that form one’s personhood, just as 
much as we form that of others. It is only in this context, that the kind of agency and 
responsibility of which Williams’ speaks in the William Temple Lecture and the 2008 House 
of Lords debate makes sense. As he wrote in an essay ‘On Being Creatures’ a number of 
years earlier, our spiritual health demands “a twofold honesty”, incorporating on the one 
hand, a recognition of “the inevitability of dependence (since we are not self-regulating 
systems)” and on the other a recognition of “the fundamental need to imagine oneself, 
nonetheless, as a true agent, not confined by dependence.”100 Autonomy is not, he says, 
“the self’s ability to select and freely execute its goals”, but rather the skill of “knowing 
whose aid and companionship you need and the freedom to depend on that.”101 
The resulting combination – of dependence and agency; of receiving and giving gifts – 
should generate a mutuality that is the foundation of true social wellbeing. Human 
community, he writes in his book on Christology, is “most fully realized in the 
unconditional mutuality which is represented by the language of organic 
interdependence.”102 Such mutuality is, naturally, central to Williams’ understanding of the 
church and what it shows society. It is telling that his reference to citizenship in the House 
of Lords debate quoted above, is followed by the parenthesis “both of their own societies 
and of the City of God”; for Williams there is no wholesale break between the kind of ethic 
to which church and society should aspire. A “theological approach” to community – 
evidenced in “the community of the Hebrew scriptures living under law”, or the Pauline 
community in which “we work as a body in which there is nothing good for one part that 
isn’t good for the whole and nothing bad for one part that is not bad for the whole” – is one 
5: Rowan Williams 
150 
 
in which “we all have something we are called upon to contribute to the flourishing of an 
organic whole.”103 
This is perhaps one of the commonest sentiments in Williams’ speeches on human society. 
Sometimes, the sentiment is framed with specific reference to the church. “The relation of 
each to the Master is such that each is given some unique contribution to the common life, 
so that no one member of the community is able fully to realise their calling and their 
possibilities without every other.”104 “The good of the other is eventually intrinsic to the 
good of oneself”, as he says in an essay on William Tyndale.105 A good ‘society’ – whether 
constituted by its conscious adherence to God, or by geography, language, history, 
ethnicity, or some other created criterion – is one that is drawn to the idea of self-giving, 
whereby every person seeks their own good by giving of themselves and pursing the good 
of the other, in imitation of God’s own inherent self-giving.106 
Here, then, we have a clear link between Williams’ anthropology and his political thought, 
the idea that the human person is fulfilled in self-giving, and that properly understood this 
informs the contours of society. The world of voluntary and community organisation 
should nurture “a culture of self-respect”, in which people “come to believe that they are 
capable of making a difference,” he told the NCVO.107 Welfare is not about someone else’s 
responsibility to make me happy, he told the William Temple Foundation, but is rather 
about “releasing the self for well-being, to shape and discover that well-being with other 
selves and other agents.”108 
Political Implications 
This account of Rowan Williams’ anthropology is, as caveated above, vulnerable to the 
accusation that it is overly schematised, drawn as it is not only from Williams’ extensive 
and largely occasional corpus of speeches and essays that touch on the topic, but also from 
his repeated antipathy to finality or closure in any intellectual endeavour, as well as the 
apophatic register with which he is clearly comfortable. His understanding of human 
nature as essentially (though the word must be used with caution) communicative, creative, 
and kenotic is, I argue, defensible; but his understanding of human nature as essentially not 
self-creative,109 self-interested,110 self-possessive,111 relativist,112 grounded ultimately in 
rights113 and so forth is clearer still. What the human person is not is more easily stated than 
what s/he is.114 
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Much the same applies to his resulting political theology: although it is possible to edge 
towards his vision for the state and for the provision of welfare, to do so in a way that is 
true to Williams’ own theological method would involve first outlining what political 
visions or systems his anthropology precludes.  
Again at the risk of over systematisation, there are three political approaches to the state 
that Williams sees as indefensible given the nature of the human and the human good he 
proposes which can be labelled, without too much inaccuracy, Fabianism, Thatcherism and 
managerialism. 
The first (although the order is arbitrary) is a certain kind of left-wing politics, Williams’ 
critique of which is at odds with popular assumptions of his own political home. Given the 
non-negotiable importance of people exercising agency, generosity and creativity in such a 
way as affirms and develops their personhood, there are real perils in the kind of state that 
understands itself as the solution to people’s needs, the idea that “all problems are to be 
solved top down from the State.”115 There are obvious enemies here, such as those 
“utopian” programmes of “justice and reconciliation” that are “consistently vulnerable to 
[their] own failure to transform more than the interpersonal”.116 The experience of state 
socialism in Eastern Europe and elsewhere, he told the NCVO in 2014, made it painfully 
obvious “that motivation for co-operative work cannot be imposed at a level that is remote 
from people’s actual working lives and personal concerns.”117 Such approaches are 
inconsistent with fundamental tenets of the Christian faith, not only contravening its 
anthropology but also its “‘eschatological reserve’ about excessive political claims.”118  
That acknowledged, there are other subtler forms of state activity that are also 
problematic. The most prominent among these for Williams is the Fabian socialism that 
features with notable frequency in his speeches and clearly serves as a British model of how 
forms of politics that pay insufficient attention to human creative agency are problematic. 
More importantly (for our purposes), Fabianism is repeatedly placed in opposition to 
traditions of politics (usually but not always Labour politics) that offer an alternative and 
more constructive approach that pays closer attention to the true contours of human 
nature, and bring us closer to Williams’ vision for the welfare state. 
Speaking to the William Temple Foundation he interpreted the history of British socialism 
in the twentieth century as a victory of the Webbs and over William Morris; Sydney and 
Beatrice Webb’s model “of highly controlled social provision” winning over Morris’ 
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“anarcho-syndicalism” with its greater concern for “agency” and “creativity”.119 More 
forcefully still, he told the Welsh Assembly that there is a strand British left thinking 
“which has been almost obsessional about state solutions,” solutions that have “sat rather 
uncomfortably with the localist cooperative element in British socialism” that always paid 
much more attention to the need for immediate, participation and moral agency. 120 
In actual fact, Williams noted in his Big Society lecture, the Fabian vision didn’t wholly win 
out. It did, however, offer “top-down solutions” that ultimately proved irresistible to 
people across the political spectrum, its commitment to “central planning” apparently 
“more effective than anything”.121 One of Williams’ repeated messages in his speeches on 
this topic centres on the need to recapture this alternative vision. “We still need a robust 
defence of the non-Fabian, the pluralist, vision of what a just society might be,” he told the 
William Temple Foundation.122 “We all need to grow out of the sort of early Fabian/ Sidney 
Webb idea that government is always the prime provider of social goods, whether you like 
it or not.”123 This “defence” or “growing out of” has important resources and models on 
which to draw, both historical – Lord Acton, F.W. Maitland, John Neville Figgis and Harold 
Laski – and contemporary – Philip Blond and Maurice Glasman – to which we shall turn 
later. For now, however, we can see in Williams’ treatment of Fabianism a line over which 
his anthropology will not allow his politics to cross. A proper understanding of human 
nature will mean that the state listens “to the voices of moral vision that spring from 
communities that do not depend on the state itself for their integrity and meaning”, 
something that Fabian socialism patently failed to do.124  
The second political approach judged inconsistent with Williams’ anthropology might be 
labelled neo-liberalism or Thatcherism, although these are labels Williams eschews for 
obvious reasons. In reality, at least in Williams’ writings, this position comprised a cluster 
of approaches rather than a single, neat ideology. There is the “poisonous distortion” of 
unalloyed individualism, the idea that “there is no such thing as society… [but only] 
individuals all pursuing their own goals”, with government limited to “prevent[ing] the 
worst conflicts that might arise out of that.”125 There is the doctrine of what Williams’ calls 
“economism”, the notion that “economic solutions can be narrowly defined in terms of 
measurable profit and loss, bracketing out issues of a shared wellbeing.”126 While there are 
practical objections aplenty to the utilitarianism that underlies this approach, it is 
primarily the fact that economism envisages humans as “essentially calculating machines” 
to which Williams objects. There is also the kind of moralism that sometimes attends this 
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political programme, the “nostalgia for ‘values’” that “echoes the individualistic and facile 
language of moral retrenchment”, and is really little more than political “window 
dressing.”127  
The third political approach that Williams’ anthropology judges unacceptable again lacks 
an obvious label, not so much because Williams is too canny to give it one as because it 
remained politically fresh in his time at Canterbury, and had yet to coalesce into a coherent 
agenda (or because, by some reckonings, was too opportunistic ever to do so). It combined 
a Fabian conviction that the state was the proper vehicle to solve society’s problems with 
the more liberal emphasis inherent in Thatcherism, thereby generating a kind of 
managerialism and consumer politics – a kind of Blairite ‘Third Way’, although again this is 
too loaded and contemporary a political identity for Williams to use.128  
In his early archiepiscopal ‘Richard Dimbleby lecture’, Williams spoke directly to this 
concern, saying that the “apparently simple and attractive picture of a more direct relation 
between individuals and government”, whereby citizens becomes consumers whose 
aggregate demands government is mandated to respect and deliver through some 
unwritten contract, “is not the ideal of democratic life but a parody of it.”129 The ends are 
those of Fabianism, the means those of Thatcherism. Government has the responsibility 
and ability to solve problems but the problems that need to be fixed are identified and 
advocated by public opinion, not by central command. “Political and social ‘goods’ are seen 
more and more as fixed objects of aspiration, as commodities marketed by the national 
executive”. Voting is a form of consumer pressure. “The individual political subject, 
endowed with rights” is pitted against the state, “endowed with the monopoly of legitimate 
power.” Instead of the politicizing of consumption, “not at all a bad idea” by Williams’ 
reckoning, what we ultimately get is the consumerization of politics, “not at all a good 
idea.”130 
This commodification of politics “seeks to smooth everything out into lumps of material on 
which price tags are affixed”, generating an irredeemably “managerial and functional 
approach” to our common life.131 It (inadvertently) creates a competitive environment for 
social goods. Williams remarked in a speech on William Tyndale (of all people) in a lecture 
delivered before his time at Canterbury, that the kind of “universalist ideal of justice”, 
which substitutes “a community of abstract individuals” for the messy reality of real people 
and the multiple loyalties and associations, leads “precisely [to] the rights-obsessed society 
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of our own age, in which each individual arrives in the social process equipped with a 
variety of enforceable claims”, leaving social life “a constant adjustment of rival 
interests.”132 
This crept into and has become a particular blight on the politics of welfare, as Williams 
observed in his William Temple lecture. In the 1980s, he explained, in response to the 
complaints about dependency and “welfarism”, “some people seemed to think that the 
alternative was to give people power and initiative through the market, to make them 
independent agents as purchasers.”133 They became, in effect, “purchasing agent[s]”, no 
longer just passive recipients. The inadequacy of this, he reasons, is obvious, and is 
anthropological, in as far as, while it tries to respect people’s agency, it shrinks that agency 
“to one particular mode”. The person becomes the purchaser, a consumer, thereby wholly 
ignoring the seminal importance of person as giver.  
As it happens, the ramifications of this approach on politics as a whole extends beyond 
problematic models of welfare provision or rights-claiming to the very foundations of 
politics itself. In his 2001 essay ‘Beyond Liberalism’, Williams warned that we seem to be 
losing sight “of what the very idea of government is about”. The mundane, time-refined 
and concrete “processes and protocols” of government were becoming “increasingly 
overshadowed” by unrealistic public expectations, the “instantaneous button-pressing” 
model of (pseudo-)democracy of which he spoke in his Dimbleby lecture the following year, 
in which the “ideal” – and perhaps the only legitimate – model for democracy is the 
referendum, which itself generates enormous discord while settling little that really 
matters.134 Fifteen years later, in a review of John Milbank and Adrian Pabst’s book The 
Politics of Virtue, published in the wake of the Brexit campaign and referendum, he talked 
again about “the resurgence of a ‘plebiscite’ ideal of democracy, the fantasy of politics as 
the direct expression of unmediated demands [and] all the risks of majoritarian tyranny 
that go with it” – this time able to point of live and potent examples.135 
‘Pluralism’ and ‘Communitarianism’  
If Fabianism, Thatcherism and managerialism – for want of better labels – are proscribed as 
state models by Williams’ anthropology, what (if anything) is prescribed? Williams is 
disinclined to pin his political theology colours to any ‘ism’ for reasons already discussed, 
and so we must answer this question with the appropriate caution. Thus, while the short 
answer orients us away from these three models towards pluralism and communitarianism, 
the longer one insists that although Williams gravitates in the direction of both of these 
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political concepts, he arrives as neither, critiquing and self-consciously distancing himself 
from both. Thus, while it might be reasonable to call Williams’ position one of 
communitarian pluralism, it would not be reasonable to do so without attending to his 
reservations with both those terms. We will look at each in turn, drawing out those aspects 
that Williams affirms and questions. 
It is the pluralist political theorists of whom Williams writes most frequently and 
positively. Supreme among these is John Neville Figgis, so influential on Temple, whom 
Williams commends in his early essay ‘Liberation Theology and the Anglican Tradition’.136 
Williams credits Figgis with mainstreaming the phrase (and thereby the idea) of society 
being a “community of communities”, in the early 20th century.137 His work offers a 
commendable model of “how the Church should be seeking to shape public opinion.”138 
Along with the work of others – Williams mentions Harold Laski and David Nicholls – Figgis 
popularised the idea of the state as “a particular cluster of smaller political communities 
negotiating with each other under the umbrella of a system of arbitration recognised by 
all.”139 
It is important to be clear of what Williams’ understands pluralism to be, if we are also to 
clear on how he finesses the term. He draws out two distinct meanings of pluralism in the 
political context.140 The first is Figgis and Laski’s idea that the state is not “the all-powerful 
source of legitimate community life and action” but “the structure needed to organise and 
mediate within a ‘community of communities’”, coordinating but not authorising the 
“plurality of very diverse groups and associations of civil society, ranging from trade 
unions and universities to religious bodies.”141 
The second form of political pluralism is deeper-rooted, in the sense that there is “a 
genuine plurality of human goods… [that] are not all compatible in any given situation”. 
This pluralism is agonistic at the deepest level, rejecting an idea “that there is some ideal 
condition in which all genuine human moral goals are realised harmoniously” in favour of 
an essentially tragic conception of reality, in which “doing the right thing may” – surely 
will? – “involve the sacrifice of one desired good for the sake of another”. Given this deep, 
ineradicable and incommensurable diversity of goods, the “most realistic” political 
aspiration is for a liberal state that does not seek to advance by legislation a programme for 
this or that specific vision of human improvement or self-realisation.”142 
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These two understandings of pluralism distinguished, it is worth stressing that Williams 
has palpable reservations with the second – deep, ideological – pluralism associated with 
Isaiah Berlin. For all the respect he pays his subject in his 2010 Isaiah Berlin lecture, 
refraining from criticising him too directly, Williams clearly does not (and cannot) agree 
with his understanding of deep pluralism. In his lecture of the same year, ‘The Finality of 
Christ in a pluralist world’, Williams answers this question – “[do] we believe there is 
something that is true in, and for, all human beings. Or do human beings have different 
needs and different destinies?” – with a straightforward Christocentric answer:  
“There is a truth about human beings. God has revealed it in Jesus Christ and 
revealed himself in that action… to affirm the uniqueness and the finality of Jesus 
Christ is actually to affirm something about the universal reconcilability of human 
beings: the possibility of a universal fellowship.”143 
In this way, Berlin’s deep and incommensurable pluralism is untenable for anyone who 
holds to the uniqueness and finality of Christ. 
Beyond this, however, I would suggest that there is a second reason for Williams’ 
distancing himself from Berlin’s pluralism that is germane to the question of the link 
between his anthropology and political thought. Given its emphasis on the need for 
openness, Berlin’s underlying anthropology is itself – perhaps paradoxically – too closed a 
doctrine for Williams, stating with unjustified finality that there are deep and 
incommensurable differences between human goods. As we noted when discussing 
Williams’ anthropology, his own commitment to openness, on-going dialogue and the 
endless potential made possible by the nature of creation and communication, mean that to 
arrive at a conclusion of deep and unbridgeable human plurality it itself an illegitimately 
final statement. While he would no doubt recognise the fact of deep difference underlying 
Berlin’s pluralism (and thereby the attendant need for political structures and processes 
that respected that pluralism), he would cavil at its finality. 
These reservations with deep, ideological pluralism stand in contrast to his rather more 
positive understanding of associational pluralism, and his repeated affirmation of Figgis’ 
‘community of communities’. That recognised, this second objection to Berlin’s pluralism, 
i.e. that of undue finality, also informs his engagement with Figgis’ associational pluralism. 
The quite proper recognition of a society “in which a number of interlocking, intersecting 
communities…of interest, concern and intention, build up the actual density of social life” 
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can, in Williams vision, easily balkanise, resulting in the “juxtaposing mutuality of non-
communicating groups.”144 Alternatively, along similar if less overtly antagonistic lines, it 
can degenerate into what Williams calls “static pluralism”, in which different group 
identities ossify and are simply managed as “clusters of cultural and religious expression as 
equally worthy of abstract respect”.145 
Such ‘balkanised’ or ‘static’ pluralism is, ultimately an anthropological issue. “Our social 
identities are not constituted by one exclusive set of relations of modes of belonging”, 
Williams remarked in his ‘Sharia law’ lecture.146 Human personhood is continually being 
modified in communication with the other, in the exercise of the imagination and in self-
giving. While it is certainly better to see it as being forged in relationship, as opposed, say, 
to imagining the self as being self-generative or sovereign, it is nonetheless wrong to think 
that self is “exhausted” by a single set of relationships. Communal identities, even those 
that are religiously grounded, do not (or should not) “determine” the “entire horizon” of a 
person, so much as being something that the person brings into the “negotiating process” 
of the “public sphere”.147 
In this way, pluralism, if it is to remain healthy, needs to be malleable or, in Williams’ 
preferred phrase, “interactive”. By this model, communities may have strong identities but 
they must nonetheless be “capable of challenging one another, impinging on one another, 
making demands of one another, negotiating with one another, and finding together what 
is good for them.”148 Ideally, our “belonging in society” should be a form of “interlocking 
pattern where we are always trying to find how different sorts of belonging map onto each 
other.”149 
This is pluralism that requires not “nervous or evasive good manners” but the kind of 
“argument [that] is essential to a functioning democratic state,” as he says in the 
Introduction to his collection Faith in the Public Square.150 As opposed to “programmatic 
secularism”, in which public life is viewed as “a sphere of rational negotiation according to 
universal enlightened principles”, or the kind of multiculturalism that “seeks to keep the 
peace between essentially separate social groups or interest groups, with minimal 
government and much reliance on private initiative,” Williams advocates an interactive 
pluralism whereby the state’s “arbitrative” and “balancing” function[s] – important terms, 
as we shall see – enable “active partnership and exchange between communities 
themselves and between communities and state authority.”151 
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A similar point may be made, if more briefly, with regard to Williams’ engagement with 
communitarianism – briefer because Williams’ engagement with communitarianism is 
itself briefer, and because much of what was said about pluralism’s “community of 
communities” applies to communitarianism in any case. 
In the division drawn up a generation ago between liberals and communitarians, with 
figures like Rawls, Rorty and Dworkin on one side, and Taylor, MacIntyre and Sandal on the 
other, there would seem to be little doubt on whose side Williams would naturally stand. 
His relational and communicative anthropology, coupled with his antagonism toward 
individualism and self-ist ideologies clearly place him in communitarian ranks.  
It is noteworthy, therefore, that when discussing communitarianism, in his essay ‘Beyond 
Liberalism’, Williams is critical, albeit offering the criticism of a fellow traveller. Building 
on Raymond Plant’s sympathetic critique offered in Politics, Theology and History, and 
mentioned in the introduction above, Williams claims that “both the liberal and the 
communitarian refuse in their different ways the risk of political discovery”, meaning 
specifically, “how the very idea of the good for me is modified, sometimes drastically, by 
the process of political engagement.”152 He made a similar point a few years later shifting 
the lens from communities to their cultures, in a lecture on multiculturalism. There is 
something odd, he remarked, in regarding culture “as a fixed and given matter”. On the 
contrary, if culture is “a mode of making sense of the world,” it is, almost by definition, 
“inherently changeable”.153 
Thus, in much the same way as pluralism can harden in to “static pluralism”, so 
communitarianism can become “sectarian communitarianism”. Moreover, there is a degree 
of “complicity” between liberals and communitarians “who are really doing little more 
than offering rival versions of the ‘contract of mutual indifference’, disagreeing only about 
the moral standing of the public tribunal of the state.” Thus, although it might be 
reasonable to call Williams a ‘communitarian pluralist’ when it comes to his vision of the 
state, it is vital to recognise his reservations with both of those terms and to stress his own 
emphasis on the necessarily ‘interactive’ element within each, borne of his multi-
dimensional and ultimately mysterious understanding of inexhaustible human 
personhood.  
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The state as (more than) a broker 
Williams’ qualified affirmation of pluralism and of communitarianism, best captured in his 
advocacy of “interactive pluralism”, orients us towards a clear(er) understanding of the 
function of the state – hinted at above in the terms “arbitration” and “balancing” – which 
we will examine in generic terms, before honing in on his conceptualisation of the state’s 
specific function vis-à-vis welfare.  
In the first instance, the state exists to serve first level communities by means of which 
persons grow and mature through communication, imagination and self-giving. It is thus 
an ancillary institution whose role is “to serve the diverse human groupings that now 
constitute it”, and derives its legitimacy “from their co-operation and consent as embodied 
in constitutional form.”154 This is done through brokerage, the state being the body to which 
“in practical affairs, communities defer to help them sort out potential areas of overlap and 
conflicting priority,” with the interactive and argumentative nature of Williams’ pluralism 
meaning that conflict is an inevitability and therefore brokerage both necessary and 
vital.155 
This is elsewhere described as a role of “mediation”, “organisation”, or “judgement”, the 
last an obvious parallel to O’Donovan’s conception of government as “public judgement”, 
although not one that Williams follows up, despite acknowledging O’Donovan in the 
introduction to Faith in the Public Square. The state is “the structure needed to organise and 
mediate within a ‘community of communities’”.156 It has “the right from time to time to 
judge how far particular behaviours and associations adversely affect the coexistence of the 
communities in its jurisdiction.”157 
There is an important detail here that merits clarity and emphasis because the mechanism 
of law, by means of which the state acts as a broker or judge for and within the 
“community of communities”, is apt to be misunderstood as an imposition from above, 
ordering and legitimising the associations in society. This is not Williams’ understanding of 
law, as he is at pains to emphasise. The state is not “the all-powerful source of legitimate 
community life and action”158 still less, “the source of legitimate behaviour or legitimate 
modes of association”159 and cannot “prescribe in advance that behaviour unlicensed by the 
state should be publicly invisible or illegitimate.”160  “The ‘lawful’ state” he explains: 
“is not one in which sovereign authority delegates downwards but one in which the 
component overlapping but distinct ‘first-level’ communities and associations that 
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make up the state are assured that their interests are both recognised and 
effectively brokered, so that none of these communities is threatened in its pursuit 
of social good by others.”161 
This summary of the proper function of the state – as broker, by means of law, between 
communities within society – could feasibly be interpreted in an unduly ‘minimal’ way. 
However, in reality, Williams’ form of “brokerage” is not the morally thin, distant or 
objective kind that might be implied by the term. Indeed, he is at pains, on several 
occasions, to stress that the state is “more than a tribunal” and this is evidenced in two 
ways.162 Firstly, the state is not in itself a wholly disinterested, still less morally neutral, 
party in its exercise of duties, and secondly its legitimacy rests not simply on “settling and 
enforcing” the “boundary disputes” between first-level communities163 but also on creating 
and sustaining the “conditions” for those communities in the first place. I will take each of 
those points in turn. 
Williams is explicit in his acknowledgement that “the pluralist model assumes that the 
state is in no sense an interested party,” such as might have its own social goals that are 
“potentially in competition with those of its constituent communities.”164 As soon as the 
state becomes just another social actor, with comparable agenda to those of first-level 
communities it has abnegated its unique role and responsibilities. To make use of a 
metaphor that Williams himself uses of ‘government’ in his lecture on the Big Society and 
of law in his essay ‘Beyond Liberalism’, the state is not just another player on the pitch but 
must remain a referee (or, in fact, as we shall see, more than just a referee) however 
tempting it might be get involved. 
That noted, the very existence and nature of the ‘game’ in which “constituent 
communities” are interactively engaged is itself a morally significant fact. “The very idea of 
the coexistence of moral communities in a complex state could be seen as itself a 
convergent morality of sorts, and one with a theological underpinning.”165 The manner in 
which the state does ‘referee’ the interactive and plural life of communities is more than 
simply peace-keeping but encourages each community to “see their account of the social 
good set in the context of other such accounts”, and ensures, indeed insists that each has to 
“argue its case [and] expose itself to the exchanges of the public forum.”166 
Moreover, the relationship between state and community actors is symbiotic, rather than 
one-way, the former needing to “build on the experience of co-operation and passionate 
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concern for the common good that is nurtured in particular communities” so that this 
sense of “mutual investment and mutually created well-being can carry across into the 
wider political realm.”167 In other words, while in no way being another party like those 
between which it operates as a broker, the state is not simply a disinterested arbitrator but 
an institution that needs to reflect and draw on the community of communities within 
which it operates. The state is “not simply a dependable tribunal before which rights may 
be argued, but a legal and (in the broadest sense) moral framework within which 
communities may interact without the fear that any one may gain an unjust or 
disproportionate power.”168 
This leads on to the second reason why “broker” is a potentially misleading term, and 
indeed one that Williams supplements or modifies on several occasions. If the state is more 
than a tribunal in the sense outlined above, it is also “more than a tribunal” in the sense of 
being more ‘hands on’, so to speak, in its engagement with the community of communities, 
the state exercising “its lawful character” not simply by arbitrating between communities 
but “by promoting and resourcing collaboration” between them.169 
Williams describes this in a number of ways, his most common metaphors being of creating 
and sustaining the right “climate” or “conditions” for first-level communities. The 
legitimacy of the state “is about maintaining a climate in which interests can be argued 
about and negotiated”.170 The state needs to provide “the stable climate” for all “first-level 
communities” to flourish and, in particular, the means “for settling, and enforcing 
boundary disputes between them.”171 It not only has a duty to “restrain and control” any 
groups whose notion of the good “veers towards anything that undermines the good of 
other groups”, but it should also “create the conditions…that allows each group to pursue 
what it sees as good”.172  
Beyond “climate” and “conditions”, Williams also describes this responsibility as creating a 
“‘civic space’ where all can find a voice”; as “mak[ing] connections… so that people have 
the capacity of taking the freedom that they really ought to have”; as “capacity building… 
[so that] the communities of civil society… [can] serve one another”, and as “sustain[ing] 
the vision that… communities… belong together and depend on one another.”173 However 
such formulations might be interpreted – and we will come to how Williams does interpret 
it vis-à-vis the securing of welfare below – this is a long way from a small, distant, neutral, 
nightwatchman-like “broker” or “tribunal” state. 
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It is important to clear up a potential misunderstanding at this point, as some of this vision 
for the state might sound a little like the idea of the ‘market state’. This model, present in 
Williams’ work primarily in his Richard Dimbleby lecture, understands the function of 
government as being “to clear a space for individuals or groups to do their own 
negotiating, to secure the best deal or the best value for money in pursuing what they 
want.”174 This involves a certain degree of “deregulation”, of “franchising” what were once 
state services, and “the withdrawal of the state from many of those areas where it used to 
bring some kind of moral pressure to bear.” Market government is to be judged “on its 
delivery of purchasing power and maximal choice”, politics now little more than “a matter 
of insurance.”175 
Williams’ vision is not this, in spite of any linguistic echoes (“to clear a space for… groups”), 
the reasons why helping us further grasp the greater reach of Williams “broker” state. This 
conception of the ‘market state’ is too close to the managerial state, outlined and outlawed 
above. It is one in which the individual “confronts” the state as individual, not as 
relationally-formed person, with expectations framed in the logic and language of rights 
and/ or consumption. In that regard, the market state is wholly antithetical to the more 
pluralist and communitarian contours of Williams’ vision. In particular, it fails to counter, 
and perhaps even exacerbates, the ways in which forms of “local solidarity in speech and 
habit [and]… social bonds … [like] voluntary associations of different kinds, churches, the 
family itself” are relentlessly eroded: 
“The market state is in danger of linking its legitimacy, its right to be taken 
seriously by citizens, to its capacity to maximise varieties of personal insurance; but 
as it does so, it reinforces those elements in popular political culture that 
undermine the very idea of reasonable politics, the rule of law and the education of 
active citizens.”176 
In reality, Williams’ state has more responsibility that the ‘market state’. More than a mere 
tribunal state, it has responsibilities to create and protect the conditions and climate for a 
‘community of communities’, facilitating connections, clearing civic space and building 
capacity. In addition to this, however, there are further ‘bottom lines’, responsibilities in 
provision that no legitimate state can ignore.  
Thus the state must provide “effective defence against outside attack” and “a high degree 
of internal stability”, including “a firm directive hand in the economy” and “a safety net of 
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public welfare provision.”177 It must “protect us from acts that outrage human dignity”. It 
must “guarantee the ‘bottom line’ of liberty and dignity for all citizens.”178 It must exercise 
a “commitment to universal dignity” through the “protection of human rights and 
guaranteed benchmarks of welfare and security.”179 
None of these is disconnected form the formal role of creating and regulating the climate 
for a “community of communities”. Indeed the two are linked, as no “community of 
communities” would be possible without the basic levels of security and stability just 
mentioned. Nonetheless, such a duty of provision is worth mentioning separately in as far 
as it reminds us, as we proceed to the specifics of welfare provision, that the state needs to 
do an awful lot, in terms of defence, law and order, a functioning judiciary, implementation 
of the rule of law, stable economic management, respect for human rights, and the like 
before it comes to the specifics of welfare.  
Welfare 
Williams is not precise on what his vision of the ‘thick brokerage’ state (not a phrase he 
uses but intended to capture the essence of his vision) would look like in practice. That 
said, he did, during his time at Canterbury, engage directly with some contemporary 
debates over welfare and on occasion cited various initiatives that gesture towards what his 
positive agenda might be. 
Williams’ evaluation of the debate around “welfarism” is especially pertinent in as far as it 
provides as clear a connection between his welfare politics and his anthropology as is 
found anywhere in his writings. In spite of the ways in which the term is bandied about – 
“in a derogatory sense”, as an “abusive shorthand” – Williams recognises the reality behind 
the name-calling, for explicitly anthropological reasons.180 He may “bridle” at the term but 
nonetheless acknowledges that “there is some substance to that suspicious use of the word. 
There is a problem about dependency.”181 While the “achievements of public welfare” have 
been “enormous”, and its intentions the “best”, it has sometimes generated an approach to 
“human issues, problems and challenges” that “strips human beings of their agency, their 
initiative, and their creative capacity for dealing with themselves and one another in 
collaboration.”182 
Welfare provision becomes “disabling” when “recipients or clients of social and health 
services are frozen in the attitude of supplicants, never becoming fellow-agents with those 
administering aid.”183 In such circumstances, they are denied their capacity, “for internal 
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change and movement.”184 They become people who are done to, rather than actually do. 
“They need but are not needed.”185 
Here we see the central elements of Williams’ anthropology – of persons growing and 
maturing through having something creative to communicate and give to others: of being 
“needed” – as informing his welfare politics. This is not to condemn state-based welfare, or 
to condone the familiar condemnation of welfare on the grounds of its failing to respect 
and thereby stunting people’s agency, however much aspects of the critique might 
coincide. Rather, it is the failure to recognise people as givers, living in response to God’s 
gift of creation and self, that threatens to erode their personhood, even as it might answer 
their needs. As Williams says, in one of his few references to William Temple on this 
matter, “to talk about human welfare only in terms of how needs are to be satisfied in 
emergencies, is precisely to be tied to the kind of passive account of humanity that Temple 
wished to avoid.”186 
If, therefore, we can see what forms of welfare Williams’ anthropology precludes, we might 
ask which forms it advocates. Here, we arrive as considerations of the “welfare society” and 
the “Big Society” and, more generally, the “localism” agenda that were politically 
prominent during much of Williams’ time at Canterbury. Williams’ attitude to the 
Conservative’s Big Society agenda appeared, superficially, to be hostile. In a widely 
reported article written in 2011 for the New Statesman, he remarked how the phrase “Big 
Society” was fast becoming “painfully stale” and that the government “badly need[ed] to 
hear just how much plain fear there is around such questions at present.”187 He was 
(slightly misleadingly) quoted as saying the idea was “aspirational waffle”.188 In a lecture on 
how the churches should respond to the idea, delivered the previous year, he expressed the 
concern that the Big Society “might just be an alibi for cost-cutting, and a way back to 
government washing its hands of that shared connection-making responsibility.”189 
In actual fact, Williams was somewhat more positive about the idea than the reporting of 
his remarks suggested. Not only did he observe, in the New Statesman article, that he didn’t 
think the government’s “commitment to localism and devolved power” was “simply a 
cynical walking-away from the problem”, he also offered an explicitly theological 
commendation of the “old syndicalist and co-operative traditions” on which the idea was 
based.  
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Although he stopped short of linking the Big Society itself or its Conservative sponsors with 
any theological foundations, he did express satisfaction that “several political thinkers 
today” – presumably thinking about Philip Blond, Adrian Pabst and John Milbank – were 
“quarrying theological traditions” for reform of welfare. These traditions, he reassured his 
New Statesman readers, were not the paternalist traditions of yore, with their well-meaning 
but problematic discourse about “the poor”, but rather “sustainable communit[ies]” 
through which circulates the “mutual creation of capacity, building the ability of the other 
person or group to become, in turn, a giver of life and responsibility.” This was, in effect, 
“the heart of St Paul’s ideas about community”, and clearly of real benefit and potential for 
contemporary Britain. Elsewhere, he called it a “remarkable opportunity” to think and talk 
“about a social model that is neither Fabian nor [Milton] Friedmanite, neither stateist nor 
consumerist,”190 and gave it “two-and-a-half cheers”.191 
His reservations were two-fold, one practical, the other ideological. The former concerned 
means. While lauding the turn to “grass-roots initiatives and local mutualism” inherent in 
the Big Society, he also registered that they had “been weakened by several decades of 
cultural fragmentation”, and could not be reinvented “overnight”. Civil society 
organisations were afraid of being asked to “pick up the responsibilities shed by 
government” with additional help. In this he was simply voicing concerns of many church 
leaders, such as those of the then Bishop of Leicester, who warned the House of Commons 
Public Administration Select Committee that Ministers should not expect “the Church to 
behave like a local authority or a Government department”, and Charles Wookey, giving 
evidence to the same committee on behalf of Archbishop Vincent Nichols, who said, “as far 
as the Catholic Church is concerned, we do not want to raise expectations about what 
religious communities can suddenly do in replacing any kind of state provision. They can 
help, but they are only a very small part.”192 
Williams’ second reservation, actually made in two points in his New Statesman article, goes 
to the heart of question of what, in concrete terms, was the content of the state’s ‘thick 
brokerage’ role. While the state is legitimised by the “climate” or “conditions” it secured 
for a communities of communities to flourish, it also had certain fundamental standards – 
pertaining to “the ‘bottom line’ of liberty and dignity” mentioned in his William Temple 
lecture – that it had to secure. In the more specific language of the New Statesman article, he 
wrote: 
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“what services must have cast-iron guarantees of nationwide standards, parity and 
continuity?... What is too important to be left to even the most resourceful 
localism? [and] how, therefore, does national government underwrite these 
strategic ‘absolutes’”?193 
“Statutory policy”, he told the NCVO in 2004, “must not be a shifting of every public or 
communal burden on to the voluntary”, but rather “the creation of an environment in 
which action for shared welfare is assumed to be something that is endorsed and supported 
at every level of a society.”194 
Nowhere does Williams itemise what that environment might look like, but it is possible to 
piece some kind of picture together from scattered remarks. Thus, he strongly advocates a 
role for “professional and self-regulated bodies” such as professional institutions, 
associations, “guilds”, unions, and the like in the generation of an “ethos of ‘service’” that 
the state needs and from which it draws moral strength.195 He registered support for Harold 
Laski’s “tantalizing idea of giving workplace groups real power against the supposed 
sovereignty of the omni-competent state”, an idea that “initiatives like Network Rail or 
Foundation Hospitals [might] have the courage and vision to realise.”196 
He championed “the cooperative tradition in the broadest possible sense”, acknowledging 
its “chequered career” but lauding it not simply because it was “about voluntary agencies 
responding to local problems”, but because it “was about keeping up simultaneously local 
initiative and pressure on the public purse to support local initiatives.” He applauded the 
New Deal for Communities programme, which since 1998 had made “made an enormous 
contribution to changing the tacit presumption that either central provision or pure 
voluntary labour alone can meet the challenges.”197 He encouraged credit unions, 
commending them in the House of Lords as among the “locally based, entirely trustworthy, 
user-friendly, educationally sensitive and confidence-building methods of managing 
debt.”198 
He commended the role of churches (and other faith groups), insisting (repeatedly) that 
they were (and needed to be seen as) more than simply a reservoir of useful voluntary help. 
Rather, they were places in which “habits of agency”, “expectations of creative 
negotiation”, “patterns of self-displacing and self-risking”, practices of “mutuality and self-
giving”, and models of “human togetherness in which every voice and every gift is crucial”, 
were nourished.199 
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In all this – and in comparison with John Paul II – Williams is somewhat more reticent 
about the role of the family as a well-spring and resource for human welfare in society. This 
may be understood more as an absence of emphasis, rather than an absence altogether. 
Thus, Williams called a debate in the House of Lords in 2008 to draw attention “to the 
impact on the family of economic inequality, credit and indebtedness”. In a lecture given at 
St Andrew’s Cathedral in Singapore the previous year, he worried about the undermining 
of “stable patterns of family life”, in particular “the long-term and unconditional 
commitments of marriage and parenting, by a culture of short-termism consumerism.200 To 
the Waltham Forest Credit Union he expressed concerns about the deleterious impact of 
debt on family life.201 To the TUC, he emphasised that the human family “as a personal not 
just a biological unit” was the “indispensable foundation” for teaching humans “how to 
speak, how to trust, how to negotiate a world that isn’t always friendly”, and warned of 
how some employers continued “to reward family-hostile patterns of working.”202 
That recognised, he was also clear about how certain strands of Christian conservatism 
have treated the family uncritically, and how there was a lot of “sentimental idealising of 
domestic life” that failed to recognise the potential “corruptions and tyrannies”.203 If 
churches defend the family, he said in 2010, “it’s not because we’re wedded to some distant 
and abstract notion of Family Values, (capital F, capital V,) but because of a deep conviction 
that what people need most as they grow is a sense of security and dependability in their 
emotional environment.”204 While he acknowledged that “the unconditionality of family 
love” could serve as “a faint mirror of the unconditional commitment of God”, the gospel 
message nonetheless assumed that “the community of the new humanity may cut across 
‘natural’ belonging, in family or polity.”205 
Thus, in much the same way as he qualified Christian attachment to nation and state, 
Williams said that however much the thought may be “uncongenial” to many British 
Christians, “the Church does not either affirm or deny ‘the family’ in the abstract.” Rather, 
it asks about “the structures of material and psychological control in this or that family”, 
and about how “the various patterns of family relation fail or succeed in creating creators 
of mutual relationship.”206 This is certainly not antagonism or indifference to the family, as 
is illustrated by his repeated willingness to draw attention to the ways in which family life 
can be undermined today. But nor it is the full-throated or unconditional support of the 
family as a bulwark to personal and communal flourishing that one hears in John Paul II.  




Following the pattern established by Temple, Maritain and John Paul II, we can see how 
Williams affirms, augments and refines our picture of theological anthropology and the 
welfare state. 
His link between the two is every bit as strong and clearly articulated as John Paul’s. He 
shares the material, agential, relational and gift-oriented conceptualisation of the human 
that runs through all the figures. He repeats John Paul’s connection of Eucharist, gift and 
personhood. And he affirms and strengthens Maritain’s developmental approach to the 
person in his repeated rejection of the unattached, immobile, atemporal, indivisible self.  
All that recognised, Williams’ theological anthropology is the more self-consciously multi-
dimensional than that of the other figures. He is particularly alert to the essentially 
communicative nature not just of the human person, but of all creation. He is especially 
clear on the final unknowability of personhood. He is most sensitive to the imaginative and 
creative dimension of the human person. And in much the same way as John Paul brought a 
more explicitly scriptural dimension to the discussion of personhood, Williams too 
introduces a fresh theological dimension to this personalist anthropology this time 
grounded in Eastern Orthodox thought, and in particular the work of Vladmir Lossky.207 
There is a similar pattern of affirmation, augmentation and refining in his 
conceptualisation of the welfare state in the light of this theological anthropology. Just as 
Maritain and John Paul carefully position their understanding of the state in comparison to 
the (anthropologically) inadequate ideologies and models with which they were familiar, so 
Williams positions his vision of interactive and associational pluralism away from, and in 
contrast to Fabian socialism, Thatcherism and managerialism. 
He transparently shares the now familiar conviction that the state should support the 
‘first-level’ communities (including the family despite his reservations with the way some 
Christians talk about family life) in and through which people learn to communicate, relate, 
create, imagine, and give. His repeated metaphors of ‘climate’ and ‘conditions’ underline 
this, and his (sometimes qualified) support for the Big Society, professional groups, credit 
unions, trades unions, co-operatives, schools, families, “workplace groups”, the church, 
other faith groups, and other self-regulated ‘first-level’ bodies gives substance to this idea. 
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Williams offers a more elaborate (if not always more transparent) discussion of the 
principles of the state’s welfare functions. This is to provide and protect the legal, moral 
and material infrastructure by means of which ‘first-level’ communities exist and flourish 
through communication and collaboration. His welfare state is a ‘broker’ but – importantly 
– a practically and morally ‘thick’ one, which actively intervenes to aid, and draws energy 
and moral permission from, the communities that comprise society. Williams’ welfare state 
is mandated to supervise these interactive plural communities so that none is, 
inadvertently or intentionally, excluded or impoverished. 
No less importantly, however, his welfare state is mandated to ensure that the dignity and 
liberty of people who are citizens as well as neighbours, worshippers, and members is in no 
way violated. It is, in effect, compelled to respond satisfactorily to questions such as those 
he posed in his New Statesmen article: what services must have cast-iron guarantees of 
nationwide standards, parity and continuity? 
Furthermore, in a voice that is closer to Temple’s than to John Paul II’s, Williams is happier 
to grant it a direct role in securing “a safety net of public welfare provision” and “a basic 
level of protection of human dignity”. Hence the missing half-cheer for the Big Society, and 
his much-publicised  criticism of that brief political endeavour. However much human 
personhood is nourished by the life of “first-level communities”, it’s basic material and 
social conditions must also ultimately be guaranteed by the state.  
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6: Multi-dimensional personhood and the welfare 
state 
Introduction 
For reasons outlined in the introductory chapter, this thesis has eschewed familiar 
approaches to the question of ‘the’ welfare state, grounded in ideas of justice, efficiency, or 
fiscal sustainability for example, on the basis, justified by Plant and illustrated by Deacon, 
that such approaches are themselves grounded ultimately in anthropological 
commitments. All such contested social concepts, whether justice, equality, need, freedom, 
or efficiency, are predicated on further questions of ‘for whom?’ or ‘to what ends?’ At a 
deep level, we need to recognise and engage the human goods and, underlying them, the 
human nature that inform both what ‘welfare’ the state ‘provides’ and how it does so. 
A second advantage to this approach is that it allows us to sidestep the familiar secular 
criticism of religious engagement in the politics of welfare. In its more sophisticated form, 
this adopts the Rawlsian arguments outlined in the introduction, concerning the 
inadmissibility of introducing any comprehensive moral doctrine in justifying state 
policies. In less sophisticated forms, it simply asserts that politics is the domain of reason 
and evidence, in which ‘faith’ has no place. Either way, by adopting an anthropological 
approach to the welfare state, we not only head straight to the deepest level of discussion, 
but also (changing metaphors) level the playing field, by underlining how all approaches to 
welfare, whether theological or secular, ‘faith-based’ or ‘rational’, necessarily draw on 
commitments and beliefs that may be reasonably debated, but cannot finally be rationally 
demonstrated. Ultimately, an anthropological approach to the proper function of the state 
vis-à-vis the provision of welfare is not only a truer and more penetrating one, but also 
fairer and more honest. 
Our close reading of the manner in which the theological anthropology of Temple, 
Maritain, John Paul II, and Williams informed their conception of the purpose and role of 
the state vis-à-vis the provision of welfare offers us two approaches to the wider question 
of the proper function of the welfare state. The first lies in the rich, varying, overlapping 
but, above all, multi-dimensional conception of the person, which speaks directly to the 
foundational anthropological concerns outlined by Alan Deacon and, indirectly, Raymond 
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Plant, in our opening chapter. Accordingly, the first two sections of this concluding chapter 
return to Deacon and Plant, and explore the contribution that multi-dimensional theo-
political anthropology of Temple et al has to make to the existing debates outlined in the 
introductory chapter.  
The second approach lies in the articulations of the welfare/ social assistance state made by 
each of the four thinkers. These, it will be clear by now, tend to be less rather than more 
concrete, are often piecemeal, and are often informed by the time and circumstances of 
writing. Moreover, all of the four thinkers are happier proscribing illicit or untenable 
conceptions than prescribing licit ones. In short, it is neither possible nor legitimate to read 
anything like a full account of the welfare state directly from the pronouncements of the 
four thinkers under discussion.  
That recognised, the fact that all four thinkers do attempt, to varying degrees, to unpack 
what their theo-political anthropology might look like in practice – or at least point in the 
direction of what a welfare state that honoured and nurtured the Christian concept of the 
person would look like – is helpful and not to be ignored. Temple et al do not spell out their 
preferred welfare ‘regime’ but they do offer ideas and examples of what such a welfare 
regime might entail. In respect of this, therefore, the third section of this concluding 
chapter returns to the discussion initiated by Esping-Andersen’s pioneering work on 
welfare regimes, and explores how the preceding chapters orient us within, but also ask 
questions of, the landscape of welfare regimes. 
In this way, these three sections – bringing the work of Temple et al into dialogue with the 
conceptual framework of Deacon, Plant and Esping-Andersen – end up delineating the kind 
of welfare state towards which those informed by Christian theology might commit their 
energies. But it invariably does so in a slightly fragmentary way, so the second half of this 
conclusion draws these strands together and outlines what this welfare state might look it, 
focusing specifically on its foundation, funding, structure and ethos. The thesis thus 
concludes, not with a blueprint for a Christian welfare state, were such a thing even 
possible, but a series of principles and suggestions around which more concrete proposals 
might be developed. 
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Returning to Deacon: The importance of multi-dimensionality in 
political theological anthropology 
The centrality of (theological) anthropology to scrutiny of the (welfare) state is explicitly 
recognised by each of the four thinkers in this study. Williams’ observation that “it’s 
impossible to have anything resembling an intelligent discussion in the political and social 
realm without struggling to clarify what we actually believe about human beings,” can 
stand for all of them, and offers a robust corroboration of Alan Deacon’s conviction that 
arguments about welfare are rooted in “fundamental disagreements about the nature of 
human beings.”  
That noted, our analysis of Temple et al does more than simply endorse Deacon’s 
anthropological approach. Indeed, it provides an important corrective to how it is 
presented by Deacon and his subjects. Temple et al articulate a range of theo-
anthropological characteristics that cannot be captured by the uni-dimensional scale of 
selfishness to altruism that is central to Deacon’s analysis. Indeed, it is striking that, 
however centrally different thinkers do place ‘agency’, ‘responsibility’, or ‘fellowship’ 
within their anthropology, none ventures an analysis based on selfishness or altruism. 
Within each of the thinkers, the person or, more precisely, the elements of the person 
relevant to any discussion of welfare, are complex and go beyond any linear 
conceptualisation of how people relate to one another. In this regard, Williams’ metaphor 
of the “three-dimensional person” is apposite and helpful, albeit shorn of its numerical 
specificity. Temple et al underline the fundamentally anthropological nature of these 
discussions but insist on their irreducible multi-dimensionality too. If we are going to 
inform the function and process of the welfare state by attending to the nature of the 
persons it must serve, we must resist any attempt to capture that nature too readily or 
simply.  
This complexification factor is further exacerbated by a factor that is most clearly visible in 
Maritain’s theological anthropology, namely the fluid or developmental nature of 
personhood. Not only can the human person not be captured on a linear scale, but s/he 
changes, matures and grows in their personhood over time. This theme – that “the human 
person… is but a person in embryo” as he puts it in Scholasticism and Politics – is repeated 
through Maritain’s work, though not only there (Williams has a strong sense of personal 
growth and development), and has, as Maritain intimates, significant implications for 
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political thought. Our political settlement must recognise persons as they become, as well as 
persons as they are. The city, as he puts it in Integral Humanism, is a society “not of men 
installed in definitive dwellings, but of men en route.” A truly humanist politics, in 
Maritain’s conception, is predicated on “a ‘peregrinal’ conception of the city.” 
This multi-dimensional (and developmental) nature of the person is manifest in each of the 
four thinkers and should counsel us against unduly tidy articulations of ‘human nature’. 
Sometimes tensions reside within an individual thinker, acknowledged or not. Thus, 
Temple and Maritain could each sound differing notes on, respectively, the nature and 
severity of sin, and the nature of human materiality. Temple could range from speaking as 
if human sin were rooted simply in the balance between good and evil in which humans 
were poised, to speaking as if it were a far more complete and permanent disordering of 
human nature. Maritain varied less because his underlying Thomistic schema was less 
vulnerable to the circumstantial attacks of the period through which he and Temple both 
lived. Nevertheless, he too could sound different notes about whether human materiality 
was simply part of human nature, co-existing with the spiritual like a canvas did with art, 
or ultimately antagonistic to personality, a different “pole” or “slope” that threatened to 
undermine true personality. 
Sometimes there is apparent tension between thinkers’ conceptions of the person. To take 
one example, on the surface of it there is friction between John Paul II’s and Rowan 
Williams’ conception of (the significance of) reason within the human person, Williams 
being more reserved about its significance and capacity to determine truth. This may 
simply be a friction born of emphasis: Williams rarely speaks of human rationality as a 
significant composite element in the human person, whereas John Paul II does, most 
obviously in Fides et ratio. Alternatively, it could be a result of different theological ‘styles’: 
Williams’ theology self-consciously allows for a more open, dialogic and apophatic 
approach to the human, whereas John Paul II is more confident in saying things 
definitively. For all that it is hard to imagine Williams saying, after John Paul, that the 
human has a “ceaselessly self-transcendent orientation towards the truth”, however, the 
pope’s location of reason in “bodily and sense faculties,” and his sensitivity to reason’s 
“wound[ing]” by sin is entirely consonant with Williams’ theology. In short, as we shall 
note below, a properly balanced and moderated multi-dimensional conception of human 
personhood can work towards reconciling the apparent tensions between thinkers. 
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Such reconciliation of apparent tension suggests that, for all that we must withstand the 
temptation to define the person by any linear simplicity or finality, there is nonetheless 
considerable correspondence in our four thinkers’ theological anthropology. Recognising 
the multi-dimensionality and developmental nature of personhood, and relinquishing the 
impulse to tidy up and classify authoritatively does not entail abandoning all attempts at 
coherence or clarity. We can say things about human personhood, and the theological 
anthropologies of Temple et al overlap and cohere sufficiently for us to offer an 
understanding of the human which, while not conclusive or precise, is more than simply a 
Wittgensteinian ‘family resemblance’. 
That this is so is evidenced by the categories educed from the four thinkers and used to 
structure the analysis of their theological anthropology in the previous four chapters, 
cumulatively summarised in the conclusions to the relevant chapters. Albeit with subtly 
different emphases, Temple, Maritain, John Paul II and Williams share a conception of the 
human that is created, material, agential, sinful, relational, transcendent, creative, and 
oriented to, and fulfilled by gift. The precise terminology here is contestable. Created and 
material may elide and may also encompass a sense of human vulnerability. Agential can 
stand for self-determining and orientated to the excise of freedom. Relational includes 
‘associational’ and arguably also ‘political’. The nine terms used are selected on account of 
their presence in all (or most) of the thinkers under discussion, and, in as far as possible, on 
account of their proximity to the language actually used by the four theologians. 
In addition to this, it should be stressed that unless nuanced by each other, these precise 
terms are apt to mislead. For example, the common emphasis on effective moral agency (or 
‘freedom’ or ‘human self-determination’) is liable to lead towards a misconception of the 
person unless her embedding in, and modification by, human createdness, materiality (or 
‘corporeality’) and relationality (or ‘sociality’ or ‘fellowship’) is equally emphasized.  
It is by means of such mutual modification that we might approach the apparent tensions 
within the overall vision of human nature each espouses. Thus, as noted above, John Paul 
II’s emphasis on human orientation towards truth, capacity for rationality, and exercise of 
reason should be moderated by his insistence on the embeddedness and fallibility of 
reason, and by Williams’ insistence on the ultimate mystery of creation and the human 
person. In this way, it is important not only to recognise the multi-dimensional and 
developmental nature of the human person underlying any conception of the welfare state, 
6: Multi-dimensional personhood and the welfare state 
179 
 
but to hold the various different elements or dimensions together in what would be a 
dynamic and creative tension.  
This should be the case even with regard to what I have argued in this thesis is the most 
significant element of human personhood for these thinkers, namely, the idea of gift. This 
might be understood as unifying and summarising the collective elements of human 
personhood, as we see the idea of gift in the creation, Christological, Trinitarian, and 
Eucharistic theology discussed. Not only do all four thinkers cite gift in itself, but each in 
his own way sees it as central to the idea who God is, what creation is, who humans are, and 
how they should live. It is through gift that the person understands God, creation and self.  
Accordingly, it is tempting to make ‘gift’ the foundational element within our theological 
anthropology, not least as it has recently come to the fore in a number of prominent and 
important Christian interventions into precisely the socio-political sphere in which this 
thesis operates. Thus, Italian economists Luigino Bruni and Stefano Zamagni in their book 
Civil Economy re-embed economic models of production, consumption and distribution and 
welfare provision and civil society within a framework of reciprocity, “the typical element 
of human sociality,” and gratuitousness, “a free and open gift, or offering, in a larger 
setting of reciprocal exchanges between peers”.1 
Luke Bretherton, in his chapter on ‘Economy, Debt and Citizenship’ in Resurrecting 
Democracy, taking his cue from Bruni and Zamagni (and Polanyi), discusses how democratic 
citizenship can be “conceptualised… as involving forms of gift relation” before 
disaggregating the rather homogenizing term “social capital” into five forms of “sociality” 
understood as patterns and norms of gift – equivalent exchange, redistribution, gift 
exchange, grace, and communion.2 Most influentially (and elegantly), Pope Benedict XVI in 
Caritas in Veritate wrote that “the human being is made for gift” (#34), and then proceeded 
to structure his analysis on this, delineating “giving in order to acquire (the logic of 
exchange)”, “giving through duty (the logic of public obligation, imposed by State law)”, 
and the “principle of gratuitousness… the logic of gift as an expression of fraternity” (#39) 
None of these frameworks is in tension with the argument of this thesis. Indeed, each in its 
own way presents a powerful affirmation of the centrality of gift to the human and wider 
social good. However, I have eschewed gift as the all-encompassing terminology, in the way 
that Bruni, Zamagni, Bretherton, and Benedict use it, for two reasons. The first is that the 
idea of gift as “reciprocity”, or as “equivalent exchange” or “through duty” is in danger of 
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obscuring the fundamentally gratuitous and indeed kenotic nature of gift as discussed in 
the theological anthropology of my subjects, thereby making ‘gift’ something less than it is. 
The second is that, attractive as the all-encompassing idea of gift may be, it threatens to 
collapse the multi-dimensionality of personhood back into a single, uni-dimensional 
understanding, with all the limitations that has, ‘gift’ sliding back into something like the 
Deacon’s ‘altruism’ from which we have escaped. 
Returning to Plant: Multi-dimensional theological anthropology 
and contestable social concepts  
The theological anthropology of Temple et al allows us to return to and affirm the principle 
outlined by Deacon, that welfare thinking draws on anthropological presuppositions, while 
challenging and complexifying the nature of that relationship. How we conceive the 
welfare state will draw on our understanding of human nature and the human good, but we 
need to go beyond any one-dimensional conception of the human, based on, for example, 
the extent to which we are straightforwardly selfish or altruistic, in favour of a multi-
dimensional, developmental, and mutually-correcting understanding of personhood. 
This, in turn, enables us to return to the work of Raymond Plant and bring this richer 
conception of the human to bear on the task of conceiving the contestable social concepts 
that, he argues, underpin welfare and indeed all social policy. The impossibility of a 
“neutral account” of human nature and goods opens up the possibility of conceiving 
essentially contestable social concepts like need, freedom and community in the light of 
the persons to which they pertain. In doing so, it becomes clear that the multi-dimensional 
nature of the human person is of particular importance.  
This can be seen with particularly clarity in the case of ‘need’, historically the dominant 
social concept when it came to thinking about welfare, particularly in those regimes 
identified as ‘liberal’ by Esping-Andersen. To reiterate Plant’s observation, the precise form 
‘need’ takes will be determined by who is doing the needing and, correspondingly, for what 
purposes: “needs are means to ends: a subject always needs something for some purpose.”3 
With that in mind, we can see how conceptualising personhood according to human 
created materiality orients our understanding of ‘need’ towards the provision of adequate 
level of material goods, such as housing, healthcare and food, and that conceptualising 
personhood primarily or exclusively in this way will tend to elevate that welfare provision 
above any and all other considerations, legitimising a state whose duty of material welfare 
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provision outweighs any comparable duties in respect of human freedom, agency or 
community. 
Conversely, if we conceptualise personhood as the capacity to exercise freedom, self-
determination, autonomy, and effective moral agency, as Temple, Maritain and John Paul II 
in their own ways clearly do, and then treat this dimension as primary or exclusive, we will 
tend to orient ourselves towards a state that will intervene only in so far as it can facilitate 
the exercise of agency, and may not even do that. This could result in the kind of ‘New 
Liberal’ state that was ascendant during Temple’s early years, or alternatively the kind of 
Anglo-Saxon ‘liberal’ welfare regime identified by Esping-Andersen, depending on the 
extent to which material security is deemed a prerequisite of effective agency.  
A multi-dimensional approach to personhood thus also complexifies and arguably enriches 
our conceptualisation of contestable social concepts like need, deterring us from fixing on 
any simple or univocal definition of them. Beyond that, however, the multi-dimensional 
anthropology derived from Temple et al implies that we should resist the idea that any 
single social concept that should dictate the purpose and format of a welfare state, whether 
that be ‘need’ in the case of Esping-Andersen’s ‘liberal’ regime, ‘contribution’ or ‘merit’ in 
the ‘conservative’ or ‘state-corporatist’ regime, or ‘citizenship’ in the ‘social democratic’ 
regime. The persons that the welfare state is ordered to serve are multi-dimensional and 
developmental, their goods are accordingly plural, and the contestable social concepts that 
underpin the welfare state will be various. 
We can see something of this by taking the common dimensions of human personhood, as 
elicited from our analysis of Temple et al, and exploring which social concepts they orient 
us towards. Thus, as already mentioned, the fundamentally created and material nature of 
the person points us to a certain level of guaranteed material security and dignity. Put 
concretely, a state that ignores that fact that any of its citizens are homeless, hungry or 
wholly vulnerable to ill health because without basic medical coverage, is one that is failing 
in its responsibility to protect and honour their fundamental good. If the state’s service of 
the human person is truly to honour their personhood, it must guarantee that their 
physical and material good is secured to an appropriate (though naturally still contestable) 
level. 
Similarly, and again as mentioned, the fundamental need for persons to be able to exercise 
their freedom and agency orients us towards affording citizens the maximal opportunity to 
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secure their own welfare within the constraints of other anthropological dimensions. The 
state that takes human freedom and agency seriously will not seek simply to determine or 
procure welfare for its citizens but will work to generate opportunities for citizens to 
achieve their own standards of welfare. It will, in effect, combine its responsibilities for 
material security with those of respecting individual and associational agency, and work 
with people rather than instead of them in achieving this end.  
To these two dimensions, we can profitably add four more. Temple et al speak with one 
voice in their insistence on ‘fellowship’, ‘relationality’, and ‘communication’ as central to 
human personhood. Alongside material dignity and a meaningful sense of agency, the 
freedom, opportunity and resources for persons to come together and collaborate in pursuit of 
shared interests and goods is a fundamental good in itself. The implications here are 
manifold but with specific regards to the function of the welfare state it highlights the 
centrality of those associations that comprise ‘civil society’ in identifying and highlighting 
social needs, generating the moral energy of response, orchestrating collaboration, and 
tailoring the appropriate action that works alongside and with the communities in 
question, rather than for them. 
A fourth, significant if ambiguous dimension lies in the cognizance of human sinfulness. 
This, as noted, was recognised to various levels among the four thinkers, although none 
articulated a view that would necessitate the kind of welfare system that had to rely solely 
or even primarily on self-interest as its engine. Human sinfulness was a, not the, factor in 
their theological anthropology.4 That said, however much this might push Temple et al 
away from the Field/ Thatcher end of Deacon’s spectrum (noting, as above, that this 
spectrum is in itself inadequate), their mere cognizance of human sinfulness also removes 
them from the opposite end of the spectrum, with Titmuss and his ideas of natural 
altruism. 
In this way, the recognition, but complex conceptualistion of, personal and structural sin – 
coupled with the developmental nature of personhood, and the sense that persons are all 
capable of less sinful or selfish behaviour if they are drawn in that direction by appropriate 
relationships and encounter with the gratuitous ‘gift’ of the other – does not bring us to 
any particular model of the welfare state. More modestly, what it can be judged to do is 
underline the need for all bodies and agents operating in the provision of welfare – 
whether through state, market, or civil society – to come under appropriate scrutiny. 
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Human motivation will never be as generous or kenotic as it could or should be, and 
humans will always try “to remake the world around [themselves]”, as Williams defines sin 
in one of his very few descriptions of it, but neither is it such that social structures are 
compelled to rely only on that aspect of human personhood. Human sin, rather, has a more 
modest role in the shaping of the provision of welfare, through insisting that no structure 
or practice is wholly adequate or reliable, and that however much we might choose to 
centralise or decentralise the provision of welfare, the human propensity for sin makes it 
necessary to monitor and evaluate all parties involved.  
A fifth relevant dimension of personhood can be seen in the universal recognition of 
human transcendence and, in a corresponding although distinct way, in Williams’ repeated 
emphasis on human creativity and imagination. The first of these locates a quintessential 
characteristic of personhood in its capacity, to reference John Paul II, to transcend material 
reality, access “the metaphysical dimension of reality”, and “share in the divine mystery of 
the life of the Trinity”. There is, in other words, a dimension within personhood that is 
inaccessible to earthly agents, and not exhausted by material reality. This is augmented by 
Williams’ discussion of human creativity, which stresses how this aspect of personhood in 
which no-one can ever be completely “‘captured’, even in decades of relationship,”5 is 
linked with the irreducibly creative and imaginative dimensions of the human. The 
creative dimension is part of human openness to God, our transcendence and ultimately 
unfathomable nature.  
Critically, for our purposes, and as Williams is at pains to emphasise, such a creative and 
imaginative dimension is not limited to ‘creative industries’ but a vital element of politics 
and social campaigning, whether that is in generating the “moral energy and imagination” 
required by politics, campaigning about debt or fair trade, or developing credit unions. 
Such a focus on human transcendence and creativity, orients us towards a welfare system 
that remains open, and is constantly alert, sympathetic, and supportive to creative local and 
communal attempts to address poverty and other forms of social need. Rather than being a 
state, in the sense of being static, a welfare state that honours this aspect of human 
personhood, should act as a laboratory, incubator and catalyst for new, innovative 
experiments in the provision of welfare. 
A sixth and final relevant dimension of personhood lies in the concept of gift common to all 
four thinkers. This, superficially, is a more straightforward dimension when it comes to 
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informing the welfare state, as it self-evidently implies a system that gives everyone the 
opportunity to give to one another’s good, whether that is in terms of money, time, 
information, expertise, space, or simply presence. It is, in effect, the kind of state that gives 
space for Benedict XVI’s “principle of gratuitousness”, structures and moments of 
“fraternity” in which our personhood is most fully realised and developed, and we imitate 
and partake in the self-giving life of God.  
One might at first think this fulfilled in the third dimension mentioned above, namely that 
of ‘fellowship’, ‘relationality’, or ‘communication’, and to some extent it is. Our relationality 
requires the gift of ourselves. However, to return to the discussion of Bruni, Zamagni and 
Bretherton earlier, to do so runs the risk of misrepresenting the quintessentially kenotic 
idea of gift within Christian thought and confusing it with the (admirable, important, 
humanising, but nonetheless different idea of) reciprocity.6  
Gift is different from reciprocity, and a welfare state that properly honours the idea of gift 
will do more than simply afford and encourage a relational response. That recognised, how 
it might do this is very far from straightforward. There is an argument that the best way 
the state can encourage people to give is to give them the resources that free them up to do 
just that. This idea, variously known as Universal Basic Income or Citizens’ Income is 
increasingly popular today and sometimes articulated on Christian theological grounds.7 
Moreover, there are moments in Temple’s and Maritain’s work in which both thinkers 
appear to be advocating just such a system. In this way, it may appear as if the ‘logic of gift’ 
orients us towards a particular (and innovative) contemporary approach to welfare.  
Against this, however, are the powerful arguments, firstly, that gift simply cannot be 
compelled or even induced by the well-meaning state, and, secondly, that Universal Basic 
Income treats citizens exclusively as recipients, an improbable foundation for helping them 
develop their personality as givers. This view is most clearly audible in John Paul II, with 
his reservations concerning those measures that extend the state’s economic power over 
individuals, but it is perceptible among the others.  
The idea of gift, therefore, may have something in common with the idea of sin, when it 
comes to the design of a welfare state: not dictating a particular overarching structure but, 
more modestly, stipulating that the welfare state needs to encourage and afford 
opportunities for as much ‘gratuitousness’ as possible. If the state is unable to compel ‘gift’, 
and if (as I believe) it needs to be extremely cautious about systemic approaches, like UBI, 
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that claim to be able to induce gift – for fear of what that approach may mean for other 
dimensions of personhood like agency and relationality – the state can and should foster 
and promote all local examples of welfare as gift, in the same manner in which it should 
also work as an incubator of creative welfare experiments.  
Thus, just as the multi-dimensional concept of personhood educed from Temple et al both 
confirms and challenges the anthropological approach outlined by Deacon, so it does the 
same for the contestable social concepts highlighted by Plant. Although with the potential 
to clarify and define some of the contestability of the relevant and significant social 
concepts, the multi-dimensional concept of personhood – with its idea of humans as 
created, material, agential, sinful, relational, transcendent, creative, and oriented to, and 
fulfilled by gift – is better served by allowing it to identify which are the relevant and 
significant social concepts themselves.  
I have argued in this section that doing this orients us towards a welfare state defined by 
material dignity, respect for agency, the relationality of civil society, appropriate 
monitoring and evaluation, and a willingness to foster creative experiment, and groups and 
organisations that are motivated by, encourage, gratuity in their efforts.  
Returning to Esping-Andersen: multi-dimensionality and the 
limitations of welfare regimes 
In the same way that the ideas of Temple et al affirm, critique and complexify those of 
Deacon and Plant, they also engage sympathetically but critically with those of Esping-
Andersen and the concept of welfare regimes.  
Esping-Andersen’s innovative intervention in the field of welfare state studies was 
grounded in the idea that discussion and evaluation of welfare states needed to get beyond 
measures of ‘more or less’ – spending, redistribution, progressive taxation, etc. – and 
include questions not simply of how much is spent but where, how and why. Such an 
approach is indisputably supported by the thinking of Temple et al for whom the direct 
question of the size of the welfare state, or indeed the means of raising and distributing 
resources, only rarely comes into focus. Whatever else the welfare state is to Temple, 
Maritain, John Paul II and Williams, it is more than a matter of ‘bigger or smaller’. 
Much of this, it should be acknowledged, is explicable by the style, status and expertise (or 
lack thereof) of the authors. As is clear from preceding chapters, Temple et al are happier 
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speaking in general terms rather than particular. Three of the four wrote from positions of 
high ecclesiastical authority and profile, and this naturally deterred overly specific, 
political interventions. Moreover, none of the four would claim expertise when it came to 
the development and implementation of detailed welfare policies. To this extent at least, 
we would not expect much specificity from them when it came to questions of the funding 
or distribution of welfare. 
That recognised, their distance from the ‘bigger or smaller’ debate is nonetheless in accord 
with Esping-Andersen’s critique of it. In the same way as Williams argued that the Church 
neither affirms nor denies “the family” or “the nation” in the abstract, but asks how far and 
in which ways they “fail or succeed in creating creators of mutual relationship,”8 so Temple 
et al do not, in the abstract, support or reject a larger or smaller welfare state, but ask how 
far it recognises, nurtures and develops of the person, or fails to. 
Thus, although the thought of Temple et al offers support for Esping-Andersen’s 
reformulation of the way we think about welfare regimes, they do not go on to offer 
obvious support for any one of his regimes. Esping-Andersen’s work was pioneering, in 
large measure, because it offered a new and sophisticated theoretical-empirical study of 
welfare states.9 His categorisations have, therefore, naturally been open to challenge and 
modification by political and social scientists.10 The work of Temple et al tacitly supports 
that challenge just as much as it supports Esping-Andersen’s original idea of welfare 
regimes. No one regime wholly captures the full breath of their theological anthropology. 
Each is as open to critique as others, and the various elements of personhood educed from 
their theological anthropology are liable to exist in (creative) tension with one another 
when applied to the design and implementation of concrete welfare policies and 
institutions.11  
Thus, all four thinkers place an emphasis on the exercise of agency, and the responsibility 
of persons to act for their own welfare and that of others rather than relying on the state in 
the first instance or conceiving themselves primarily as recipients. Moreover, the classic 
liberal emphasis on work as the foundation of welfare is powerfully echoed, in particular by 
John Paul II and the William Temple of the 1930s. Indeed, John Paul II was sufficiently 
supportive of the market state in Centesimus annus, and sufficiently critical of the Social 
Assistance State, to enable liberal critics to call the encyclical “a decisive turn toward the 
liberal model of the state”. Similarly, Temple could say in Christianity and Social Order that 
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the art of government is “the art of so ordering life that self-interest prompts what justice 
demands”, a statement that, tellingly, Margaret Thatcher would quote with approval.12 
That said, all four also favour a strong element of market decommodification, to pick up on 
the first of Esping-Andersen’s dimensions, and critique those welfare regimes in which 
decommodification is at its weakest, sometimes vociferously so.13 Personality, as Maritain 
writes, must not be made subservient to capital.14 John Paul II explicitly eschewed the term 
‘capitalism’ in favour of “business economy”, “market economy” or simply “free economy”. 
Thus, whatever else a welfare regime consonant with the multi-dimensional personhood 
might look like, and however one might see signs of it in a liberal regime, it is certainly not 
satisfactorily captured by that regime. 
A similar point can be made of the social democratic regime. On one side, each of the four 
thinkers places a strong emphasis on the state’s responsibility for the welfare of all its 
citizens. They eschew any sense of stigma around welfare, in line with the culture of a 
social democratic system. Temple, for all he could be quoted out of context to favour a 
liberal welfare regime, articulated the most concrete social democratic welfare proposal of 
all four thinkers here. Maritain relied on a wide range of rights, guaranteed and enforced 
by the state, as the basis of welfare. Williams’s state had certain non-negotiable 
responsibilities, among them ensuring “a safety net of public welfare provision.”15 All this 
could be read as an uncomplicated endorsement of the social democratic welfare regime. 
And yet, all four thinkers also had clear reservations about aspects of a social democratic 
regime. Such a regime’s unmediated identification and direct provision of welfare needs 
and services could be problematic, encroaching on the creative agency of individuals and 
groups. While the social democratic regime could attend to the needs of family life, such as 
through parental leave or financial assistance for child rearing, its inclination to “pre-
emptively socialise the costs of familyhood”, as Esping-Anderson puts it, could similarly put 
it in tension with some of the values personhood described above, especially those of John 
Paul II. Perhaps most importantly, the social solidarity emphasised repeatedly among the 
four thinkers, as a foundation and outworking of the agential, relational and gift-oriented 
nature of the person, was better realised in free association with one another than directly 
orchestrated by (and for) the state. The social democratic state had appeal but was by no 
means adequate. 
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Finally, there is a similar balance struck with regard to the ‘conservative’ or ‘state-
corporatist’ and the extent to which it honours multi-dimensional personhood. On the 
affirmative side, all four thinkers advocate a system to which citizens contribute, fostering 
a sense of responsibility for oneself and the wider public good. Moreover, each sought to 
afford maximal space for non-state actors in the provision of welfare, identifying in the 
state the duty to secure the material and the associational infrastructure by means of 
which persons grow and mature through communication, imagination and self-giving. That 
noted, and again moving to a critical register, the ‘conservative’ regime’s emphasis on 
encouraging traditional family structures as the basis for welfare resonated strongly only 
with John Paul II’s vision.  
In short, the issue is not that Esping-Andersen’s welfare regimes fail to resonate with the 
thinking of Temple et al, so much as that no one of regimes satisfactorily captures the 
breadth of that thinking. As illustrated by John Paul II’s linguistic tergiversations over the 
term ‘capitalism’, or Rowan Williams’ generally reflective, reserved and apophatic 
approach to these issues, we should not seek to capture their conceptualisation of the 
welfare state in  categories defined by others for different purposes. We can see dimensions 
of each regime – the ‘agency’ of the liberal regime, the universal provision of the social 
democratic one, and the concern for localised forms of solidarity of the ‘conservative’ on – 
capture certain dimension of the theological anthropology. But no regime captures them 
all. 
The result of this is the foreclosure of any attempt to shortcut the hard work of 
constructing an approach to welfare that honours the theological anthropology of Temple 
et al by simply reaching for an established welfare regime from the shelf. None is sufficient, 
though each has its merits. Self-evidently this task is a substantial one and, by necessity, 
technical and collaborative also. All four thinkers, when they address the issue, recognise 
this; indeed, Temple, in the only one of our sources that comes close to a technical 
intervention in this issue, is self-consciously apologetic and hesitant in doing so. Clearly, 
then, articulating the reality of this kind of welfare state is beyond the capacity of this 
thesis, and this author. 
That recognised, this does not mean we cannot at least gesture toward the key elements of 
any such vision, of a welfare settlement that honours the multi-dimensional personhood 
discerned in the theological anthropology of Temple et al. This is what I will do in the 
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second half of this chapter, educing and explaining what I judge, in the light of preceding 
work, to be four critical foundations of the welfare state.  
Recasting welfare: multi-dimensional theological anthropology 
and the dimensions of the welfare state 
Welfare, like all significant political issues, is “intrinsically dilemmatic”.16 That recognised, 
it should not preclude the attempt to gestured towards a concrete and practicable welfare 
system that seeks to honour and serve the multi-dimensional, developmental and 
mutually-balancing theological anthropology of personhood outlined in this thesis. 
This rich conception of the person orients us towards a welfare state which (a) provides an 
adequate level of material comfort and security; (b) fosters a sense of agency among 
citizens; (c) encourages patterns and practices of responsible belonging; (d) fosters a sense 
of responsibility to others; (e) facilitates and enables the development of shared projects of 
mutual wellbeing; (f) allows and encourages experimentation in the provision of welfare; 
(g) generates the opportunity for persons to give to one another and to local, common 
goods; and (h) monitors and evaluates structures and ethos of welfare provision without 
falling into worst sins of new public management (e.g. elevating efficiency over humane 
care). 
This is a long, but by no means exhaustive, list, and we should not expect welfare policy 
equivalents for each factor. There is no straightforward link between a dimension of 
theological anthropology, an aspect of the welfare state, and a policy by means of which it 
might be implemented (though in this regard, this is no different from any political 
theory). Rather, each of these elements draws on the range theological anthropology 
dimensions highlighted – created, material, agential, sinful, relational, transcendent, 
creative, and oriented to, and fulfilled by gift – and each might be worked through in a 
number of ways.  
The multi-dimensional welfare state that I outline below, building on the multi-
dimensional theological anthropology educed from Temple et al, is structured around four 
pillars, which I have entitled the foundation for welfare, the funding of welfare, the structure 
of welfare, and the ethos of welfare. The complex, shifting and inherently dilemmatic 
nature of welfare provision means that any such structuring is inescapably open to debate. 
However, I believe that this four-fold division not only encompasses the breadth of 
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theological anthropology evidenced above, but also some key elements in the structuring, 
payment and provision of contemporary welfare. 
The foundation of welfare: paid work and agency 
Work may not be the obvious place to start when thinking about the welfare state, if only 
because, in common perception, one is the antithesis of the other: you need welfare 
support precisely because you are not in paid work. It is called unemployment benefit and 
pension provision for a reason. This is wrong, however, for several reasons. 
Work was at heart of Beveridge plan, in the form of unemployment benefit and assistance, 
and it remains central to welfare spending today, although, as we shall see, for less happy 
reasons. More pertinently, given the focus of this thesis, all four thinkers (although 
Williams least prominently) recognise work as foundational for human flourishing, in the 
way it honours (or, at least has the capacity to honour) the material, self-determining, 
relational, and creative dimensions of the human person. 
Temple, particularly via the influence of Men without work, acknowledged how work 
provided for most people “the pattern within which their lives are lived”, and that when 
this pattern was lost, lives, families and communities came apart. Maritain identified ‘man’ 
as being “homo faber before … homo sapiens”, writing that it is essential that human work be 
“useful” as well as simply available.”17 John Paul II was most focused on the significance of 
work arguing that the state’s principal welfare function lay in its encouragement and 
regulation of a market economy that respected the person’s primacy, agency, dignity, and 
capacity to realise himself through the “free gift of self”. 
This caveat is essential as an emphasis on work can readily but illegitimately lead to the 
policies, of the kind familiar in liberal welfare regimes, that seek to secure welfare almost 
solely through employment, without paying due attention to the repercussions this can 
have on persons, and indeed on the welfare state itself. The answer to welfare among our 
four thinkers is, in the first instance, paid work but not paid work at any cost. 
The current problem with work in the UK welfare system illustrates this well, with the 
Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS), among many others, showing how in-work poverty is now 
one of the biggest claims on the welfare budget.18 In effect, the benefit system has mitigated 
what would otherwise have been a very significant increase in economic inequality 
through substantial cash transfer to those already in employment. In the words of Paul 
Johnson, Director of the IFS, “a system originally designed largely to support those out of 
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work for a limited period has become one that supports the low-paid and the sick and 
disabled for long stretches of their lives.”19  
In light of this, a theological vision of the welfare state needs to do more than simply 
facilitate paid employment, and while it is possible to parse its exact role here in various 
ways, I would, drawing on the theological anthropology and its implications of the four 
thinkers, emphasise four particular duties in this role.  
First, the state needs to help create the economic conditions for employment. This means 
having not simply economic growth but also the reduction of unemployment as a key 
policy objective. At the same time, this is not the same as increasing levels of employment 
at any cost. It should be perfectly appropriate for people at certain stages of life, 
particularly those around early family years, not to be in paid employment. This could 
involve such policies as the incentivisation of new business ventures (contrary to Temple’s 
recommendation) through, for example, the minimisation of business rents on new 
enterprises; the provision of appropriate communication, transport and legal 
infrastructure for new businesses; selective intervention to discourage or dismantle 
monopolies and to ensure fair competition; and the willingness to step in and support 
business activities in, what John Paul II terms, “moments of crisis”. 
Second, the state needs to help people into these new employment activities. This is both a 
structural and a cultural issue. With regard to the former, it involves reducing disincentives 
to employment, such as is the intention of the taper rate with Universal Credit, which is 
not only intended to simplify the benefit system but to make the transition (back) to work 
more remunerative than it had been. (Whether the monthly payments system of Universal 
Credits, intended to imitate the salary patterns of employed work to the same effect, is 
equally sensible, given the widely-reported hardships it has generated, is more debateable).  
At a cultural level, it also means changing the approach to helping people into work. It is a 
sobering fact that two-thirds of people in any Job Centre are going round again for a 
second, third (or more) time. In other words, the system has a 66% failure rate.20 The 
funding – but not necessarily delivery – of comprehensive back-to-work support and 
broader work coaching is essential here. Some think tanks have proposed the introduction 
of competition in this area (such as “by rewarding a range of different providers for 
offering more personalised support to those furthest from the labour market”21) although 
there is the danger that this simply adopts the approach of the ‘liberal’ regime in a 
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different way (believing that creating a market for a service, in this case for employment 
itself, best serves human personhood). Rather, there are other innovative methods, which 
draw on communal and experimental approaches and are discussed below in the section on 
ethos of welfare, which may be better suited to this challenge. 
Third, the state has a responsibility to ensure that work pays adequately, honours human 
personhood, and serves to support family relationships rather than undermine them. This 
is a notoriously difficult issue, which has vexed policy makers for much longer than welfare 
states have been in existence. Presently in the UK, the Low Pay Commission is required to 
offer recommendations to governments, on the basis of consultation, concerning the level 
of the national minimum wage, which rose to £8.21 on 1 April 2019 (although less for those 
under the age of 25). At the same time, the Living Wage Foundation campaigns for a Real 
Living Wage (already voluntarily paid by 5,000 UK employers), which presently stands at 
£10.55 in London and £9 for the rest of the country.22  
Temple et al were agreed on the need for wages that honoured personhood, though John 
Paul II was clearest about the necessity of what he called a “family wage”, namely “a single 
salary given to the head of the family for his work, sufficient for the needs of the family 
without the other spouse having to take up gainful employment outside the home”.23 This 
policy, let alone the manner of its formulation, is unlikely to win many advocates in 21st 
century Britain, failing to recognise the validity of paid employment for women or indeed 
the scarcity of jobs that could pay a family wage. 
Nevertheless, the precise formulation aside, the idea that a national (or living) wage needs 
to take account the immediate relational responsibilities of the employee is surely right, 
not least given that 70 per cent of the 4.1 million children growing up in poverty live in a 
family where at least one person works.24 Child poverty is emphatically not an issue only of 
poorly remunerated work.25 However, poorly paid work can undermine precisely the 
‘subjective’ benefits of work that John Paul II (and others) emphasise if it fails to recognise 
that the needs of the employee are relational as well as material. 
Moreover, it is important to note that honouring the ‘relational’ anthropology here has 
implications beyond simply remuneration. Temple et al (but again, particularly, John Paul 
II) contend that the responsibility of the state to recognise and protect the person within a 
market economy goes beyond the right to a just wage, and includes responsibility for 
working patterns and conditions. As with the question of remuneration, this was not 
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necessarily a direct role. Indeed, by definition, except when the state was a direct 
employer, it could not be. Rather, the state’s role was to ensure that the relationship 
between employer and employee was just, in the sense that it recognised and respected the 
personhood of both parties. Thus, it meant securing, through legislation and regulation, 
“humane” working hours and a working environment, adequate free-time, the right to 
unionise, to unemployment insurance, ill-health benefits, and protection against other 
“forms of exploitation”. Such issues have become particularly acute of late with the rise of 
an unregulated, insecure and unremunerative ‘gig economy’. 
Fourth, and finally, as part of honouring the agency, creativity and relationality of the 
person, the state needs to encourage forms of business ownership that give workers a 
participatory stake in the business itself, or at least facilitate the work of unions as an 
active voice in the operation of a business. This more ‘co-operative’ approach was 
discernible in each of our four thinkers.26 
Such an approach to work is not a fully-fledged alternative to other forms of business 
ownership and none of the four thinkers, except perhaps Temple is his earliest writings, 
implied it was a replacement for capitalism. (Nor should it be confused with a ‘mutual’ 
approach to the delivery of welfare, which is discussed below) Rather, the idea behind it is 
the desire to generate structures (and cultures) of work that respond to and facilitate the 
mutual and relational dimensions of the human person, rather than simply viewing work 
as enabling and encouraging the agency and responsibility of the  person. 
Whether it is through the freedom to organise, unionise, or negotiate contracts, pay 
increases and working conditions; or through the growth in co-operative ventures that 
extends the (opportunity for) ownership and management of an enterprise to its 
employees; or, as Williams mentioned, through an increased role of “professional and self-
regulated bodies” such as professional institutions, associations, ‘guilds’, the point here, as 
with earlier elements within the dimension of work, is to encourage structures and cultures 
of work that honour as many dimensions of human personhood as possible, rather than 
simply seeing work as the foundation of welfare in a narrowly material or agency-enabling 
way. 
The funding of welfare: participation and contribution  
The technocratic, complex and highly political question of how, and how far, the welfare 
state should be funded makes it apparently unpromising fare for a theo-anthropological 
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critique.27 If any area of this debate merits the remark of John Paul II to the Pontifical 
Academy of Social Science in 1994 – “the Church…has [no] technical solutions to offer” – it 
might seem to be this.28  
And yet, the nature of funding, or more precisely the connection between the ways in 
which welfare funds are raised and spent, is not only important but lends itself to this 
analysis. The welfare state, according to Temple et al, needs to recognise and foster citizens’ 
agency, responsibility and mutuality just as much as it is responsible ultimately for their 
material security. Accordingly, several of them registered the concern that the state was in 
danger of supervening on the agency of individuals and groups, through the direct funding 
and delivery of social services. A welfare state in which the connection between what a 
citizen contributes to the system (as well, of course, as what they contribute to more local 
common goods) and what they might receive from it is broken, is one that to some extent 
disembeds the person from his or her wider context. It divorces the citizen as tax-payer 
from the citizen as welfare-recipient, separates a person’s inherent capacity and 
responsibility to contribute from her inherent material and relational need and 
vulnerability. In short, it divides those who contribute from those who need – ultimately, of 
course, the same person – thereby undermining the willingness of the former to help the 
latter.  
In the light of this, and in particular of his concerns not to undermine responsibility and 
the sense of participating in a mutual endeavour, it is not irrelevant or incidental that 
Beveridge’s report argued for, and highlighted in its title, the funding mechanism of, Social 
Insurance. His was a system in which, in theory at least, there was some connection between 
that which people contributed to the system, and that which they were able to draw from it 
in a time of need. 
Since Beveridge’s time, however, the level of ‘contributory benefits’, i.e. non-means tested 
benefits that are received depending on whether the claimant (or sometimes the claimant’s 
partner) has paid or been credited with enough national insurance contributions,29 has 
shrunk considerably. Over the same period, the level of non-contributory, means-tested 
benefits, i.e. those for which receipt is inversely correlated to the level of savings and 
income of the claimant – the more you have saved, the lower the likelihood and level of 
receipt – has risen significantly.30 
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This rebalancing has generated a number of challenges, of which Frank Field has been a 
particularly vocal and vigorous critic. Benefits that are non-contributory and means tested, 
he wrote in his IEA pamphlet Stakeholder Welfare, “are the cancer within the welfare state… 
overwhelming the honesty and dignity of recipients in almost equal proportions.”31 
Specifically, he charges them with crippling initiative, penalising savings and taxing 
honesty.32 The severity of such criticism is what one would expect from someone whose 
underpinning anthropology orients him absolutely to the vision of a welfare state that 
should be based on and encourage, in his own words from the same publication, 
“character… self-improvement… self-interest… [and] good behaviour.”33 Nonetheless, his 
criticisms are worth bearing in mind, even as we are approaching the question of welfare 
from more multi-dimensional anthropological perspective.  
These problems, and this change in welfare funding, combined with the fact that, uniquely 
among Western nations, the UK relies overwhelmingly on the central state raising taxes to 
pay for welfare, having radically reduced local tax-raising powers (while also largely 
retaining centralised tax powers as it devolved legislative and administrative powers to 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Island) means that there is a significant perceived disconnect 
between how the welfare state is funded and how and where welfare benefits are 
distributed.34 The raising of welfare funding is, in essence, an unprecedentedly long way 
from people’s immediate (and local) contexts or the reality of their contributions. 
This may not be an issue for some analysts.35 However, the anthropological approach we 
have adopted suggests that how a welfare state is funded is itself highly relevant, fostering 
or ignoring certain dimensions of personhood. Frank Field has been a particularly vigorous 
critic of the funding direction taken by the post-war welfare state and spent much of the 
1990s putting forward a detailed proposal for a wholly insurance-based system of welfare, 
along the lines of mutual aid societies of nineteenth century but adapted to incorporate the 
“the inclusiveness which was the central object of the post-war reforms”.36 This was, in 
effect, a stakeholder national insurance scheme in which national mutual aid organisations, 
would be owned by contributors rather than by private concerns, eschewing shareholders 
and dividends, ploughing surpluses back into the organisation through lower premiums or 
more generous benefits. It was, in short, a system that sought to reintroduce Beveridge’s 
principles for the 21st century. 
6: Multi-dimensional personhood and the welfare state 
196 
 
This whole system was predicated on Field’s anthropology and his according insistence 
that “welfare should aim to maximise self-improvement… work, savings and honesty must 
be rewarded rather than…punished.”37 In that way, although it paid proper attention to the 
personal agency and responsibility, it failed to attend the fundamentally relational aspect 
of the person.  
In a very different vein is the option, which has gained momentum of late, of a form of 
Universal or Basic Income. Precise details of this vary, but the principle is based on the idea 
that every citizen in the country should get a guaranteed minimum income, sweeping aside 
the complexity of the benefits system, and providing people with ‘enough’ to live on. What 
‘enough’ is, if course, a highly-contentious concept, which, in the light of the work of Plant 
and Anscombe discussed in the introductory chapter, cannot be judged without drawing on 
the nature and ends of the person for whom it is said to be enough. The discussion around 
UBI is, therefore, open to the anthropological considerations discussed in this thesis.38  
However, the very nature of this funding system, while recognising the person’s material 
security and comfort, entirely ignores the anthropological dimensions of relationality and 
responsibility. Citizens’ income essentially treats citizens simply as passive recipients, 
whose contribution to, or behaviour in the light of, welfare provision is severed entirely 
from their receipt of it. In effect, UBI suffers from the same problems as a predominantly 
insurance-based system – elevating certain dimensions of personhood clearly ahead of 
others – albeit reversing which ones.  
A more subtle and more practical approach – and one, I would argue, that pays greater 
attention to the range of dimensions of personhood outlined in this thesis – is captured by 
the Dilnot Commission into Social Care, which was published in 2011.39 This sought to 
establish a partial link between individuals’ contributions to, and receipt of, social care, by 
enforcing contributions but capping them at somewhere between £25,000 and £50,000 in 
total, while also raising the means-tested threshold (above which people are liable for their 
full care costs) from £23,250 to £100,000, but allowing all who entered adulthood with a 
care and support need to be eligible for free state support immediately (i.e. no means test). 
In the dimensions of personhood that this thesis has elicited, such an approach maintains a 
commitment to the material welfare of all citizens (e.g. by insisting on the full eligibility of 
those with serious support needs, while also stepping in to cover the extreme costs that can 
accrue to those who develop serious, long-term needs). However, it also invites the 
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participation of those who can contribute to care costs, reconnecting the dimension of 
personal responsibility and agency, with a commitment to the relational and mutual 
dimension in collective provision. 
Demographic data strongly suggest that the funding of the welfare state is going to remain 
a pressing issue for years to come. But it has always been one, at least from 1951 when 
Aneurin Bevan resigned from the Labour Government at the prospect of prescription 
charges, which were introduced by the new Conservative government the following year. It 
is telling that the Dilnot Commission imitates the very principle of prescription charges, in 
requiring a personal contribution as a way of off-setting costs and connecting individual 
with collective responsibility.40 The idea of that partial connection offers a balanced and 
workable way of attending to the various different dimensions of personhood that I have 
been arguing should underlie the welfare state. 
The structure of welfare: association and mutualisation  
In his analysis of Christian democracy and the welfare state, Kees van Kersbergen argued 
that “Christian democracy and social democracy are well matched in terms of social 
spending.” The difference, he observed, is “more about method than about substance.”41 
This is entirely of a piece with Esping-Anderson’s work on the difference between welfare 
regimes transcending mere spending levels, and leads us to a third dimension of the 
welfare state, in as far as it reminds us that however, and to what extent, the welfare state 
is funded (see previous section), the differing structures by means of which welfare 
services can be delivered is an essential component. (The closely linked question of the 
ethos of that welfare ‘delivery’ is explored in the following section). 
Here, Temple et al speak with close to one voice, in their – albeit unsystematic – advocacy of 
a welfare state that seeks to recognise and encourage the responsible, relational, creative 
and gift-oriented nature of the person by means of fostering, and working with, a rich, 
devolved, ecology of welfare provision delivered through associational activity. Welfare 
ideally should not be something done to or for people, but the process and consequence of 
persons recognising their shared material vulnerability and need, their shared 
responsibility to respond appropriately, and their unique creative and gift-oriented 
abilities in doing so. 
For all that there were differences of opinion concerning how far the state’s responsibility 
for guaranteeing the welfare of its citizens should translate into direct intervention and 
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indeed delivery of service, all four thinkers tend towards a vision of the state that permits, 
enables, encourages, resources, supports, and regulates as wide a range of intermediate 
bodies as possible to deliver welfare services, creating and sustaining the right conditions 
for “first-level communities” to honour the multi-dimensional personhood not only of 
those in need but also of those – ultimately the same people – in a position to help them.  
This is an alternative to the understanding of welfare – “welfarism” in Williams’ 
terminology – in which one group of persons are reduced to being “recipients or clients” of 
another, “frozen in the attitude of supplicants”, rather than ever attaining the status of 
“fellow-agents with those administering aid.” (As we shall note below, this is even more of 
an issue when we come to talk of the ethos of welfare). But, equally importantly, it is not 
the same as straightforwardly voluntarising welfare, or of devolving welfare provision to a 
marketplace that enables citizens (qua consumers) to choose between providers, in the 
belief that it will naturally improve efficiency and drive up standards. The first of these 
(voluntarising welfare) risks disregarding the state’s responsibility for its citizens 
altogether, while the second (marketising welfare) simply turns recipients into consumers, 
replacing one inadequate uni-dimensional concept of the person with another.  
Rather, this approach gestures towards the ‘mutualisation’ of welfare, as it is increasingly 
known, seeking to locate the ‘provision’ of ‘welfare services’ (the words themselves are too 
transactional but used for the sake of familiarity) in associations and organisations that are 
rooted in the context in which they operate and work with relative autonomy from state 
structures. Mutualising welfare removes its provision from the direct control of central 
government (which does maintain regulatory and funding roles), and places it in ‘social 
enterprise’ organisations in which employees exercise an active role in governance and/or 
ownership, and ‘service users’ (again, the term is familiar but somewhat inappropriate) are 
involved in the design and delivery of activities. 
In reality, the precise definition, and the legal structure, of such ‘public service mutuals’ 
(PSM) is far from straightforward.42 Historically, friendly societies, building societies, co-
operatives, housing associations, credit unions, mutual insurers, employee owned mutuals, 
and community mutuals could all haven fallen under a PSM rubric, even if the terminology 
itself is a recent thing. The UK Cabinet Office places its emphasis on the independence of a 
mutual from government, and the roles played by employees, though the nature of these 
can vary. However, its definition differs subtly from the more demanding one of Mutuo, an 
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organisation dedicated to promoting all types of co-operative and mutual (including 
business mutuals), which sees mutuals as “organizations that are owned by, and run for the 
benefit of, their current and future members”.43 Other definitions abound.44 
Such definitional issues aside, public service mutuals are intended to include stakeholders 
in the development of services; to facilitate ‘co-production’, with professionals working 
alongside service users and their communities in the design and delivery of services (rather 
than simply ‘consulting’ with or doing it for them); to place restrictions on ownership 
rights designed to protect the members’ interests; to develop forms of internal 
accountability (to members) that offers a ‘first-line’ form of scrutiny and alleviate state’s 
role of inspection; and to offer the benefits of voluntarism (local knowledge, personal 
commitment, moral energy, etc.) while protecting against variability of service delivery 
quality and funding unpredictability that can often come with such voluntarism. Moreover, 
at least according to Julian Le Grand, in his chapter on PSMs in the ResPublica report on 
Making it Mutual, mutualisation also offers greater professional freedom, allowing people to 
use their knowledge and expertise to better effect, to innovate more freely, to take 
decisions (and responsibility for them), and to minimise the constraints placed upon them 
by “orders and directives from others more distant and less knowledgeable than 
themselves.”45   
The studies analysed in the Mutuals Taskforce’s report Our Mutual Friends did show that 
mutuals had lower levels of absenteeism and staff turnover (than comparable non-
employee-owned organisations), lower production costs and (generally) higher 
productivity, while delivering greater customer satisfaction, paying on average higher 
wages, and showing themselves to be innovative, profitable and resilient to changes in the 
economic climate.46 Such research is supported elsewhere although, as Myers and 
Maddocks note, much of this research into benefits of employee-owned mutuals 
concentrates on private sector commercial activity rather than delivery of public services.47  
However accurate and relevant these studies are for the mutualisation of public services, 
the principle of mutualisation is clearly workable, seemingly sustainable, and offers a fuller 
working out of the theological anthropological principles of Temple et al than is offered in 
their own, somewhat hesitant and piecemeal articulations on the subject. It finds favour in 
John Milbank and Adrian Pabst’s The Politics of Virtue, which argues that the healthcare 
system should be run as a mutual trust accountable to its members with “a much greater 
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role for health care cooperatives that are co-owned by patients or citizens”, rather than 
those that are simply partners of professionals, like GP surgeries.48 It is a centrepiece of the 
work of ResPublica, set up by another of Milbank’s pupils, Philip Blond, and drawing on 
similar ‘post-liberal’ ideas, as exemplified by their publication Making it Mutual.49  
Similar ideas are to be found in Stefano Zamagni’s articulation of a ‘civil-welfare’ model, 
which places civil society organizations as “active partners” in the process of developing 
interventions and adopting of “strategic choices”. In practice, Zamagni argues, this means 
going beyond recognizing the “juridical subjectivity” of such organizations to include 
“economic subjectivity”, providing them with financial independence so that each has “the 
capacity to realize its own program and to achieve its own objectives without depending, in 
a constraining way, on either the government or for-profit firms.”50 This vision is also 
consonant with, if less radical than, Paul Hirst’s decentralised and pluralistic vision of an 
“associational” and “confederal” Welfare State, in Associative Democracy, which seeks to 
provide – in his phrase – “thick welfare [and] thin collectivism” by devolving the provision 
of public welfare to voluntary self-governing associations while simultaneously enabling 
such associations to obtain public funds to provide such services for their members.”51 
A move towards the mutualisation of welfare services is no panacea for whatever ails the 
welfare state, any more than re-introducing a more significant contributory element would 
be. Indeed, just as the welfare state seems unlikely, in the present political climate, to be 
converted to a predominantly contributory system, so public services mutuals are unlikely 
to dominate the structure of welfare provision. The pressures towards centralisation and 
direct political accountability, which Temple registered in the 1930s, remain too great. 
However, to revert to the driving argument of this thesis, the nature of the welfare state 
transcends questions of mere size and funding, and incorporates key ideas of structure and 
design which themselves reflect, embody, and advance anthropological preconceptions. 
The mutualisation of welfare provision recognises and advances (elements of) the multi-
dimensional personhood that is core to Christian theological anthropology, and has a 
strong call be a core element of any settlement that honours that personhood.  
The ethos of welfare: creativity and gift 
Closely linked to the question of the delivery of welfare, is the ethos of welfare, the way in 
which welfare is delivered, as much as by whom. Indeed, one of the reasons for favouring a 
more mutualised approach to welfare provision is the belief that it catalyses an ethos of 
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creative, shared responsibility. “Professional and self-regulated bodies”, like associations, 
guilds, and unions, according to Williams, can help generate an “ethos of ‘service’”.52 
Whether or not there is a fixed (or even causal) link between the delivery structure and the 
ethos of welfare, there is a powerful summons in Temple et al towards an ethos of mutual, 
creative, relational, gift-oriented welfare, irrespective of the form and structure of its 
delivery. The unemployed have no money to give, Temple reasoned in the light of Men 
without Work, “but they have themselves to give.” “It is not possible to fulfil our duty towards 
[man],” John Paul wrote in Memory and Identity, “except by loving him.”53 
Such language – of relationality and creativity, let alone love and gift – has been largely 
alien to political discussions of welfare, sounding too soft, idealistic, and naïve to be of any 
practical consequence. It need not be, however. Indeed, there are increasing examples of 
how approaches to welfare that take the relational, creative, gift-oriented – and even 
transcendent – dimensions of the human seriously are not only possible, but demonstrably 
advantageous. We can take each of these dimensions in turn, illustrating their effectiveness 
through contemporary examples.  
Relationality – or rather the lack of it – is built into so much welfare provision, albeit in 
various different ways. For example, a remarkably high proportion of social workers’ time 
is spent on administration (e.g. recording, tracking, monitoring, referring, assessing, and 
meeting with other agencies) rather than in actual contact with ‘clients’ themselves.54 The 
professionalization of welfare provision connects ‘clients’ with social workers (in as far as it 
actually does) but often inadvertently bypasses more informal sources of advice, 
opportunity and help, such as may be available in the lived contexts of ‘clients’, such as 
among local community groups and businesses. Healthcare treatment is “designed around 
the lone individual”, as opposed to seeing her as a person embedded in precisely the kind of 
relationships that can help her psychologically, emotionally and physically heal. In the 
words of Hilary Cottam, whose reflections on a decade of experiments in welfare are 
gathered together in her book Radical Help, “relationships are never designed into any of 
our solutions.”55 
They can be, however, as various social enterprises (including some of Cottam’s) have 
shown. Cottam’s programme of ‘intervention’ in troubled family lives, entitled ‘Life’, 
attempted to invert the proportion of time social workers spent with families, with 80% of 
her team’s time in their company, and 20% on bureaucracy. Her health programme, 
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‘Wellogram’, sought not to medicate patients, but to help them live with their conditions 
alongside others, on the basis that, unlike in Beveridge’s day, a substantial proportion of 
the population live with long-term conditions such as obesity, depression, stress, diabetes, 
high blood pressure, and the like, for which there are no obvious medical cure, but the 
experience of which is alleviated and often improved by close relationships.56 ‘Backr’, the 
experiment aimed at getting people into work, was predicated on the recognition that a 
significant number of jobs – perhaps even a majority – are found through personal 
connections and word of mouth, rather than formal JobCentre mechanisms, and that 
therefore building connections and relationships is the critical element in gaining the 
unemployed work placements, experience and finally positions.57 
This emphasis on relationality was to some degree enabled by the attention paid to the 
second anthropological dimension highlighted above, namely creativity. Cottam herself 
repeatedly uses the word ‘experiment’ to describe her welfare programmes, which self-
consciously eschewed existing and familiar plans in favour of novel and adaptable 
approaches. ‘Life’ was determined not to ‘fix’ dysfunctional families – “this just wasn’t 
people coming in and doing things to us” as one ‘client’ put it – but to listen to their vision, 
draw on their capacity, and to “help me to help myself make things better and live my 
life”.58 ‘Backr’ started by focusing simply on friendship and activities, organising exercise 
groups in the park as a way of intentionally generating a mixed social gathering, initiating 
new relationships, developing habits of communication and widening the relational net in 
which people operated.59 Similar approaches are adopted by Lifeline Community Resources, 
a local collaborative project that, in its own words, seeks to “grows creative solutions to 
local issues – solutions provided ‘By the community, for the community’”.60 By integrating 
service users into the design and implementation of the programme, it drew on their 
particular and local knowledge, and afforded them a sense of genuine agency, which meant 
that programmes were necessarily flexible and different. 
This reliance on creativity and willingness to embrace experiment was (and is), it should be 
emphasised, a risky affair, and at least one of Cottam’s experiments in relational welfare 
failed. The ‘Loops’ programme, an intervention in adolescent care, so called because it was 
based on “cycles of experimentation” in which “we expected young people to go round and 
round again, broadening and deepening their experiences and relationships” ultimately 
failed.61 The experiment was targeted not on specific problems like school exclusion, 
teenage pregnancy, or drug use, but on building connections between troubled young 
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people and young workers, to show possibilities of the latter to the former.62 Consciously 
based on relations between approximate peers “rather than through the control of 
traditional management hierarchies” it failed because, although successful with the young 
people themselves, “potential funders freaked when they saw young people mixing with 
adults (even though the latter had been DBS checked) and pulled plug.”63 The flip side of 
creativity is risk and the willingness to risk failure. 
The creative and experimental element within these welfare programmes leads to, indeed 
emphasises, the third anthropological elements mentioned above, namely orientation to 
gift. Cottam’s experiments drew on the creative agency of all involved, predicated on the 
strong conviction that everyone had something to contribute to the process. Time and 
again, the experiments worked on the principle of helping people exercise their agency for 
themselves and others. ‘Life’ eschewed all attempts at “managing problems” and instead 
sought to “support families to grow their own capabilities.”64 The result was a self-fulfilling 
process: “the more control the families took, the more they changed and the more they 
dared to raise the bar.”65 Wellogram avoided treating people merely as patients, and 
encouraged them to think of themselves as agents of their own and other people’s physical 
and mental health. ‘Circle’, a programme designed to help people age well, intentionally 
“blend[ed] the traditional boundaries of who is helped and who is helping, of what is social 
and what is practical.66 
This recognition that all must contribute and the consequent blurring of giver and 
recipient has, it should be noted, been elaborated on elsewhere. It has, for example, been 
noted several times, not least by Jean Vanier himself, that volunteers often joined L’Arche 
communities on the understanding that they were giving to others only to find that they 
actually had something very different and important to learn, namely that “the 
marginalised and despised – ‘the poor’ – have something to give.” As Hans Reinders 
remarks in his essay, ‘Being with the disabled: Jean Vanier’s Theological Realism’, “the 
virtuous motives that make people want to be good to others often betray a hidden sense of 
superiority; they assume for themselves the role of ‘giver’ and assign to the other person 
the roles of ‘receiver’.” Without this recognition, “true community is impossible.”67 
The final dimension of the person relevant to the ethos of welfare – transcendence – is 
even more alien to familiar welfare discourse than the previous three. In one attenuated 
sense, it is implicit in the idea of recognising and integrating the agency of welfare ‘clients’ 
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in such programmes. Going beyond problem solving, this relational, creative, and 
participatory approach to welfare is akin to a ‘capabilities approach’ in which the agency, 
potential and vision of the client to transcend immediate circumstance was essential. This, 
however, remains some way from the transcendent dimension of personhood implicit (or 
explicit in John Paul II’s case) in the four thinkers in this thesis, in the sense of being open 
to a more directly transformative encounter with the Holy Spirit.  
And yet, this should not be as entirely alien to formulations of a welfare state as it is, 
particularly if those formulations are attentive to the multi-dimensional personhood here 
discussed. Professor George Vaillant’s analysis of the uniquely long-running longitudinal 
Grant study (of the adult development of Harvard students from the class of 1939-44) in 
parallel with the Glueck study (of a matching cohort drawn from Boston inner-city 
‘underclass’) is instructive in this regard. It reported, among many other things, that when 
viewed beyond a five-year window, almost all health interventions and short-term talking 
remedies (such as cognitive behaviour therapy) have only short-term limited effects, or 
indeed none at all. In contrast, Vaillant observed, the two factors that do make a long-term 
difference are interventions on improving relationships and those that reach into the more 
spiritual side of our lives, Vaillant citing the success of Alcoholics Anonymous 12-step 
process as an example of the latter.68 
In reality, there is overwhelming evidence for the positive role of religious belief, practice 
and association in securing positive mental and physical health, and subjective well-being 
across the world,69 which further underlines the possibility of integrating the transcendent 
dimension of human personhood into our consideration of the ethos of welfare. That this 
can be done badly does not need saying; that it can be, and is, done well, does. The Christian 
debt advice centre CAP (Christians Against Poverty) is open, from the outset, about the 
spiritual support it offers its clients, praying with and for them, even as it restructures 
their debts and invites them into a wider community. This does not make it evangelistic 
(let alone proselytising): CAP is explicitly cautious in their spiritual engagement with 
vulnerable ‘clients’ and in fact only 4 per cent of people they deal with become Christian.70 
But it remains an essential component in what is an extremely successful welfare provider, 
albeit one with no connections to the state.71 
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Conclusion: from welfare state to personal state 
Sir Andrew Dilnot, whose Commission on Social Care is referenced above (and who 
commented on an earlier draft of this chapter) does not like the term ‘welfare state’. He 
believes that the phrase narrowly implies “redistributive action that is helping identifiable 
needy groups”, and in the process therefore giving an unhelpful signal of what ‘welfare’ 
should be. In its stead, he prefers the phrase “collective provision”, although he 
acknowledges that this lacks the “historical resonance” and pithy memorability of the 
original phrase.72  
Such linguistic tergiversations are easily dismissed as an alternative to genuine action, 
rather than a spur to it. Moreover, and particularly in today’s political climate, they are 
liable to provoke fears of a surreptitious dismantling of the post-war state. Nevertheless, 
much as John Paul II’s equivocations over ‘capitalism’ helped frame and clarify his 
understanding of what a free market economy should actually be for – persons, not capital 
– so venturing other terms for the welfare state – whether “collective provision”, Big 
Society, or Enabling State, etc. – can help do the same. 
The phrase “personal state” is, no doubt, no catchier than Dilnot’s “collective provision”. 
Moreover, it is apt to be interpreted as a state that it tailored to personal needs – 
consumerist kind of a state – rather than one that is grounded in the ideas of personhood 
that I have been discussing in this thesis.  
Nevertheless, that recognised, the point of deploying it here is to make a provocation, 
rather than formally to rebaptise an institution. Just as William Temple reasoned, in 
Christianity and the State, that the “Power-State” derived its legitimacy from its exercise of 
(military) power, and the “Welfare-State” derived its from its concern for the welfare of its 
citizens, so a ‘Personal State’ would draw its legitimacy from its attention to human 
personhood in all its dimensions. 
I have argued in this thesis, by drawing on the work of Esping-Anderson, Plant and Deacon 
that this anthropological approach is a wholly legitimate (indeed necessary) basis for 
thinking about welfare. And I have demonstrated, by drawing on the ideas of Temple, 
Maritain, John Paul II, and Williams, what this might look like. A multi-dimensional 
Christian theological anthropology (at least one drawn from these four thinkers) 
conceptualises the human as created, material, agential, sinful, relational, transcendent, 
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creative, and oriented to, and fulfilled by gift, and seeks to fashion a state that recognises 
and fosters these ‘personal’ dimensions.  
In particular, vis-à-vis the provision of welfare, I have argued that the personal state would 
place work at the heart of its welfare programme; creating economic conditions for 
maximal employment; reducing disincentives, and offering opportunities and programmes 
for return to the labour market; and regulating the security, conditions, temporal demands, 
and remuneration of employment so as to protect the material, agential and relational 
dimensions of the person. 
A personal state should seek to establish a partial link between individuals’ contributions to, 
and receipt of, social care, thereby (re)connecting the dimension of personal responsibility 
and agency, with a commitment to the relational and mutual dimension in collective 
provision. It should place a premium on association and mutualisation when it comes to the 
delivery of welfare encouraging, resourcing and regulating a range of intermediate bodies, 
particularly ‘mutuals’, as vehicles for welfare services. It should attend to the reality of 
human sin not by presupposing a certain level of selfishness in human motivation or 
behaviour, but by recognising the need for all bodies and agents operating in the provision 
of welfare – whether through state, market, or civil society – to come under appropriate 
scrutiny and regulation. And it should seek to introduce space for human relationality, 
creativity, orientation to and for gift, and even transcendence in the design, delivery and 
ethos of welfare services, being willing to draw and experiment with local, embedded, 
community knowledge and networks in the process. 
Such a “personal” approach to welfare may not amount to a new or distinctive welfare 
‘regime’, and many of these ideas will resonate with existing and proposed welfare 
solutions from a wide range of ideological schools. But that is not a problem. Indeed, such 
resonances with other approaches to welfare should make the ideas inherent in a ‘personal’ 
state more rather than less likely to be acceptable to those tasked with the never-ended job 
of reforming the welfare state.
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